This article takes a critical look at three conceptions of Islamic education. I argue that conceptions of Islamic education ought to be considered as existing on a minimalist–maximalist continuum, meaning that the concepts associated with Islamic education do not have a single meaning, but that meanings are shaped depending on the minimalist and maximalist conditions which constitute them, that is, tarbiyyah (nurturing), ta`lim (learning) and ta`dib (goodness). I then explore some liberal conceptions of cosmopolitanism, showing how these notions connect with (...) meanings of Islamic education. Finally, I show how maximalist views of Islamic education connect with cosmopolitanism, while minimalist views of Islamic education seem to undermine the pursuit of cosmopolitanism. (shrink)

Should ethics be taught in the high schools? Should high school faculty teach it themselves or invite college and university professors (or instructors) into the classroom to share their expertise? In this paper, I argue that the challenge to teach ethics in the high schools has a distinctly Deweyan dimension to it, since (i) Dewey proposed that it be attempted and (ii) he provided many valuable resources with which to proceed. The paper is organized into four sections. In the first, (...) I summarize Jim Garrison’s account of Dewey’s philosophy as education and argue that it offers an exceptional tool-kit to someone interested in advocating for high school ethics pedagogy. The second section presents Dewey’s model for ethics instruction in a high school setting, as articulated in his only essay devoted specifically to the subject: “Teaching Ethics in the High School.” The third examines Peter Singer’s brief essay, “Moral Experts,” to see whether moral expertise is a sine qua non for teaching ethics in the high schools. In the fourth and concluding section, I propose that meeting the Deweyan challenge of teaching ethics in the high schools requires, first, preparing oneself to overcome the objection that such a project is naïve, utopian or just plain foolish and, second, organizing enthusiastic participants to develop and test a prototype, experimenting with various implementation strategies on a small scale before attempting a bolder and larger scale version of the project. Apropos of this second requirement, I showcase the Center for Education in Law and Democracy’s “The High School Ethics Project” in the state of Colorado. (shrink)

Panagiotis Kanellopoulos explores children's talk about musical thinking through the study of their reflections on their own improvised music. He accepts the possibility that children's discourse on music is the beginning of their philosophizing about music, an idea that is related to the larger issue of how to develop a music education perspective that gives voice to the learners and welcomes experimentation, constantly questioning the assumptions we bring as music educators. Based on particular examples of discussions with eight-year old children (...) he explores the development of their discourse, interpreting the meaning of their thinking, and illustrating how they put forward issues that although they begin from concrete particulars point to issues usually confined to abstract philosophical concerns. Children's reflective potential as well as their particular views has important educational implications. Discussions with the children about their work highlight interpretation and meaning-formation at the center of their experience as artists. And musical improvisation emerges as a source of genuine musical experiences and a core means for the creation of communities of practice, dialogue, and reflection. (shrink)

This article proposes that the `renewal' of Dewey might contributeto filling the gap between the pedagogical commitment tocontingency and plurality and the fact that the pedagogicaltradition, until now, has neutralized contingency and deniedits systematic meaning for education. Therefore, the maintraits of the `renewal of Dewey' are shown in thework of some Dewey scholars who, critically and creatively,reconstruct Dewey in the mirror of poststructural, communicational and constructive theory developments.Following Dewey, these researches balance the objectiveevaluation of Dewey's work by a deliberate and (...) overtpursuit of their own intentions and (pre-)selections by the scholars.Intersubjectivity and communication are key concepts in thisrenewal of pragmatism rejecting the subject-centered philosophy of consciousness, the traditional westernepistemology and metaphysics. The turn to the philosophicalpriority of the unforeseeable also leads to anunderstanding of action as an essentialfocus. In this context Dewey's pragmatistic view of radical democracy is received as a non-foundationaltheory and the concept of consensus is criticized.The scholars clarify that the boundaries of the subjectare broadened by communicative destabilization.At the end of the article it is asked what the renewal-dimensions mean for education locatedin the public sphere. (shrink)

This article proposes that the `renewal' of Dewey might contributeto filling the gap between the pedagogical commitment tocontingency and plurality and the fact that the pedagogicaltradition, until now, has neutralized contingency and deniedits systematic meaning for education. Therefore, the maintraits of the `renewal of Dewey' are shown in thework of some Dewey scholars who, critically and creatively,reconstruct Dewey in the mirror of poststructural, communicational and constructive theory developments.Following Dewey, these researches balance the objectiveevaluation of Dewey's work by a deliberate and (...) overtpursuit of their own intentions and (pre-)selections by the scholars.Intersubjectivity and communication are key concepts in thisrenewal of pragmatism rejecting the subject-centered philosophy of consciousness, the traditional westernepistemology and metaphysics. The turn to the philosophicalpriority of the unforeseeable also leads to anunderstanding of action as an essentialfocus. In this context Dewey's pragmatistic view of radical democracy is received as a non-foundationaltheory and the concept of consensus is criticized.The scholars clarify that the boundaries of the subjectare broadened by communicative destabilization.At the end of the article it is asked what the renewal-dimensions mean for education locatedin the public sphere. (shrink)

In placing education at the centre, as The Main Enterprise of the World, Philip Kitcher has undertaken a monumental task. He has come to the field of philosophy of education captivated by the importance of its substantive preoccupations for the advancement of democratic aims. Accordingly, his book argues that the most salient obstruction to preparing citizens who will contribute to society is the seeming irreconcilability of the demands of industry, on the one hand, and of students’ personal growth, on the (...) other. In spite of his desire to accommodate diverse accounts of the human good, and his recognition of the formative role of culture, broadly conceived, there are strains in his account of human fulfilment deriving from the disjunction of the self and others. It is not evident, on his Deweyan onto-epistemology, that there is adequate attention to the imprint on an individual, and on the beliefs they come to form, of proximal social groups. The nature of the balance between ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’ influences, between those that are near and those that are far, can profoundly affect the plausibility of Kitcher's account of a socially based sense of fulfilment. (shrink)

In this inquiry, I ask what is distinctive about listening as a teacher. I develop the meaning of educative listening as a mode of listening to interruptions in a way that promotes students’ thinking and learning. Interruptions in a teacher’s listening are defined as any unexpected response from a student to the material presented — for example, a challenging viewpoint, a difficult question, or a confusing reply — that opens up possibilities for cultivating learning. To begin, I draw upon Dewey (...) to examine the connections between listening and learning in teacher-student interaction. In the second section, I explicate the implications of Dewey’s theory of learning for a theory of listening in reflective teaching. Here, I contend that reflective teaching entails educative listening. In the final section, I inquire into how teacher education can productively address the connections between learning to listen and learning to teach reflectively. (shrink)

In the current climate of high-stakes testing and performance-based accountability measures, there is a pressing need to reconsider the nature of teaching and what capacities one must develop to be a good teacher. Educational policy experts around the world have pointed out that policies focused disproportionately on student test outcomes can promote teaching practices that are reified and mechanical, and which lead to students developing mere memorisation skills, rather than critical thinking and conceptual understanding. Philosophers of dialogue and dialogic teaching (...) offer a different view of teaching, one that counters mechanical, transmissive or ‘monologic’ teaching. In this paper, I seek to extend the notion of dialogic teaching as a method of supporting social and moral learning processes. Specifically, my focus is on answering the question: What capacities must a teacher have to engage students dialogically? Drawing on Paulo Freire and other contemporary philosophers, I examine dialogic interaction as involving a way of ‘being with learners’ and put forth three teacher capacities necessary for dialogic teaching: self-critique, narrativity and building community. I then examine further what is concretely entailed in the practice of dialogic teaching using research in educational psychology. I aim to highlight how dialogic teaching, unlike monologic teaching, involves the teacher's active ability to support learners’ identification and exploration of their own blind spots—that is, the limits of knowledge and ability—and those of others. Following this, I consider implications of my discussion for international policy on teacher assessment. I close the paper with considerations for future research on teacher capacity and teacher evaluation. This paper contributes to our understanding of teacher capacity and the nature and aims of good teaching. (shrink)

Adversariality in argumentation is typically theorized as inhering in, and applying to, the interactional roles of proponent and opponent that arguers occupy. This paper considers the kinds of adversariality located in the conversational roles arguers perform while arguing—specifically listening. It begins by contending that the maximally adversarial arguer is an arguer who refuses to listen to reason by refusing to listen to another’s reasons. It proceeds to consider a list of lousy listeners in order to illustrate the variety of ways (...) that the conversational role of listener can be performed adversarially. Because conversational roles, while not adversarial by nature, can be enacted adversarially, arguers are properly subject to praise and blame for their performances of these roles. Thus, the paper concludes, argumentation theory stands in need of an articulated normative vocabulary and theory to codify, apply, explain, and justify the norms of listening governing, guiding, and appraising arguers’ performances of listening in argumentation. (shrink)

In this article I argue that Dewey, throughout his work, conducted a systematic dismantling of the concept of rationality as mastery and control. Such a dismantling entails, at the same time, the dismantling of the auto-grounded subject, namely, the subject that grounds itself in the power to master experience. The Deweyan challenge to Western ontology goes straight to the core of the subject’s question. Dewey not only systematically challenged the understanding of thinking as a process consciously managed by the subject (...) but also conceived of thinking as an event rather than a process—something that occurs in us rather than something intentionally staged by a reflective subject. Such a twofold dismantling of rationality and subject rather than a flow in a nihilistic/relativistic account of education results in a reinforcement of education that must be understood not so much as the attempt to understand and predict experience but as the means to create new, unpredictable experience. As a result, education, for Dewey, is grounded on, moved by, and directed at uncertainty. Education, in a sense, engenders uncertainty. (shrink)

In this paper, I analyse the Deweyan account of thinking and subject and discuss the educational consequences that follow from such an account. I argue that despite the grouping of thinking and reflective thought that has largely appeared in the interpretation of Deweyan work, Dewey discloses an inescapable uncertainty at the core of human thinking. This move is even more challenging given Dewey's firm faith in the power of intelligent action, and in education as the means by which human beings (...) grow and create meaningful existence. I argue that throughout his work, Dewey dismantled the understanding of the subject as a detached and self-assured centre of agency. In Deweyan understanding, on one hand, the subject is empowered to reflect on experience and to use this reflection to evolve new ways of acting, thus pushing experience forward. On the other hand, by acting, the subject can create new points of interaction within experience. This understanding of thinking and subject has far-reaching consequences for education, which must be conceived not so much as the attempt to master and control experience but as the means to create new, unpredictable experience by putting new points of interactions into our relationship with the environment, changing our being-embedded-in-the-world. Dewey repositions educational, intentional agency away from control and mastery and in the direction of growth and openness. (shrink)

At least since the Lisbon Memorandum on Lifelong Learning, European education has been increasingly framed in terms of a neoliberal rallying cry. Such a gesture has widely affected education and schooling in Europe and has pushed educational institutions and processes towards a significant transformation. Such a transformation – and this is my point – is anything but benign: it implies a lack of invaluable educational features such as critical agency, democratic sharing, and meaning creation. In this paper, I wish to (...) address this issue in the light of Dewey’s thought and philosophy of education, mainly in reference to his masterpiece Democracy and Education. In particular, drawing from the Deweyan conception of democracy and meaning creation, I wish to argue that a different conception of education, where education is not rationed, individualised or commodified, is required. I also argue that the EU framework on education is inconsistent, as it is not able to fulfil its own goals. By enacting the EU educational framework, we indeed lose sight of the variety, complexity and unpredictability of education and society. (shrink)

In his article Potentialism and the experience of the new, Jasinski argues for the use of a potentialist approach in education by relating it to a line of thought that starts with Dewey and is fulfilled by Agamben and Lewis. Although the reading that Jasinski offers on potentialism is interesting, his understanding of Dewey is problematic. In this paper, I argue that much of what Jasinski claims as worthy of pursuit in education is already contained in the Deweyan questions of (...) newness, openness, and radical possibility. Even the Agambenian notion of ‘coming community’ falls under a Deweyan understanding of society and democracy, which, in Deweyan thought, always exist in suspension and connectedness. Given such premises, the idea of education that emerges from Deweyan thought is that of a leap. The question regarding what education is and entails is left radically open by Dewey, for education belongs to the not-yet. (shrink)

This paper explores the value of the eros motif for critical pedagogy and citizenship education. The conceptual affinities between eros and democracy are identified and integrated into a theory of democratic political education. Long recognized as vital to the process of self knowledge, the ancient Greek concept of eros has nevertheless been largely erased from contemporary educational debate. By retrieving eros from the fringe of academic discourse and integrating it with critical pedagogy, the aims of radical democracy can be more (...) fully achieved. The essay emphasizes the civil society or cultural dimensions of democracy as against its legal or procedural aspects. Renewed emphasis on the associational qualities of democracy underscore the importance of eros as an educational principle. The ancient pedagogical motif of educating the desires is posited as an alternative to the liberal/modernist paradigm of education which de-values affective domains of knowledge. (shrink)

(2010). Betwixt and Between: Working Through the Aesthetic in Philosophy of Education: George F. Kneller Lecture, Conference of the American Educational Studies Association Savannah, Georgia, October 30, 2008. Educational Studies: Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 291-316.

James Baldwin wrote: "People who shut their eyes to reality simply invite their own destruction, and anyone who insists on remaining in a state of innocence long after that innocence is dead turns himself into a monster." When people impute meanings to events--such as the 2020 killing of George Floyd, the shooting of Jacob Blake, and subsequent upheavals--they do so with ideas that already make sense to them. And what makes most sense to people is typically due to others with (...) whom they share identities and experiences, and from whom they’ve inherited their basic intellectual scaffolding. But making sense of an event isn’t enough. We’re driven to mobilize action by convincing ourselves that our cause is morally or politically in the right. So people build on their stable-yet-evolving intellectual scaffolding and explanatory schemes to rationalize, justify, and sanctify their conduct. The easiest part of becoming what Baldwin called a moral monster is to build up these self-justifying rationalizations. The more complicated part is to construct a justifying consciousness that insures we’ll arrive safely at foregone conclusions with little risk of confronting others’ experiences in a way that might unsettle our equilibrium or sap our vehemence. In this way, people avoid facing realities that might upend their pretenses, so they are now ideally positioned to be, in Dewey’s words, “profoundly moral even in their immoralities.". (shrink)