Moral perceptualism is the theory that perception and perceptual experience is attuned to moral features in our environment. This idea has received renewed attention in the last 15–20 years, for its potential to do theoretical work in moral epistemology and moral psychology. In this paper, I review the main motivations and arguments for moral perceptualism, the variety of theories that go under the heading of “moral perception,” and the three biggest challenges to moral perception. https://youtu.be/9cc_1zykq80.

The aim of this study was to determine the relationship between a clinical environment and the development of empathy, teamwork, and lifelong learning in medical students who are doing their first clinical rotation. The Jefferson Scales of Empathy, Jefferson Scale of Attitudes toward Physician-Nurse Collaboration, and Jefferson Scale of Physician Lifelong Learning were administered to 60 sixth-year medical students, before and after their first clinical rotation in five health care institutions. The Dundee Ready Education Environment Measure questionnaire was administered to (...) measure their perception of the educational environment after the rotation was finished. Scores were compared to determine differences before and after the rotation. Other variables associated with gender, age, and moral perception, were included into the comparisons. A correlation analysis was also performed. The analyses confirmed a positive association among the measured elements of medical professionalism. Lifelong learning decreased after the rotation. Associations were found between the educational environment and the development of lifelong learning ; and between the development of attitudes toward teamwork and the educational environment. During the rotational internship, the development of some components of professionalism in medical students is influenced by the clinical environment. Gender, age, and moral perception influence the development of some elements of medical professionalism and the perception of the educational environment. (shrink)

Plotinus treats certain pre‑philosophical concepts as reliable or promising starting‑points for philosophical study. This article studies the way in which he, in the act of philosophizing, conceives of the passage from an unclear understanding, a kind of pre‑concept, to a better, philosophical conception. What are the sources of this passage? What is the role of data given by sense‑perception? In what way are innate conceptual and cognitive capacities involved? It will be argued that the methodology suggested is a Platonic version (...) of the Stoic appeal to common notions (koinai ennoia). Moreover, Plotinus seems to maintain several features of the empirical original. The concepts discussed are not primarily introspected or intuited, but seem to result from both experience and from innate tendencies. The bottom‑up approach of scrutinizing the combination of inquiries in the Enneads (and in a commentary of Proclus) and the methodological remarks made within these same inquiries, exposes, further, an interesting list of concepts significant for the Neoplatonic theory‑building : freedom, oneness, time and eternity, as well as good and evil. (shrink)

This dissertation is a contribution to the field of empirically informed metaethics, which combines the rigorous conceptual clarity of traditional metaethics with a careful review of empirical evidence. More specifically, this work stands at the intersection of moral psychology, moral epistemology, and philosophy of action. The study comprises six chapters on three distinct (although related) topics. Each chapter is structured as an independent paper and addresses a specific open question in the literature. The first part concerns the psychological features and (...) cognitive function of moral intuition. Chapter 1 (“Moral intuition, strength, and metacognition”) is focused on the concept of intuitive strength, which is one of the defining features of moral intuition. I provide a metacognitive account of intuitive strength and show why such a view is preferable to emotional or quasi-perceptual accounts. Then, in Chapter 2 (“Dual process reflective equilibrium”), I will discuss the interplay between intuition and reflection in moral reasoning. I will contend that the influential “default-interventionist” model of reasoning, theorized by Greene, is insufficiently supported by the evidence. In light of some recent studies, I outline an account of moral reasoning in which intuition and reflection are not in conflict but cooperate to reach a reflective goal. I call this model dual process reflective equilibrium. The aim of the first part is descriptive, i.e., it argues for an accurate understanding of moral intuition and reasoning in light of the available empirical evidence. In contrast, the second part addresses a normative question: is a subject epistemically justified in forming a belief on the basis of a moral intuition? Skeptics of moral intuition argue that accepting moral intuitions should be the exception rather than the rule to the extent that epistemically defective processes determine the content of moral intuitions. Chapter 3 (“Moral intuitionism and the reliability challenge”) introduces the recent empirical challenges to the reliability of moral intuitions and elaborates a promising strategy for defending intuitionism. In short, I consider whether subjects can track the reliability of their intuitions with their confidence. In Chapter 4 (“The argument from limited cognitive resources”), I evaluate a different strategy to defend moral intuitionism. Specifically, I develop an argument according to which accepting moral intuitions is legitimate because it is the most rational option that a subject has, given her limited resources. The third and final part of the dissertation concerns the role of moral intuitions in action. The influence of automatic processes on moral conduct raises different challenges to moral philosophy. The first challenge is to explain how a subject can be motivated by certain values without the mental effort of deliberation. Chapter 5 (“Caring, moral motivation, and automatic conduct”) tackles this issue. Chapter 6 (“Moral sensitivity as skillful automaticity”) aims to explain how moral agents can be sensitive to good reasons through automatic mental processes. (shrink)

It is increasingly recognized that human values play an essential role in engineering design. Recent literature in the ethics of technology has focused on spelling out the role of values in different fields of engineering. Value Sensitive Design, as a well-established approach, aims to systematically integrate human values into technologies and engineering products. Although there is significant attention to stakeholders in VSD, how contexts may affect what stakeholders perceive as values deserves more attention. It seems that there is an implicit (...) tendency to universality in the studies of VSD and it is often assumed implicitly that values have the same meaning in different contexts and in different cultures. Therefore, while the concept of cultural relativism and its difference to universalism has been taken into account, we propose paying explicit attention to the contextual sense of values, namely the interpretation, prioritization and perception of values that have their basis in the specific contexts in which they are implemented, for instance, in a specific cultural or religious setting. Building on the proposed categorization of contextual sense of values in which their evolution has shown, we aim to shed light on what these contextual senses entail and how an explicit focus on contextuality could improve VSD. It will be argued that contextually looking at VSD may make it more flexible in dealing with the different contexts/cultures. (shrink)