This paper intends to critically consider the idea put forward by Johan Gamper that the principle of causal closure can be reconciled with the possibility of pluralism. This idea is based on redefining causal closure and on the introduction of so-called interfaces between the universes. By reconstructing and analyzing the author's argumentative steps, we will try to show that this approach is methodologically and explanatory unfounded. Firstly, this way of redefining the principle of causal closure is inconsistent with the very (...) reasons why this principle was introduced. Secondly, the proposed view does not bring the explanatory benefits it promises, that is, it cannot solve difficulties such as the problem of the first cause. Moreover, the position itself produces many additional concerns and perplexities that remain unresolved. The conclusion of our analysis is that certain aspects of the proposed position may be sustainable and plausible, but only if novel arguments should be offered. (shrink)

As physical things have mathematical properties we in this paper let mental things have biological properties. The work is based on recent metaphysical findings that shows that there could be interfaces between separate ontological domains. According to this view there could be mathematical objects, physical objects, and also mental objects. The aim of this study is to establish a view of the biological object that allows it to possibly generate the experiencing subject. Based on the notion that energy per se (...) is related to the ability of a system to do some work, biological energy is defined as a biological object’s ability to recover from the load it is exposed to. Introducing the concept of the experiencing subject, the experiencing subject would be the agent experiencing the biological object’s need of recovery from the load it is exposed to. Once established, the experiencing subject may develop non-biological needs. On this basis experiencing subjects have biological properties without being biological in exactly the same manner as physical things have mathematical properties without being mathematical. (shrink)

In this paper we begin categorizing a plurality of possible worlds on the basis of permitting or not permitting ontologically different things to be causally connected. We build the work on the dual principle that all universes are causally closed either because no universe causes anything outside itself or because no universe has anything in it that is caused by another universe.

The modal properties of the principle of the causal closure of the physical have traditionally been said to prevent anything outside the physical world from affecting the physical universe and vice versa. This idea has been shown to be relative to the definition of the principle. A traditional definition prevents the one universe from affecting any other universe, but with a modified definition, e.g., the causal closure of the physical can be consistent with the possibility of one universe affecting the (...) other universe. Gamper proved this modal property by implementing interfaces between universes. Interfaces are thus possible, but are they realistic? To answer this question, I propose a two-step process where the second step is scientific research. The first step, however, is to fill the gap between the principles or basic assumptions and science with a consistent theoretical framework that accommodates the modal properties of an ontology that matches the basic assumptions. (shrink)

On the recently suggested loophole view of causal closure, nothing in a universe has its cause coming from another universe. It is allowed, though, that something, especially a first thing, can have its cause situated in an interface between universes. However, the possibility of such an interface does not mean that there is any actual interface. In fact, there are several major obstacles to be managed before an interface should be hoped for. One such obstacle, the need for an account (...) of how objects in one universe relate to objects in another universe, is addressed in this paper. The outcome is positive and suggests that objects of different ontological status relate as the kind ‘object’. Some positive and negative properties of such higher-order objects are noted. (shrink)