Quine is routinely perceived as saving metaphysics from Carnapian positivism. Where Carnap rejects metaphysical existence claims as meaningless, Quine is taken to restore their intelligibility by dismantling the former’s internal–external distinction. The problem with this picture, however, is that it does not sit well with the fact that Quine, on many occasions, has argued that metaphysical existence claims ought to be dismissed. Setting aside the hypothesis that Quine’s metaphysical position is incoherent, one has to conclude that his views on metaphysics (...) are subtler than is often presupposed; both the received view that Quine saved metaphysics and the opposite view that Carnap and Quine are on the same anti-metaphysical team seem too one-sided if we take seriously Quine’s own pronouncements on the issue. In this paper, I offer a detailed reconstruction of Quine’s perspective on metaphysical existence claims. Scrutinizing his published work as well as unpublished papers, letters, and notebooks, I show how Quine is able to both blur the boundary between scientific sense and metaphysical nonsense and to argue that we cannot ask what reality is really like in a distinctively philosophical way. I argue that although Quine’s position is much closer to Carnap’s than the received view suggests, it still differs in two crucial respects. (shrink)

Some Buddhists claim that all phenomena are empty of inherent existence and thereby endorse a kind of global anti‐realism. Buddhist global fictionalists argue that for these Buddhists, ordinary discourse is best understood in global fictionalist terms. I argue here that these attempts fail because the types of fictionalism that these accounts are modeled after structurally rely on a non‐fictionalist domain of discourse to establish normative constraints within the target fictionalist domain. If the goal of appealing to fictionalism is to help (...) explain how discourse involving reference to entities that are unreal can still be governed by non‐arbitrary norms of acceptance, such that some conventional claims can be meaningfully described as conventionally true in contrast to other such claims that are conventionally false, then Buddhist global fictionalism undermines its own goals. It does so by eliminating the very feature of a fictionalist account – the ability to appeal to a non‐fictionalist domain – that makes possible the norms that fictionalism is invoked to explain in the first place. (shrink)