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  1. The tuning-fork model of human social cognition: A critique☆.Pierre Jacob - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):229-243.
    The tuning-fork model of human social cognition, based on the discovery of mirror neurons (MNs) in the ventral premotor cortex of monkeys, involves the four following assumptions: (1) mirroring processes are processes of resonance or simulation. (2) They can be motor or non-motor. (3) Processes of motor mirroring (or action-mirroring), exemplified by the activity of MNs, constitute instances of third-person mindreading, whereby an observer represents the agent's intention. (4) Non-motor mirroring processes enable humans to represent others' emotions. After questioning all (...)
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  • Sharing and Ascribing Goals.Pierre Jacob - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (2):200-227.
    This paper assesses the scope and limits of a widely influential model of goal-ascription by human infants: the shared-intentionality model. It derives much of its appeal from its ability to integrate behavioral evidence from developmental psychology with cognitive neuroscientific evidence about the role of mirror neuron activity in non-human primates. The central question raised by this model is whether sharing a goal with an agent is necessary and sufficient for ascribing it to that agent. I argue that advocates of the (...)
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  • How from action-mirroring to intention-ascription?Pierre Jacob - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (3):1132-1141.
  • A Philosopher’s Reflections on the Discovery of Mirror Neurons.Pierre Jacob - 2009 - Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (3):570-595.
    Mirror neurons fire both when a primate executes a transitive action directed toward a target (e.g., grasping) and when he observes the same action performed by another. According to the prevalent interpretation, action-mirroring is a process of interpersonal neural similarity whereby an observer maps the agent's perceived movements onto her own motor repertoire. Furthermore, ever since Gallese and Goldman's (1998) influential paper, action-mirroring has been linked to third-person mindreading on the grounds that it enables an observer to represent the agent's (...)
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  • Simulation is not enough: A hybrid model of disgust attribution on the basis of visual stimuli.Luca Barlassina - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (3):401-419.
    Mindreading is the ability to attribute mental states to other individuals. According to the Theory-Theory (TT), mindreading is based on one's possession of a Theory of Mind. On the other hand, the Simulation Theory (ST) maintains that one arrives at the attribution of a mental state by simulating it in one's own mind. In this paper, I propose a ST-TT hybrid model of the ability to attribute disgust on the basis of visual stimuli such as facial expressions, body postures, etc. (...)
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  • Two Views of Emotional Perception: Some Empirical Suggestions.Andrew Sneddon - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (5S):161-183.
    Two models of modularity are presented in analysis of perceptual theories of emotion. Empirical tests for assessing whether either model is apt for emotion are suggested. The paper concludes by standing back and assessing the stakes of the issue.
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