Human Action: a Comprehensive Proposal for Interdisciplinary Dialogue on Personality The need to categorize the personality is recurrent in philosophical, theological and, especially, psychological studies. However, the lack of dialogue between the different disciplines gives rise to analyzes that seem to divide human reality into 'parts', often incompatible with each other. In view of this problem, this article proposes the integral analysis of human action, seeking a psychological parameterization that is more adjusted to the complexity of the personality. Starting from (...) the integral vision of the action, the human behavioral and mental aspects commonly studied are seen as insufficient and the horizon is broadened with the reference to interiority. It is intended to achieve a more accurate vision of the complexity of human action. Interiority, parameterized as personal identity, relational intention, and existential positioning, calls for a renewed and related understanding of psychology, philosophy, and theology. (shrink)

Fifteen years after the publication of my assessment of comparative philosophy in the inaugural issue of Dao, this article comments on some of the major changes that have taken place in the field since Dao began. One of the most significant is the improvement in the conditions for Chinese philosophy in mainland China and the return of many of the original participants in Dao’s audience to positions in East Asia from earlier careers in the West. The article also surveys advances (...) in various forms of objective and normative comparison and in the development of metaphysics based on Chinese models. (shrink)

This article endeavors to interpret certain facets of Dewey’s philosophy in light of an underinvestigated research program in contemporary situated cognition, namely, plant cognition. I argue that Dewey’s views on situated cognition go substantially further than most philosophers of embodied mind are ready to admit. Building on the background of current research in plant cognition, and adding conceptual help of Dewey, I contend that plants can be seen as full-blown cognitive organisms, although they do not have what one would normally (...) call “a body.” Through this line of inquiry, I identify what are among the most pressing problems in current theories of the embodied mind and subsequently try to overcome them by means of Dewey’s metaphysics of the psychical. (shrink)

The main goals of this paper are two. First, it articulates what kinds of knowing pure knowing is in its narrow sense pure knowing as the capacity of moral judgment; pure knowing as moral knowledge and standard. Besides, it analyses pure knowing’s different features through a phenomenological description. All these aspects of pure knowing are tied by moral feeling. Second, this paper addresses two sets of theoretical problems that have been raised in Confucian discourse with respect to pure knowing and (...) Heavenly principle, primarily those that render Wang’s notion of pure knowing to be static recognition toward particular moral issues, or immediate response, which reading cannot really admit the possibilities of extension, reflection, moral cultivation, and reform of institution; and those that understand pure knowing to be merely abstract without concrete content, such as merely being a metaphysical substance. When properly understood, that is, from the perspective of moral emotions, Wang Yangming’s account of pure knowing provides for the possibilities of enhancement and cultivation, while insisting that the content of pure knowing is always accessible to us. (shrink)

AbstractThis essay argues for a new interpretation of the notion of “unity” in Yangming’s 王陽明 famous doctrine of the “unity of knowledge and action” (zhi xing he yi 知行合一). I distinguish two parts of Wang’s doctrine: one concerning training (gong fu 工夫), and one concerning the “original natural condition” of knowledge and action (ben ti 本體). I focus on the latter aspect of the doctrine, and argue that Wang holds, roughly, that a person exhibits knowledge in its original natural condition (...) if and only if the person exhibits action in its original natural condition. Moreover, I argue that Wang denies that knowledge in its original natural condition is identical to action in its original natural condition. (shrink)

This article presents a new interpretation of the great Ming dynasty philosopher Wang Yangming’s celebrated doctrine of the “unity of knowledge and action”. Wang held that action was not unified with all knowledge, but only with an elevated form of knowledge, which he sometimes called “genuine knowledge”. I argue for a new interpretation of this notion, according to which genuine knowledge requires freedom from a form of doxastic conflict. I propose that, in Wang’s view, a person is free from this (...) form of doxastic conflict if and only if they are acting virtuously. (shrink)

This article uses the Confucian and Neo-Confucian slogan that we should strive to “form one body with all things” as a starting point for asking whether the organismic metaphors so central to their ontology might be compatible with and of service to contemporary thinkers in cognitive science and philosophy of mind who are actively pursuing a fully embodied theory of mind. In this article I draw upon lines of inquiry exemplified in the work of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson and (...) Andy Clark who take different routes to important conclusions that I argue would be even more convincing where they to be seen from within the context of an ontology that draws upon organismic rather than mechanistic metaphors. In short, this article draws attention to the largely unnoticed fact that a fully embodied understanding of mind, one that treats knowledge as a kind of active engagement with the world rather than as a purely cognitive state, points away from mechanistic metaphors and toward organismic ones. (shrink)

While business as a social activity has involved communities of persons embedded in dense relational networks and practices for thousands of years, the modern legal, theoretical psychological, and moral foundations of business have progressively narrowed our understanding of practical wisdom. Although practical wisdom has recently regained ground in business ethics and management studies, thanks mainly to Anscombe's recovery of virtue ethics, Anscombe herself once observed that it lacks, and has even neglected, a moral psychology that genuinely complements the nuanced philosophical (...) perspective of a virtue‐centered moral philosophy. Herein, we offer one way to fill this gap by suggesting two opposing psychological paradigms, namely the inter‐processual self and the autonomous self, which are classified according to the assumptions they make about the self, human agency and action more broadly, as well as how they relate to practical wisdom. Upon presenting these moral psychologies, we will bring this proposal into conversation with business ethics to show how the IPS paradigm can enable and support virtuous management. (shrink)

This paper studies one aspect of the great Ming dynasty philosopher Wang Yangming’s (王陽明 1472-1529) celebrated doctrine of the unity of knowledge and action (zhi xing he yi 知行合一). Wang states that his doctrine does not apply to all knowledge, but only to an elevated form of knowledge, which he sometimes calls “genuine knowledge” (zhen zhi 真知). But what is “genuine knowledge”? I develop and compare four different interpretations of this notion: the perceptual, practical, normative and introspective models. The main (...) aim of the paper is to develop these models in more detail than has been done before. But at the end of the paper I argue that the introspective model is to be preferred over the alternatives. (shrink)

Drawing an analogy between Wang Yangming’s endeavor to know ethical truth and Descartes’ quest for epistemic certainty, this paper proposes a reading of Wang's doctrine of the unity of knowing and acting to the effect that the doctrine does not express an ethical teaching about how the knowledge that is already acquired is to be related to acting, but an epistemological claim as to how we know ethical truths. A detailed analysis of Wang’s relevant texts is offered to support the (...) claim. (shrink)

توماس لویس تلاش می‌کند نشان دهد که چرا تاریخ برای فلسفۀ دین اهمیت دارد. وی استدلال می‌کند که فهم اینکه چهره‌های اثرگذار در تاریخ مدرن فلسفۀ دین چگونه تلاش می‌کرده‌اند مفهوم دین را متحول کنند، هم اهمیت مطالعات تاریخی برای فلسفۀ دین را نشان می‌دهد و هم محوریت فلسفۀ دین را در مجموعۀ مطالعات دینی نمایان می‌سازد. وی تلاش می‌کند نمایان سازد که چگونه نشان داده شدن مسیرهای پیموده شده در فلسفۀ دین با مطالعۀ تاریخ فلسفه می‌تواند به پیشبرد فلسفۀ (...) دین کمک کند. در این نوشته، نشان خواهیم داد که چگونه می‌توان استدلال لویس را به اهمیت مطالعۀ سنت‌های مختلف فکری در فلسفۀ دین نیز گسترش داد. با استفاده از صورت‌بندی‌ای که رابرت نویل از «فلسفۀ مقایسه‌ای هنجاری» می‌کند، از سویی، و پیاده‌سازی آن از باب نمونه بر نگاه هگل به رابطۀ ایمان و عقل، از سوی دیگر، تلاش خواهیم کرد نشان دهیم که نه تنها مطالعۀ تاریخ فلسفۀ دین در یک سنت می‌تواند به پیشبرد فلسفۀ دین در آن سنت کمک کند، بلکه مطالعۀ تاریخ فلسفۀ دین در سنت‌های مختلف فلسفی نیز می‌تواند برای پیشرفت در مواجهه با مسائل فلسفۀ دین الهام‌بخش باشد. (shrink)