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  1. You Disgust Me. Or Do You? On the Very Idea of Moral Disgust.Iskra Fileva - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (1):19-33.
    ABSTRACT It has been argued that so-called moral disgust is either not really moral or not really disgust. I maintain that sceptics are wrong: there is a distinct emotional response best described as ‘moral disgust’. I offer an account of its constitutive features.
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  • Boundary problems and self-ownership.Jessica Flanigan - 2019 - Social Philosophy and Policy 36 (2):9-35.
    :Self-ownership theorists argue that many of our most morally urgent and enforceable rights stem from the fact that we own ourselves. Critics of self-ownership argue that the claim that people own their bodies commits self-ownership theorists to several implausible conclusions because self-ownership theory relies on several vague moral predicates, and any precisification of the required predicates is seemingly too permissive or too restrictive. I argue that this line of criticism does not undermine the case for self-ownership theory because self-ownership theory (...)
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  • Is Visiting the Pharmacy Like Voting at the Poll? Behavioral Asymmetry in Pharmaceutical Freedom.Jeffrey Carroll - 2022 - HEC Forum 34 (3):213-232.
    Jessica Flanigan argues that individuals have the right to self-medicate. Flanigan presents two arguments in defense of this right. The first she calls the epistemic argument and the second she calls the rights-based argument. I argue that the right to self-medicate hangs and falls on the rights-based argument. This is because for the epistemic argument to be sound agents must be assumed to be epistemically competent. But, Flanigan’s argument for a constitutionally mandated right to self-medicate models agents as epistemically incompetent. (...)
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