Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Intrinsic Explanation and Field’s Dispensabilist Strategy.Russell Marcus - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (2):163-183.
    Philosophy of mathematics for the last half-century has been dominated in one way or another by Quine’s indispensability argument. The argument alleges that our best scientific theory quantifies over, and thus commits us to, mathematical objects. In this paper, I present new considerations which undermine the most serious challenge to Quine’s argument, Hartry Field’s reformulation of Newtonian Gravitational Theory.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Co‐Identification and Fictional Names.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1):3-34.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Early Russell on Types and Plurals.Kevin Klement - 2014 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 2 (6):1-21.
    In 1903, in The Principles of Mathematics (PoM), Russell endorsed an account of classes whereupon a class fundamentally is to be considered many things, and not one, and used this thesis to explicate his first version of a theory of types, adding that it formed the logical justification for the grammatical distinction between singular and plural. The view, however, was short-lived; rejected before PoM even appeared in print. However, aside from mentions of a few misgivings, there is little evidence about (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • The Hierarchy of Fregean Senses.Ori Simchen - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):255-261.
    The question whether Frege’s theory of indirect reference enforces an infinite hierarchy of senses has been hotly debated in the secondary literature. Perhaps the most influential treatment of the issue is that of Burge (1979), who offers an argument for the hierarchy from rather minimal Fregean assumptions. I argue that this argument, endorsed by many, does not itself enforce an infinite hierarchy of senses. I conclude that whether or not the theory of indirect reference can avail itself of only finitely (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Formality of Logic and Frege’s Begriffsschrift.Daniele Mezzadri - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):182-207.
    This paper challenges a standard interpretation according to which Frege’s conception of logic (early and late) is at odds with the contemporary one, because on the latter’s view logic is formal, while on Frege’s view it is not, given that logic’s subject matter is reality’s most general features. I argue that Frege – in Begriffsschrift – retained the idea that logic is formal; Frege sees logic as providing the ‘logical cement’ that ties up together the contentful concepts of specific sciences, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Identity Theories of Truth and the Tractatus.Peter M. Sullivan - 2005 - Philosophical Investigations 28 (1):43–62.
    The paper is concerned with the idea that the world is the totality of facts, not of things – with what is involved in thinking of the world in that way, and why one might do so. It approaches this issue through a comparison between Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and the identity theory of truth proposed by Hornsby and McDowell.The paper’s positive conclusion is that there is a genuine affinity between these two. A negative contention is that the modern identity theory is (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Frege on Identity and Identity-Statements: A Reply to Thau and Caplan.Richard Heck - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):83-102.
    The paper argues, as against Thau and Caplan, that the traditional interpretation that Frege abandoned his earlier views about identity and identity--statements is correct.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Metaontological Minimalism.Øystein Linnebo - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (2):139-151.
    Can there be objects that are ‘thin’ in the sense that very little is required for their existence? A number of philosophers have thought so. For instance, many Fregeans believe it suffices for the existence of directions that there be lines standing in the relation of parallelism; other philosophers believe it suffices for a mathematical theory to have a model that the theory be coherent. This article explains the appeal of thin objects, discusses the three most important strategies for articulating (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • The Applicability of Mathematics as a Philosophical Problem: Mathematization as Exploration.Johannes Lenhard & Michael Otte - 2018 - Foundations of Science 23 (4):719-737.
    This paper discerns two types of mathematization, a foundational and an explorative one. The foundational perspective is well-established, but we argue that the explorative type is essential when approaching the problem of applicability and how it influences our conception of mathematics. The first part of the paper argues that a philosophical transformation made explorative mathematization possible. This transformation took place in early modernity when sense acquired partial independence from reference. The second part of the paper discusses a series of examples (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Mental Files.François Recanati - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    Over the past fifty years the philosophy of language and mind has been dominated by a nondescriptivist approach to content and reference. This book attempts to recast and systematize that approach by offering an indexical model in terms of mental files. According to Recanati, we refer through mental files, the function of which is to store information derived through certain types of contextual relation the subject bears to objects in his or her environment. The reference of a file is determined (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   179 citations  
  • A Description Theory of Singular Reference.Francesco Orilia - 2003 - Dialectica 57 (1):7–40.
    According to the received view, descriptivism is a dead end in an attempt to account for singular reference by proper names, indexicals and possibly even incomplete descriptions, for they require referentialism. In contrast to this, I argue for an application of the former to all kinds of singular terms, indexicals in particular, by relying on a view of incomplete descriptions as elliptical in a pragmatic sense. I thus provide a general analysis of singular reference. The proposed approach is in line (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Does Frege Have Too Many Thoughts? A Cantorian Problem Revisited.Kevin C. Klement - 2005 - Analysis 65 (1):45–49.
    This paper continues a thread in Analysis begun by Adam Rieger and Nicholas Denyer. Rieger argued that Frege’s theory of thoughts violates Cantor’s theorem by postulating as many thoughts as concepts. Denyer countered that Rieger’s construction could not show that the thoughts generated are always distinct for distinct concepts. By focusing on universally quantified thoughts, rather than thoughts that attribute a concept to an individual, I give a different construction that avoids Denyer’s problem. I also note that this problem for (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Structure-Making.Kris McDaniel - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):251-274.
    Friends of states of affairs and structural universals appeal to a relation, structure-making, that is allegedly a kind of composition relation: structure-making ?builds? facts out of particulars and universals, and ?builds? structural universals out of unstructured universals. D. M. Armstrong, an eminent champion of structures, endorses two interesting theses concerning composition. First, that structure-making is a composition relation. Second, that it is not the only (fundamental) composition relation: Armstrong also believes in a mode of composition that he calls mereological, and (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  • Abstract Objects.Gideon Rosen - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • A Repair of Frege’s Theory of Thoughts.Mark Textor - 2009 - Synthese 167 (1):105 - 123.
    Frege’s writings contain arguments for the thesis (i) that a thought expressed by a sentence S is a structured object whose composition pictures the composition of S, and for the thesis (ii) that a thought is an unstructured object. I will argue that Frege’s reasons for both (i) and (ii) are strong. Frege’s explanation of the difference in sense between logically equivalent sentences rests on assumption (i), while Frege’s claim that the same thought can be decomposed differently makes (ii) plausible. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Making Sense of Truth-Makers.George Englebretsen - 2010 - Topoi 29 (2):147-151.
    This essay argues that propositions are made true by facts. A proposition is the sense expressed by a statement (sentence token used to make a truth claim). Facts are positive or negative constitutive properties of the domain of discourse (usually the actual world). The presence of horses is a positive constitutive property of the world; the absence of unicorns is a negative one. This notion of constitutive properties accords well with the Hume-Kant claim that existence is not a property of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Rejection.Timothy Smiley - 1996 - Analysis 56 (1):1–9.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   97 citations  
  • A Platonist Epistemology.Mark Balaguer - 1995 - Synthese 103 (3):303 - 325.
    A response is given here to Benacerraf's 1973 argument that mathematical platonism is incompatible with a naturalistic epistemology. Unlike almost all previous platonist responses to Benacerraf, the response given here is positive rather than negative; that is, rather than trying to find a problem with Benacerraf's argument, I accept his challenge and meet it head on by constructing an epistemology of abstract (i.e., aspatial and atemporal) mathematical objects. Thus, I show that spatio-temporal creatures like ourselves can attain knowledge about mathematical (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   56 citations  
  • The Independence of the Parallel Postulate and Development of Rigorous Consistency Proofs.David J. Stump - 2007 - History and Philosophy of Logic 28 (1):19-30.
    I trace the development of arguments for the consistency of non-Euclidean geometries and for the independence of the parallel postulate, showing how the arguments become more rigorous as a formal conception of geometry is introduced. I analyze the kinds of arguments offered by Jules Hoüel in 1860-1870 for the unprovability of the parallel postulate and for the existence of non-Euclidean geometries, especially his reaction to the publication of Beltrami’s seminal papers, showing that Beltrami was much more concerned with the existence (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • A Modal Account of Propositions.Andy Demfree Yu - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (4):463-488.
    In this paper, I motivate a modal account of propositions on the basis of an iterative conception of propositions. As an application, I suggest that the account provides a satisfying solution to the Russell-Myhill paradox. The account is in the spirit of recently developed modal accounts of sets motivated on the basis of the iterative conception of sets.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Reading ‘On Denoting’ on its Centenary.David Kaplan - 2005 - Mind 114 (456):933-1003.
    Part 1 sets out the logical/semantical background to ‘On Denoting’, including an exposition of Russell's views in Principles of Mathematics, the role and justification of Frege's notorious Axiom V, and speculation about how the search for a solution to the Contradiction might have motivated a new treatment of denoting. Part 2 consists primarily of an extended analysis of Russell's views on knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description, in which I try to show that the discomfiture between Russell's semantical and (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • The Development of Arithmetic in Frege's Grundgesetze der Arithmetik.Richard Heck - 1993 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 58 (2):579-601.
    Frege's development of the theory of arithmetic in his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik has long been ignored, since the formal theory of the Grundgesetze is inconsistent. His derivations of the axioms of arithmetic from what is known as Hume's Principle do not, however, depend upon that axiom of the system--Axiom V--which is responsible for the inconsistency. On the contrary, Frege's proofs constitute a derivation of axioms for arithmetic from Hume's Principle, in (axiomatic) second-order logic. Moreover, though Frege does prove each of (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   51 citations  
  • Linguistic Aspects, Meaninglessness and Paradox: A Rejoinder to John David Stone. [REVIEW]Laurence Goldstein - 1980 - Linguistics and Philosophy 4 (4):579 - 592.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • The Constitution of Abstract Objects.Miroslava Trajkovski - 2021 - Theoria 87 (1):87-108.
    Theoria, Volume 87, Issue 1, Page 87-108, February 2021.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Development of Moral Reasoning and the Foundations of Geometry.John Macnamara - 1991 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 21 (2):125–150.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Caesar From Frege's Perspective.Gary Kemp - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (2):179-199.
    I attempt to explain Frege's handling of the Julius Caesar issue in terms of his more general philosophical commitments. These only became fully explicit in his middle-period writings, but his earlier moves are best explained, I suggest, if we suppose them to be implicit in his earlier thinking. These commitments conditionally justify Frege in rejecting Hume's Principle as either a definition or axiom but in accepting Axiom V. However, the general epistemological picture they constitute has serious problems in accounting for (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Gottlob Frege, One More Time.Claude Imbert & tr Bontea, Adriana - 2000 - Hypatia 15 (4):156-173.
    : Frege's philosophical writings, including the "logistic project," acquire a new insight by being confronted with Kant's criticism and Wittgenstein's logical and grammatical investigations. Between these two points a non-formalist history of logic is just taking shape, a history emphasizing the Greek and Kantian inheritance and its aftermath. It allows us to understand the radical change in rationality introduced by Gottlob Frege's syntax. This syntax put an end to Greek categorization and opened the way to the multiplicity of expressions producing (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Extensionality, Indirect Contexts and Frege's Hierarchy.Nicholas Koziolek - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (3):431-462.
    It is well known that Frege was an extensionalist, in the following sense: he held that the truth-value of a sentence is always a function only of the references of its parts. One consequence of this view is that expressions occurring in certain linguistic contexts – for example, the that-clauses of propositional attitude ascriptions – do not have their usual references, but refer instead to what are usually their senses. But although a number of philosophers have objected to this result, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Priority Principle From Kant to Frege.Jeremy Heis - 2014 - Noûs 48 (2):268-297.
    In a famous passage (A68/B93), Kant writes that “the understanding can make no other use of […] concepts than that of judging by means of them.” Kant's thought is often called the thesis of the priority of judgments over concepts. We find a similar sounding priority thesis in Frege: “it is one of the most important differences between my mode of interpretation and the Boolean mode […] that I do not proceed from concepts, but from judgments.” Many interpreters have thought (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Kant on the Content of Cognition.Clinton Tolley - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):200-228.
    I present an argument for an interpretation of Kant's views on the nature of the ‘content [Inhalt]’ of ‘cognition [Erkenntnis]’. In contrast to one of the longest standing interpretations of Kant's views on cognitive content, which ascribes to Kant a straightforwardly psychologistic understanding of content, and in contrast as well to the more recently influential reading of Kant put forward by McDowell and others, according to which Kant embraces a version of Russellianism, I argue that Kant's views on this topic (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • An Analysis of Two Accounts on the Sense of Singular Terms.Alan Schwerin - 1988 - Dialectica 42 (3):221-231.
    This paper is a critical investigation of Gottlob Frege's and Bertrand Russell's views on the sense or meaning of singular terms. In his famous "On denoting" Russell erects his case on objections that he raises against Frege. I suggest that Russell's criticisms of Frege are seriously misguided, due in large measure to the uneven applications of his terminology when addressing Frege's views.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On Indirect Sense and Reference.Lukas Skiba - 2015 - Theoria 81 (1):48-81.
    According to Frege, expressions shift their reference when they occur in indirect contexts: in “Anna believes that Plato is wise” the expression “Plato” no longer refers to Plato but to what is ordinarily its sense. Many philosophers, including Carnap, Davidson, Burge, Parsons, Kripke and Künne, believe that on Frege's view the iteration of indirect context creating operators gives rise to an infinite hierarchy of senses. While the former two take this to be problematic, the latter four welcome the hierarchy with (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Propositional Attitudes in Modern Philosophy.Walter Ott - 2002 - Dialogue 41 (3):551-568.
    Philosophers of the modern period are often presented as having made an elementary error: that of confounding the attitude one adopts toward a proposition with its content. By examining the works of Locke and the Port-Royalians, I show that this accusation is ill-founded and that Locke, in particular, has the resources to construct a theory of propositional attitudes.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Le « Wittgenstein intermédiaire » et les mathématiques modernes.Sören Stenlund & Anne-Marie Boisvert - 2012 - Philosophiques 39 (1):125-161.
    Dans cet article, j’essaie de montrer que le dépassement et le rejet du dogmatisme sont un aspect décisif du changement dans la pensée de Wittgenstein qui a eu lieu au début des années 30, quand il commence à mettre en valeur l’autonomie de la grammaire du langage et à parler d’images grammaticales et de jeux de langage en tant qu’objets de comparaison. En examinant certains traits fondamentaux de ce changement, je mettrai en évidence l’impulsion et les idées décisives que Wittgenstein (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Frege's Changing Conception of Number.Kevin C. Klement - 2012 - Theoria 78 (2):146-167.
    I trace changes to Frege's understanding of numbers, arguing in particular that the view of arithmetic based in geometry developed at the end of his life (1924–1925) was not as radical a deviation from his views during the logicist period as some have suggested. Indeed, by looking at his earlier views regarding the connection between numbers and second-level concepts, his understanding of extensions of concepts, and the changes to his views, firstly, in between Grundlagen and Grundgesetze, and, later, after learning (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Frege on the Normativity and Constitutivity of Logic for Thought II.Daniele Mezzadri - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (9):592-600.
    This two-part paper reviews a scholarly debate on an alleged tension in Frege's philosophy of logic. In Section 1 of Part I, I discuss Frege's view that logic is concerned with establishing norms for correct thinking and is therefore a normative science. In Section 2, I explore a different understanding of the role of logic that Frege seems to advance: logic is constitutive of the very possibility of thought, because it sets forth necessary conditions for thought. Hence, the tension the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Frege and Object Dependent Propositions.Heimir Geirsson - 2002 - Dialectica 56 (4):299–314.
    Gareth Evans and John McDowell have challenged the traditional reading of Frege according to which Frege accepted propositions that are not object dependent, i.e., propositions that can exist even though the proper names that occur in the sentences that express them do not refer. A consequence of the Evans‐McDowell interpretation of Frege is that if someone hallucinates that there is an oasis in front of her, then there is no thought of an oasis but only an illusion of a thought. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On the Origin of Symbolic Mathematics and Its Significance for Wittgenstein’s Thought.Sören Stenlund - 2015 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 4 (1):7-92.
    The main topic of this essay is symbolic mathematics or the method of symbolic construction, which I trace to the end of the sixteenth century when Franciscus Vieta invented the algebraic symbolism and started to use the word ‘symbolic’ in the relevant, non-ontological sense. This approach has played an important role for many of the great inventions in modern mathematics such as the introduction of the decimal place-value system of numeration, Descartes’ analytic geometry, and Leibniz’s infinitesimal calculus. It was also (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Composition and Relative Counting.Massimiliano Carrara & Giorgio Lando - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (4):489-529.
    According to the so-called strong variant of Composition as Identity (CAI), the Principle of Indiscernibility of Identicals can be extended to composition, by resorting to broadly Fregean relativizations of cardinality ascriptions. In this paper we analyze various ways in which this relativization could be achieved. According to one broad variety of relativization, cardinality ascriptions are about objects, while concepts occupy an additional argument place. It should be possible to paraphrase the cardinality ascriptions in plural logic and, as a consequence, relative (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Are Propositions Essentially Representational?Bryan Pickel - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3).
    Jeffrey King argues that nothing has truth conditions except by being taken to be true or false by rational agents. But – for good reason – King claims that propositions possess truth conditions essentially and intrinsically. I will argue that King cannot have both: if the truth conditions of a proposition depend on the reactions of rational agents, then the possession of truth conditions can't follow from the intrinsic nature or existence of the proposition. This leaves two options. Either, nothing (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Pierre and the Fundamental Assumption.Joseph Owens - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (3):250-273.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Frege's Natural Numbers: Motivations and Modifications.Erich Reck - 2005 - In Michael Beaney & Erich Reck (eds.), Gottlob Frege: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, Vol. III. London: Routledge. pp. 270-301.
    Frege's main contributions to logic and the philosophy of mathematics are, on the one hand, his introduction of modern relational and quantificational logic and, on the other, his analysis of the concept of number. My focus in this paper will be on the latter, although the two are closely related, of course, in ways that will also play a role. More specifically, I will discuss Frege's logicist reconceptualization of the natural numbers with the goal of clarifying two aspects: the motivations (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Informative Identities: A Challenge for Frege's Puzzle.Elisa Paganini - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (4):513-530.
    Frege's puzzle about identity sentences has long challenged many philosophers to find a solution to it but also led other philosophers to object that the evidential datum it is grounded on is false. The present work is an elaboration of this second kind of reaction: it explains why Frege's puzzle seems to resist the traditional objection, giving voice to different and more elaborated presentations of the evidential datum, faithful to the spirit but not to the letter of Frege's puzzle. The (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • A Note on Dummett and Frege on Sense‐Identity.Eva Picard - 1993 - European Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):69-80.
  • IV—Sharing Thoughts About Oneself.Guy Longworth - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (1pt1):57-81.
    This paper is about first‐person thoughts—thoughts about oneself that are expressible through uses of first‐person pronouns. It is widely held that first‐person thoughts cannot be shared. My aim is to postpone rejection of the more natural view that such thoughts about oneself can be shared. I sketch an account on which such thoughts can be shared and indicate some ways in which deciding the fate of the account will depend upon further work.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Frege on the Generality of Logical Laws.Jim Hutchinson - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy (2):1-18.
    Frege claims that the laws of logic are characterized by their “generality,” but it is hard to see how this could identify a special feature of those laws. I argue that we must understand this talk of generality in normative terms, but that what Frege says provides a normative demarcation of the logical laws only once we connect it with his thinking about truth and science. He means to be identifying the laws of logic as those that appear in every (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • How (Not) to Think of Emotions as Evaluative Attitudes.Jean Moritz Müller - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):281-308.
    It is popular to hold that emotions are evaluative. On the standard account, the evaluative character of emotion is understood in epistemic terms: emotions apprehend or make us aware of value properties. As this account is commonly elaborated, emotions are experiences with evaluative intentional content. In this paper, I am concerned with a recent alternative proposal on how emotions afford awareness of value. This proposal does not ascribe evaluative content to emotions, but instead conceives of them as evaluative at the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • On the “Gray’s Elegy” Argument and its Bearing on Frege’s Theory of Sense.James Levine - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):251–295.
    In his recent book, "The Metaphysicians of Meaning" (2000), Gideon Makin argues that in the so-called "Gray's Elegy" argument (the GEA) in "On Denoting", Russell provides decisive arguments against not only his own theory of denoting concepts but also Frege's theory of sense. I argue that by failing to recognize fundamental differences between the two theories, Makin fails to recognize that the GEA has less force against Frege's theory than against Russell's own earlier theory. While I agree with many aspects (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Russell, His Paradoxes, and Cantor's Theorem: Part I.Kevin C. Klement - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (1):16-28.
    In these articles, I describe Cantor’s power-class theorem, as well as a number of logical and philosophical paradoxes that stem from it, many of which were discovered or considered (implicitly or explicitly) in Bertrand Russell’s work. These include Russell’s paradox of the class of all classes not members of themselves, as well as others involving properties, propositions, descriptive senses, class-intensions, and equivalence classes of coextensional properties. Part I focuses on Cantor’s theorem, its proof, how it can be used to manufacture (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Understanding Kripke's Puzzles About Belief.Michael McGlone - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (3):487-514.
    In his famous 1979 article 'A Puzzle About Belief' Saul Kripke presents two puzzles regarding belief attribution, and he uses them to cast doubt on classical substitution arguments against the Millian view that a proper name has a 'denotation' (or reference) but no 'connotation' (or sense). In this article, I present Kripke's puzzles in what I take to be their most revealing form, discuss their relevance to the abovementioned arguments, briefly survey the ways in which philosophers have responded to these (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation