ABSTRACT This article reconstructs Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge’s critical theory by articulating some of the key concepts of History and Obstinacy, their second collaboration. The objective is to detail the grounds of their critical theory and to show how it acquires its normative character. To this aim, in a first step, I reconstruct the basis of the anthropology developed by Negt and Kluge. This anthropology allows them to argue that subjects-insofar as they are creative beings-possess ‘obstinacy’, which they understand (...) as an intrinsic and material power to resist oppression. Following this, I discuss the concept of ‘primitive accumulation’, which is used by Negt and Kluge to expose the relation between capitalism and obstinacy. Finally, I clarify the way Negt and Kluge appeal to the concept of ‘human nature’ in order to show how their theory derives its normative character. To do so, I rely on Christoph Menke’s work on ‘inner nature’. (shrink)

Metaphysics is, as Adorno once notes, the nuisance of philosophy. On the one hand, metaphysics is the reasons of philosophy's existence; on the other hand, it is nearly impossible to characterise metaphysics precisely. This tension is reflected with reference to the contemporary political and cultural situation in Adorno's "Meditations on Metaphysics", the last part of his opus magnum *Negative Dialectics*. The essays in this volume are devoted to different facets of Adorno's examination of metaphysics. They do, however, not only concern (...) themselves with Adorno's metaphysical reflections in a narrow sense, but also extend to other themes Adorno relates to metaphysics: critique of concepts, history, truth, and materialism. Thereby, they render a hardly investigated topic of the *Negative Dialectics* accessible. -/- Contributors: Emil Angehrn, Dirk Braunstein, Peggy H. Breitenstein, Gunnar Hindrichs, Axel Hutter, Philip Hogh, Christian Iber, Julia Jopp, Guido Kreis, Ansgar Martins, Brian O'Connor, Mario Schärli, Marc Nicolas Sommer, Tilo Wesche. (shrink)

The events of 1968/69 initiated a dispute between Adorno and Marcuse over the separation of theory and praxis. While Marcuse “stood at the barricades” Adorno sought recluse in the “ivory tower”. Marcuse and German students perceived Adorno’s move as departure from fundamental postulates of critical theory as laid down in Horkheimer’s 1937 essay. Adorno died amidst the process of clarifying his differences with Marcuse and thus the “unlimited discussions” between the two remain unfinished. This paper sets to examine how both (...) Marcuse and Adorno remained dedicated to the unity of theory and praxis, albeit in different ways. I argue that Adorno did not separate theory and praxis; instead, he perceived the gap between critical theory and concrete historical situation. Adorno rejected simple and unreflective translation of theory into praxis. Hence his attempt to recalibrate critical theory. Marcuse’s and Adorno’s differences lie in their different evaluation of the student movement and this evaluation was context related. My second argument is that Marcuse/Adorno disagreement is partly caused by the absence of the two from the concrete historical context. (shrink)

La teoría crítica de Adorno –cuyo desarrollo filosófico y metódico fundamental se encuentra en Dialéctica negativa– ha sido objeto de lecturas marcadamente contrapuestas, desde aquellas que critican las estreches de su análisis social y la impotencia de su actitud política, hasta los que advierten en ella una lucidez analítica admirable y un trasfondo político radical cuyas posibilidades no han terminado aún de explorarse en profundidad. Esta ambigüedad interpretativa, debido en gran parte a la reticencia de Adorno a formular una filosofía (...) política como tal, nos lleva a preguntarnos en qué medida la extemporaneidad de su pensamiento lo ha convertido en un precedente de aproximaciones políticas que hoy ya nos resultan familiares y, sobre todo, si nos puede ayudar a reconceptualizar algunas de estas nociones y a dar respuesta así a la cuestión de la transformación política en un contexto tan problemático como el contemporáneo. Por eso, el objetivo de este trabajo es tratar de elucidar la concepción de lo político que subyace a la teoría de Adorno y poner su pensamiento en diálogo con perspectivas políticas rigurosamente contemporáneas –particularmente, la de la impolítica y la del pensamiento político posfundacional– para delinear el sentido y la forma posibles de una propuesta de transformación política a partir de la dialéctica adorniana. (shrink)

In this article I argue that the method of normative reconstruction that is underlying Freedom’s Right undermines Critical Theory’s aspiration to be a force that is unreservedly critical and progressive. I start out by giving a brief account of the four premises of the method of normative reconstruction and unpack their implications for how Honneth conceptualizes social pathologies and misdevelopments, specifically that these notions are no longer linked to radical critique and normative revolution. In the second part, I demonstrate that (...) abandoning forms of radical critique and normative revolution is internally linked to adopting this method, before arguing that Freedom’s Right entails no resources to account for why abandoning them does not amount to a deficiency. In the final part, I point out two problematic implications of turning away from radical critique and normative revolution for the very project Honneth pursues in Freedom’s Right. I show that Honneth’s own view about the limited scope of application of the method of normative reconstruction and his account of the dangers associated with social misdevelopments give us reasons to consider this method to be incomplete. Finally, I contend that the explanatory power of Freedom’s Right is dubious because methodological premises that form part of normative reconstruction lead Honneth to ignore relevant alternative explanations of processes of deviation and disassociation from norms of social freedom, which he characterizes as social misdevelopments. (shrink)

This essay revisits Adorno’s relation to Marx through a reading of his recently translated seminar on Marx within the broader context of the two thinkers’ views on the dialectic. While Adorno’s critical comments in the seminar seem to be applicable to some of Marx’s bold assertions about Hegel’s dialectic, taken in isolation, they fail to challenge Marx’s more rigorous analysis of the dialectic, as presented in his introduction to the Grundrisse. Nevertheless, read alongside Adorno’s mature critique of identity, the text (...) of the seminar could be interpreted as pointing to a much more serious criticism of Marx, that is, the criticism of the primacy of economy that animates Marx’s dialectic from within. The essay is concluded with a warning against reducing Adorno’s position on Marx to his criticism of the primacy of economy, followed by a brief reference to the fundamentally transitory character of critical theory. (shrink)

Resumo: De acordo com parte da literatura, a teoria crítica de Adorno é um lamento sobre o fracasso da civilização moderna que é incapaz de dar conta de suas próprias condições de possibilidade. No presente artigo, questiono tal veredito, por meio da análise da questão de como a crítica pode ser feita e de quem seria o destinatário dela, em uma situação de quase completa dominação.: According to a certain part of the relevant literature, Adorno's critical theory is a lament (...) on the failure of modern civilization to explain its own conditions of possibility. In this paper, I question this verdict by analyzing the problem of how criticism can be done and who the addressee for it would be in a situation of almost complete domination. (shrink)

Fabian Freyenhagen's impressive reconstruction of Adorno's ‘practical philosophy’ provides a convincing defence of the possibility of making normative claims about the social world we live in without justifying these claims in terms of the right, the good, or human nature. More specifically, and more controversially, Freyenhagen argues that the normative resources Adorno's critique relies on are provided by a negative Aristotelianism. In this paper, I argue that this approach underestimates the extent to which Adorno follows the model of immanent critique, (...) I highlight the socio-theoretical underpinnings of what Freyenhagen calls Adorno's ‘ethics of resistance’, and I discuss the risk of overstating the danger of co-optation that collective political action faces. (shrink)