À travers la présentation clinique du cas de Caroline, une jeune femme sourde suivie en psychothérapie, ce texte réfléchit à la question de la triangulation, à ses spécificités et achoppements. Du fait des besoins spécifiques de l’enfant, la situation de handicap peut accentuer la situation de dépendance de l’enfant et prolonger la préoccupation maternelle. De même, le handicap sensoriel risque d’engendrer un retard dans l’adaptation des parents à leur enfant et de créer une vulnérabilité dans le lien aux autres, notamment (...) lors des séparations. Ces spécificités intensifieraient la menace de castration, fantasmatiquement attribuée au père, et favoriseraient la fixation à la mère. Une approche psychodynamique permet d’être attentif à la dimension défensive en jeu dans la mise au premier plan d’imagos parentales clivées, avec d’un côté une mère idéale, de l’autre un père qui focalise l’agressivité. (shrink)

John Cook Wilson (1849–1915) was Wykeham Professor of Logic at New College, Oxford and the founder of ‘Oxford Realism’, a philosophical movement that flourished at Oxford during the first decades of the 20th century. Although trained as a classicist and a mathematician, his most important contribution was to the theory of knowledge, where he argued that knowledge is factive and not definable in terms of belief, and he criticized ‘hybrid’ and ‘externalist’ accounts. He also argued for direct realism in perception, (...) criticizing both empiricism and idealism, and argued for a moderate nominalist view of universals as being in rebus and only ‘apprehended’ by their particulars. His influence helped swaying Oxford away from idealism and, through figures such as H. A. Prichard, Gilbert Ryle, or J. L. Austin, his ideas were also to some extent at the origin of ‘moral intuitionism’ and ‘ordinary language philosophy’ which defined much of Oxford philosophy until the second half of the twentieth-century. Nevertheless, his name and legacy were all but forgotten for generations after World War II. Still, his views on knowledge are with us today, being in part at work in the writings of philosophers as diverse as John McDowell, Charles Travis, and Timothy Williamson. (shrink)

This paper examines causal theories of reference with respect to how plausible an account they give of non-physical natural kind terms such as ‘gene’ as well as of the truth of the associated theoretical claims. I first show that reference fixism for ‘gene’ fails. By this, I mean the claim that the reference of ‘gene’ was stable over longer historical periods, for example, since the classical period of transmission genetics. Second, I show that the theory of partial reference does not (...) do justice to some widely held realist intuitions about classical genetics. This result is at loggerheads with the explicit goals usually associated with partial theories of reference, which is to defend a realist semantics for scientific terms. Thirdly, I show that, contrary to received wisdom and perhaps contrary to physics and chemistry, neither reference fixism nor partial reference are necessary in order to hold on to scientific realism about biology. I pinpoint the reasons for this in the nature of biological kinds, which do not even remotely resemble natural kinds (i.e., Lockean real essences) as traditionally conceived. (shrink)