There is still considerable debate among commentators about the extent to which Descartes intended to, or actually did, exercise the principle of methodic doubt. Basically, the debate is about the import of the word “all” in the opening sentence of the synopsis of the Meditations: “In the first Meditation I set forth the reasons for which we may, generally speaking, doubt about all things … ”. A. K. Stout and Willis Doney have argued that the thing to be doubted is (...) all knowledge to the extent in which memory plays a role in it. They attempt to show that Descartes is looking for a guarantee for the reliability of memory rather than for, say, a guarantee for the reliability of all clear and distinct ideas. Most commentators do not restrict methodic doubt in this way. For example, Alan Gewirth has recently suggested that sometimes Descartes even doubts the cogito. (shrink)

This paper defends an interpretation of Descartes according to which he sees us as having normative (and not merely psychological) certainty of all clear and distinct ideas during the period in which they are apprehended clearly and distinctly. However, on this view, a retrospective doubt about clear and distinct ideas is possible. This interpretation allows Descartes to avoid the Cartesian Circle in an effective way and also shows that Descartes is surprisingly, in some respects, an epistemological externalist. The paper goes (...) on to defend this interpretation against some powerful philosophical objections by Margaret Wilson and others by showing how Descartes' doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths can be brought in to support his epistemology. This doctrine and other analogous positions in Descartes can also reveal that Descartes, again surprisingly, takes important steps toward doing epistemology without direct appeal to God and God's veracity. (shrink)

In the Fifth Meditation Descartes considers the problem of knowledge preservation : the challenge of accounting for the diachronic certainty of perfect knowledge [scientia]. There are two general solutions to PKP in the literature: the regeneration solution and the infallible memory solution. While both readings pick up on features of Descartes’ considered view, I argue that they ultimately fall short. Salvaging pieces from both readings and drawing from Descartes’ virtue theory, I argue on textual and systematic grounds for a dispositionalist (...) solution. On this view, the diachronic certainty of scientia is achieved through virtuous habits of belief. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn answering the circularity charge, Descartes consistently distinguished between truths whose demonstrations we currently perceive clearly and distinctly and truths whose demonstrations we merely remember having perceived clearly and distinctly. Descartes uses C-truths to prove God’s existence, thus validating R-truths. While avoiding one form of circularity, this introduces another circle, for Descartes believes that God’s existence validates R-truths even when itself an R-truth. I consider Newman and Nelson’s grounds enhancement strategy according to which this problem is solved when God’s existence (...) is rendered axiomatic. I argue that since it is still possible to doubt axioms when not directly apprehending them, this strategy cannot work; having to reproduce the argument for God’s existence in face of sceptical doubt is unavoidable. Drawing both on Newman and Nelson’s notion of grounds enhancement and on repr... (shrink)

Znaczenie epistemiczne aktualnie jasnych i wyraźnych ujęć w epistemologii Kartezjusza W niniejszym artykule omawiam kwestię dotyczącą roli, jaką Kartezjusz wyznaczył w budowie gmachu wiedzy pewnej temu, co można określić mianem aktualnie jasnych i wyraźnych ujęć. Powyższa kwestia jest od dawna przedmiotem ożywionej dyskusji wśród komentatorów epistemologii Kartezjusza. W współczesnej literaturze historyczno-filozoficznej spotkać można dwie zasadnicze interpretacje na temat funkcji jaką pełnią w systemie Kartezjusza aktualnie jasne i wyraźne ujęcia. Pierwszą można nazwać interpretacją psychologiczną, drugą zaś normatywną. Ta ostatnia głosi, że (...) aktualnie jasne i wyraźne ujęcia są całkowicie odporne na wątpienie zanim jeszcze dowiedzie się istnienia Boga i ustali ogólną regułę prawdy. Z tego względu ich pewność nie ogranicza się u Kartezjusza jedynie do pewności psychologicznej, lecz ma charakter normatywny. Opowiadam się za interpretacją normatywną. Przemawiają za nią – moim zdaniem – liczne racje. Ale rodzi ona także pewne trudności. Dlatego po przedstawieniu argumentów przemawiających na jej rzecz i niewątpliwych zalet wynikających z jej przyjęcia, omawiam szczegółowo pewne trudności zarówno tekstowe, jak i merytoryczne, którym musi sprostać ta interpretacja, jeśli mamy ją utrzymać. (shrink)

The problem of the Cartesian Circle has been with us ever since the publication of the Meditations. This is quite remarkable, since the error of circularity which Descartes is accused of having committed is not a subtle one but is, if there is such an error, a gigantic blunder which is not difficult to discover, which was pointed out to Descartes shortly after the Meditations appeared, and which completely undermines Descartes’ primary project, the establishment of sure and certain knowledge. It (...) is incredible that Descartes, a slow and careful thinker with considerable philosophical talent, could have made such an obvious and egregious error. It is much more plausible that there really is no circularity in Descartes’ argument, and that the charges of circularity grow out of a misunderstanding of Descartes’ intention or of the way in which his argument progresses.The incredible, of course, is possible, and I am not proposing that the question of the circle be resolved merely by dismissing it, nor am I suggesting that the text be ignored in order to force consistency onto Descartes’ thought. (shrink)

Resumen: Este artículo ofrece razones iniciales para interpretar en forma dia-léctica las “pruebas de la existencia divina” que Descartes ofrece en sus Meditaciones III y V. Primero indico algunos precedentes entre los comentaristas contemporáneos y señalo cómo esa manera de abordar los problemas funda-mentales arranca en los clásicos griegos. Después muestro cómo un procedi-miento dialéctico podría resolver un conjunto de problemas que, en principio, incluye el tradicional “círculo cartesiano”. Por último, intento mostrar que no es impensable atribuirle a Descartes una (...) argumentación metafísica del tipo indicado; para ello, esgrimo un pequeño conjunto de argumentos textuales. Mi conclusión es que este tipo de interpretaciones merecen explorarse con mayor esmero.: This paper intends to sketch an initial reason for reading in a dialec-tical way the “proofs of God’s existence” in Descartes’ Meditations, III and V. I begin by indicating antecedents for this kind of interpretation among com-mentators, and show how this approach towards basic philosophical prob-lems can be traced to the Greek classics. I then try to explain how this ar-gumentative procedure can afford in principle a solution to the well-known riddle of the “Cartesian circle”, among other related issues. Finally, I discuss a small set of textual points and show that attributing a dialectical character to Descartes’ main metaphysical arguments should not be taken to be implausi-ble at all. I conclude that interpretations of this kind deserve a more careful exploration. (shrink)

This paper argues for a novel solution to the Cartesian Circle by emphasising the important epistemic role of the Second Meditation and Descartes’ faculty epistemology. I argue that, for Descartes: doubt requires a ‘good reason’ to doubt ; whether a reason qualifies as a ‘good reason’ depends on which faculty produces that reason ; and for distinct metaphysical perceptions from the faculty of the intellect, no other faculty can provide ‘good reasons’ to doubt. The upshot of §2 is that the (...) doubts raised up to the Third Meditation do not apply to the distinct metaphysical perceptions of the intellect, and in particular do not apply to the premises of the proof of the existence of God. I present the role of God as primarily to secure clear and distinct perceptions beyond the intellect, and knowledge of conclusions when those conclusions are no longer being clearly and distinctly perceived. Finally, I give an account of Descartes’ use of ‘ cognoscere ’, ‘ scire ’, and ‘ scientia ’ as three distinct epistemic levels, providing a valuable structure within which one can see the meditator progress. (shrink)

This version has been superseded by the one published in Spring, 2014.

Descartes is not widely recognized for his ethics; indeed, most readers are unaware that he had an ethics. However, Descartes placed great importance on his ethics, claiming that ethics is the highest branch of his philosophical system. I aim to understand the systematic relationship Descartes envisions between his ethics and the rest of his philosophy, particularly his metaphysics and epistemology. I defend three main theses. First, I argue against the recent trend in the literature that claims that the chief virtue (...) in Descartes’ ethics—generosity—is acquired in the Meditations. On this view, the presence of moral virtue in the Meditations shows that ethical practice is intertwined with metaphysics and epistemology. I argue that generosity cannot be acquired in the Meditations because acquiring generosity presupposes several metaphysical and physical truths that the meditator cannot access given her epistemic position. Thus, I maintain that metaphysics and epistemology is foundational to ethics. Second, I resolve the tension between Descartes’ description of distinct virtues, and his insistence that there is only a single virtue—the disposition to judge well. Drawing from his theory of conceptual distinction in his metaphysics, I argue that Descartes offers a unique account of the unity of the virtues. Although Descartes describes different virtues, he thinks that all of them are identical to each other because they are reducible to the disposition to judge well. Nonetheless, we can conceptually distinguish between the virtues because we can regard the disposition to judge well in different ways given the various applications it has in different types of moral situations. Third, I show that some of Descartes’ ethical concepts inform his epistemology. I draw from Descartes’ theory of virtue to address “the problem of knowledge preservation,” that is, how to render perfect knowledge— scientia—stable in light of the instability of clear and distinct perceptions. I argue that Descartes intends to preserve scientia by grounding items of scientia in virtuous habits of belief. These habits of belief are established through repeated engagement with cognitive routes to clear and distinct perceptions, and are ultimately grounded in memory. This reading has the advantage of explaining Descartes’ notoriously confusing remarks about memory in response to the Cartesian circle. (shrink)

This dissertation examines Rene Descartes' view of certainty and defends the view that Cartesian certainty is possible. The first half of the dissertation includes an interpretation of Descartes' epistemology as well as an examination of other interpreters' readings. The second half of the dissertation is a defense of the claim that Cartesian certainty of a particular kind is possible; it includes a variety of contemporary objections and replies in defense of the possibility of certainty.

Ever since Arnauld and others first pointed it out in their objections to Descartes' Meditations, philosophers have concerned themselves with what appears to be a vicious circle: that the principle of clarity and distinctness which is employed to validate God's existence is itself in need of a guarantee which only God's existence can provide. In general, contemporary commentators proposing solutions to this problem can be divided into three camps: first, there are those who see reason as autonomous for Descartes and (...) the principle of clarity and distinctness as needing no guarantee. By 'autonomy of reason' I mean that the faculty by which the Cogito and other of Descartes' first principles are perceived is not in need of any verification of its inability to err. Second, there are those who see reason as only partially autonomous for Descartes with that part validating the proof of God's existence which in turn validates that aspect of reason which is not autonomous. Third, there are those who see reason as non-autonomous and who argue for distinctions in the concepts of certainty and doubt in order to avoid the circle. ;In this dissertation I present the problem by drawing directly from the Meditations and the Objections and Replies and I outline the strategy I will employ in dealing with the problem. I proceed to discuss in turn each of the aforementioned three positions, the arguments offered by proponents of each, and the criticism of each, both my own and those found in the literature of the problem. Taking the third position, the non-autonomy of reason, as my starting point, I then present my own interpretation of Descartes' strategy which, I argue, succeeds in circumventing the problem of circular reasoning and in overcoming the objections raised against others. (shrink)

Much ado has been made regarding Descartes's understanding of the creation of what he called the "eternal truths" because he described them, paradoxically, as both the free creations of God, and necessary. While there are many varying interpretations of Cartesian modality, the issue has heretofore been treated in a vacuum, as a niche issue having little import beyond being an interesting puzzle for Descartes Scholars. I argue that this treatment is misguided, and that in order to properly understand Cartesian philosophy (...) at all, one must properly understand Descartes's theory of modality. This, however, is no small feat; in order to understand Descartes's seemingly peculiar view on modality, one must first make sense of what Descartes understood the nature of God to be. One reason for this, I argue, is the systematic nature of Cartesian philosophy; indeed when dealing with a dense inter-connection of philosophical issues, one must move from what is more known in itself to what is more known to us, and not the other way around. I argue that in the literature on Cartesian modality, insufficient attention has been paid to the influence of the French School of Spirituality on the Cartesian notion of the divine. I argue that this influence pushed Descartes to criticize traditional attempts to split the horns of Plato's Euthyphro dilemma as violating a proper understanding of the doctrine of divine simplicity. Descartes's commitment to a radical form of the doctrine of divine simplicity leads him to a version of divine voluntarism wherein all `things' depend on God for their existence, and God cannot have had antecedent reason to prefer the creation of anything over anything else. There is little doubt that Descartes embraced the voluntarist horn of the Euthyphro dilemma, but just what that means for Cartesian modality and philosophy generally remains a contentious issue. I argue that Descartes is best read as what I call an `agnostic quietist' regarding God given textual, historical, and systematic considerations. One virtue of an agnostic quietist reading is that I am able to square the passages where Descartes discusses the inconceivability of God's power with the conclusions reached regarding God's non-deceiving nature in the Meditations and elsewhere. Further virtues that I explore are the effects that a quietist reading has on the Cartesian scientific programme, the infamous mind-body problem, Descartes's seemingly inconsistent view regarding human free-will and Descartes's refusal to engage in "theology." Traditionally, Cartesian epistemology has been understood to be a purely a priori undertaking, which succumbs to deep and insurmountable problems. One of the greatest problems facing the Cartesian was the move from the mind to the world. Simon Blackburn, for example, says of the Cartesian epistemological project in the Meditations that Descartes "has put himself on a desert island from which there is no escape." This view is echoed by, and even motivates some of the contemporary views concerning Cartesian modality. I argue, however, that a proper understanding of the Cartesian doctrine of clear and distinct ideas circumvents this famous problem. By highlighting the proper understanding and application of the doctrine of clear and distinct ideas, I show that such ideas not only guarantee the existence of an external truth-maker, but also that such ideas do not do much more than show that there is a truth-maker. I argue that in instances of clear and distinct perception, the truth of the idea is normatively certain, but what makes it true is yet to be established. In this way, clear and distinct ideas are both powerful, in terms of guaranteeing truth, and relatively unhelpful, in that further work is required in order to determine to what the ideas conform. I argue that this is the case not only for actual truths, but for some clearly intuited truths about possibility. As an illustration of my overall thesis, I address the Cartesian argument for the separability of mind and body, and entertain the various interpretations of Descartes's view of human freedom. I argue that in order to understand Cartesian views on either of these issues, one must first make sense of his modal commitments. In both of these cases Descartes claims that finite minds can know that something is possible, even though what makes it possible is well beyond what they can understand. (shrink)

(Shoshana Smith now goes by her married name, Shoshana Brassfield: http://philpapers.org/profile/37640) Descartes famously claims that everything we perceive clearly and distinctly is true. Although this rule is fundamental to Descartes’s theory of knowledge, readers from Gassendi and Leibniz onward have complained that unless Descartes can say explicitly what clear and distinct perception is, how we know when we have it, and why it cannot be wrong, then the rule is empty. I offer a detailed analysis of clear and distinct perception, (...) showing how Descartes answers these questions. Many doubts about the usefulness of the clarity and distinctness rule arise from the mistaken assumption that in clear and distinct perception, like sense perception, we must be able to establish a correspondence between perception and reality before we can have knowledge. I show that Descartes has a different metaphysical picture of clear and distinct perception. Clear and distinct perception is direct perception, typically of essences. On this view, by relying on the intellect instead of the senses, we can have direct perception not only of our own ideas, but also of a mind-independent reality. Because clear and distinct perception is direct perception, problems of correspondence do not arise. My account of clear and distinct perception also yields unique insight into other issues in Descartes, such as the Cartesian Circle and the doctrine of the free creation of the eternal truths. Completed at the University of California, 2005. Dissertation advisers: Janet Broughton, Hannah Ginsborg, Anthony A. Long. ProQuest UMI: 3187156. (shrink)

Descartes understood the subject matter of physics (or natural philosophy) to encompass the whole of nature, including living things. It therefore comprised not only nonvital phenomena, including those we would now denominate as physical, chemical, minerological, magnetic, and atmospheric; it also extended to the world of plants and animals, including the human animal (with the exception of those aspects of the human mind that Descartes assigned to solely to thinking substance: pure intellect and will). Descartes wrote extensively on physiology and (...) on the physiology and psychology of the senses. This chapter examines the notions of *physiology* and *psychology* in medical and natural philosophical works of Descartes' day; follows his efforts to bring physiology into his mechanistic idiom; considers the relation between physiology of the animal machine and psychological functions that yield functionally appropriate behavior; goes into his physiology and psychology of vision; and elaborates the tension in Descartes' works between his metaphysically supported micro-corpuscularism and his discussion of the animal machine as an organic unity comprising various functionally and teleologically characterized systems. The chapter draws on Descartes' works in both metaphysics and natural philosophy, including his Treatise on Man (originally published as L'Homme, 1664). (shrink)

Early in his career, Max Deutscher he started to explore questions in the philosophy of mind, which continue to interest him. His early reading of Jean-Paul Sartre, and the work of Gilbert Ryle, informs all his work. My paper traces the theme of genre in philosophy as it is exemplified and discussed throughout Deutscher’s work, including Judgment After Arendt (2007).