Postmodernism is often characterized, among other things, as the belief in the unattainability of objective truth and as a rejection of teleological and reductionist, or essentialist, forms of thought. For instance, in his provocative book The Rhetoric of Economics, Donald McCloskey sketches the implications for economic methodology of Richard Rorty's rejection of the modernist quest for Truth, as represented by various rationalist and empiricist epistemologies. McCloskey describes modernist methodology as displaying a desire to predict and control, a search for objective–;which (...) often means measurable–;knowledge, and an attempt to develop a value-free inquiry, among other characteristics. This “methodological correctness,” McCloske suggests, is discredited by the postmodern dissatisfaction with traditional epistemology. Thus, in place of the modernist belief in a rule-guided path to truth, he advocates a “free market” approach to knowledge, in which participants in the variety of theoretical conversations agree to be earnest and listen politely to one another. (shrink)

In attempting to build intelligent litigation support tools, we have moved beyond first generation, production rule legal expert systems. Our work integrates rule based and case based reasoning with intelligent information retrieval.When using the case based reasoning methodology, or in our case the specialisation of case based retrieval, we need to be aware of how to retrieve relevant experience. Our research, in the legal domain, specifies an approach to the retrieval problem which relies heavily on an extended object oriented/rule based (...) system architecture that is supplemented with causal background information. We use a distributed agent architecture to help support the reasoning process of lawyers. (shrink)

Given statements like these about current developments in intellectualizing about law in America it is an exciting time to look at American legal philosophy. Given the ferment in the law schools and the volume of literature in the law journals it is also a difficult task confidently to extract the main lines of current thought and adequately to assess the significance of current intellectual movements. American lawyers are inclined to point out that there is no such thing as ‘American law’. (...) Rather, in addition to Federal law and the Supreme Court's jurisdiction there are some fifty jurisdictions each with its own Constitution, Legislature and Supreme Court and consequently diversity rather than uniformity is the rule. Equally, the very idea that there is some single, coherent and widely accepted theory of law deserving description as ‘American legal philosophy’ obviously begs all manner of significant questions. (shrink)

The article unveils the intellectual indebtedness of Hans J. Morgenthau's realist theory of international power politics to Freudian meta- and group psychology. It examines an unpublished Morgenthau essay about Freudian anthropology written in 1930, placing this work within the context of Morgenthau's magna opera, the 1946 Scientific Man vs. Power Politics and the 1948 Politics among Nations. The article concludes that Morgenthau's international theory is ultimately based on the early instinct theory of Sigmund Freud. Freud is thus to be seen (...) as one of Morgenthau's intellectual fathers. A second main argument refers to the theoretical tradition that Morgenthau has founded within International Relations (IR), namely: political realism. By investigating its core principles, it is argued that realism also may be rooted in Freudian thought. Throughout, the article calls upon IR, Morgenthau scholarship, and international-political theory to take Freud seriously. (shrink)

A variety of theoretical positions are emerging to explain the judicial process from such perspectives as hermeneutics, semiotics, critical theory and argumentation/rhetoric. They ask such questions as these: What is the source of judicial authority? How do judges arrive at their decisions? By what logic are decisions to be tested? In this essay I argue that a focus on decisions and their justifications alone masks the broader process in which judges, along with all the other relevant groups, engage in a (...) continuing and evolving dialogue to structure their normative universe through the complementary processes of dialectic and rhetoric. Contemporary concepts of argumentation can serve to analyze this process critically. (shrink)

The article focuses on the problem of constitutional symbolism in functionally differentiated societies and its relevance to legal, political, and moral systems. The first part analyses differences between the three systems and their constitutional context. The second part concentrates on the moral symbolic function of modern constitutions and its temporal dimension. It shows that the “good/bad” moral code of constitutions draws on expressive symbolism and transforms it into evaluative symbolism and dogma of morality. The final part analyses the prospective character (...) of modern constitution‐making and its symbolic selectivity regarding the past. The paper concludes by emphasising the systemic pluralisation effect of constitution‐making and the impossibility of constituting systems of “pure” law, morality, and politics. (shrink)

The dominant social scientific approach to studying judicial behavior treats judges as strategic actors pursuing their political preferences under institutional constraint. The intellectual roots of this rational choice approach are in American law’s long but sporadic engagement with pragmatist ideas. This article challenges that approach: a fully pragmatist account of judicial action provides a better description of the intellectual and social work of judging, and better explains how judges reach a decision in difficult cases that most affect the development of (...) law and its relationship to society. The article argues that the foundational intellectual problem for appellate judges is how to define the legal questions presented in a case. Definitions of legal questions arise from the interplay of habitual and creative action in the local social context of an appeals court. Professional and local interpretive habits and legal forms ordinarily do a great deal to define the key questions, which are not strictly determined when a case comes before a court. Unscripted small group interactions at oral arguments also figure in question definition; oral arguments are most important in the rare but legally important cases where habitual practices alone are insufficient to delimit the legal question judges must answer. Supported by extensive interviews with federal appeals judges and clerks, the article illustrates judges’ creative, interactional efforts to define an answerable question in a major asylum case decided in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Building from this case, the article describes the factors that shape judicial question definition, and describes the conditions when creative judicial action is likely to be most prominent. (shrink)

In this article I will show that ‘best interests’ is a concept that fits nicely with many of the features of pragmatism—Holm and Edgar’s rejection of the principle in favour of pragmatism it will be suggested is misplaced. ‘Best interests’ as a principle may be considered an embodiment of the ideals of pragmatic adjudication. The paper starts by briefly introducing the concept of ‘best interests’ and theories of judicial and legal ‘pragmatism’. This article will examine the role of the rational (...) decision-maker in medical law and argue that this role is limited. The paper concludes by suggesting how we view the relationship between ‘best interests’ and ‘pragmatism’. (shrink)

This essay examines judicial decision-making from the perspective of Whiteheadian ‘process philosophy’. As such, it seeks to demonstrate how the explanatory categories of process thought can be applied to law and legal reasoning in such a way as to expose the nature of the processes that constitute their development. The essay begins with a description of the judicial task drawn from contemporary theorising about legal argumentation, identified in terms of the separation of contexts of decision-making: discovery and justification. In light (...) of this discussion, the essay then adopts Whiteheadian terminology to provide the basis for an alternative understanding and description of the way that a discrete instance of judicial decision-making develops and is maintained within the decision-making process. In this way, independent of any debate over the separation of contexts, the essay seeks not only to expose and unpack the otherwise hidden micro-processes that contribute to and constitute a legal decision but also, by utilising the same conceptual categories of Whiteheadian process thought, to provide a coherent and consistent account of the macro-processes more commonly observed on the level of law as a social realty. The essay argues that the explanatory power of the categoreal scheme of process thought provides a better tool for understanding these relations on all levels. (shrink)

This paper revisits the challenge of Berman and Hafner’s “missing link” paper on representing teleological structure in case-based legal reasoning. It is noted that this was mainly an ontological challenge to represent some of what made legal reasoning distinctive, which was given less attention than factual similarity in the dominant AI and Law paradigm, deriving from HYPO. The response to their paper is noted and briefly evaluated. A parallel is drawn to a new challenge to provide deep structure to the (...) legal context of textual meaning, drawing on the forthcoming work of two Constitutional law scholars who appear to place some faith in the ways of thinking that AI and Law has developed. (shrink)

There is much interest in moving AI out into real world applications, a move which has been encouraged by recent funding which has attempted to show industry and commerce can benefit from the Fifth Generation of computing. In this article I suggest that the legal application area is one which is very much more complex than it might — at first sight — seem. I use arguments from the sociology of law to indicate that the viewing of the legal system (...) as simply a rule-bound discipline is inherently nave. This, while not new in jurisprudence, is — as the literature of AI and law indicates — certainly novel to the field of artificial intelligence. The socio-legal argument provided is set within the context of AI as one more example of the failure of scientific success and method to easily transmit itself over into the social sciences. (shrink)

This article explores the claim that law is characteristically in search of the past. We argue that the structure of memory defines our relationship with the past and this relationship, in turn, has important implications for the nature of law. The article begins by examining the structure of memory, drawing particularly on the work of Henri Bergson. It then draws out the implications of Bergson’s theory for the interplay of past and present, highlighting the challenges this poses for law’s project (...) of retrieval. Law, as an artifact, seeks its origins in human action, but this often yields a static view of legal discourse as the retrieval of pivotal moments. Bergson, by contrast, shows us that past and present influence each other dynamically, giving rise to an integrated whole. The article concludes by exploring the potential for law to transcend the structure of memory. We argue that even beyond the limits of memory legal reasoning encounters a kind of residue left by the ethical foundations of law. Law searches vainly for the past, but what it finds is itself. (shrink)

This paper examines the use of connectionism (neural networks) in modelling legal reasoning. I discuss how the implementations of neural networks have failed to account for legal theoretical perspectives on adjudication. I criticise the use of neural networks in law, not because connectionism is inherently unsuitable in law, but rather because it has been done so poorly to date. The paper reviews a number of legal theories which provide a grounding for the use of neural networks in law. It then (...) examines some implementations undertaken in law and criticises their legal theoretical naïvete. It then presents a lessons from the implementations which researchers must bear in mind if they wish to build neural networks which are justified by legal theories. (shrink)

Critical Legal Studies poses a direct and expressed challenge to the basic tenets of American legal education and scholarship. Critical Legal Studies postulates that law is not a scientific exercise involving the application of objective principles, but rather a creative process involving the selection of conflicting rules which has the effect of reinforcing the existing political order. In an effort to explain the contribution of Critical Legal Studies to argumentation theory, this essay briefly discusses the role of legal reasoning in (...) the American legal system, describes and critiques Legal Positivism, lays the intellectual foundation for Critical Legal Studies, and considers the implications that this conception of jurisprudence has for argumentation theory. (shrink)

Computational models of relevance in case-based legal reasoning have traditionallybeen based on algorithms for comparing the facts and substantive legal issues of aprior case to those of a new case. In this paper we argue that robust models ofcase-based legal reasoning must also consider the broader social and jurisprudentialcontext in which legal precedents are decided. We analyze three aspects of legalcontext: the teleological relations that connect legal precedents to the socialvalues and policies they serve, the temporal relations between prior andsubsequent (...) cases in a legal domain, and the procedural posture of legal cases,which defines the scope of their precedential relevance. Using real examples drawnfrom appellate courts of New York and Massachusetts, we show with the courts' ownarguments that the doctrine of stare decisis (i.e., similar facts should lead to similar results) is subject to contextual constraints and influences. For each of the three aspects of legal context, we outline an expanded computational framework for case-based legal reasoning that encompasses the reasoning of the examples, and provides a foundation for generating a more robust set of legal arguments. (shrink)

La notion d’arbitraire s’est imposée en théorie du droit—où il est question des moyens d’éviter l’arbitraire du juge ou du souverain—et en sémiotique, où la thèse de l’arbitraire du signe est associée à Saussure, un des pères de la “sémiologie”. Pourtant, aucune définition positive n’existe de l’arbitraire, ou du moins aucune ne s’est encore valablement imposée. Le présent article se propose de trouver les raisons pour lesquelles un concept si présent dans la théorie pâtit d’un tel manquement.

American legal realism is commonly treated as a theory-pariah. The article exposes certain reasons explaining such a treatment. Generally, it seems that such an attitude is a result of many misunderstandings of realist aims and ambitions, some of which pertain to the theoretical status of legal realism and its relation to so called general jurisprudential theories, such as legal positivism. In the first part of the article I explain generally what these aims were and how one should see these relations. (...) In the second part I briefly analyze B. Leiter’s famous claim that legal realism is conceptually dependent on hard legal positivism (as a general theory of law). The critique of this claim opens the possibility for some alternative understanding of legal realism. (shrink)

This study aims at investigating vagueness in Security Council Resolutions by focussing on a selection of nouns and phrases used as the main casus belli for the Second Gulf War. Analysing a corpus of Security Council Resolutions relating to the conflict, the study leads a qualitative and quantitative analysis drawing upon Mellinkoff’s theories on “weasel words”, which are “words and expressions with a very flexible meaning, strictly dependent on context and interpretation”. Special attention is devoted to the historical/political consequences of (...) such vague and indeterminate expressions. The findings indicate that excessive vagueness might have led to biased or even strategically-motivated interpretations of the Resolutions, triggering the Iraqi conflict instead of a diplomatic solution. The analysis of the “weasel words” used in the Resolutions suggests the double-faced strength of such expressions: though they can guaranteed a wide degree of applicability of the Resolutions, their subjective interpretability might become a source of manipulation and elusiveness, with the overall legislative intent of using intentional vagueness as a political strategy. (shrink)

This paper construes various positions in the philosophy of science and the philosophy of law as responses to the problem of underdetermination in science and in law. We begin by drawing a close analogy between the successive approaches to this problem in the two fields. In particular, we stress the analogy between conventionalism as a philosophy of science and legal realism as a philosophy of law, and between Putnam's and Dworkin's critiques of these positions. We then challenge the Putnam-Dworkin strategy, (...) arguing that their attempts to combat underdetermination are unsuccessful. We are thus led to scepticism regarding the outlook underlying the celebrated maxim, “ruled by law, not by men”. (shrink)

The notion of reasonable interpretation of legal texts, as opposed to the absurd or unacceptable interpretation, is presupposed in different legal theories as the fundamental basis of legal rationality and as a clear limitation to chaotic behaviour by courts. This article argues that the ever-present notion of reasonability is not a useful descriptive tool for understanding legal practices or how legal institutions work. The article builds on radical legal realism perspective in order to develop two arguments supporting this claim. First, (...) it argues that, from an empirical point of view, the complexity of contemporary law and its multiple layers of normativity do not allow for the description of what a reasonable interpretation is, since no coherent universal interpretative community can be envisioned. Second, from a conceptual point of view, it argues that describing the references interpreters make to reasonability as references to a semantic object—that is, to some kind of universal “reasonableness”, a model of reasonable behaviour or rationality—is not a reliable way of understanding judicial practice in a certain legal context. This is the case because, as an internal justification discourse, the appeal to reasonability by the interpreter has no bearing on truth or correctness. Nothing prevents courts from cherry-picking a meaning for reasonability in each case, using it as the justification to solve similar cases in different, sometimes contradictory ways. In short, the concept of reasonability cannot be taken, in itself, as an instrument of legal analysis. As a prescriptive discourse, it can merely be one of the objects legal science intends to observe and explain. Its discursive functions—not its semantic references—, as part of a strategy to convince and to justify, are the only observable elements that can sustain a coherent falsifiable description by legal science. (shrink)

Moral and theoretical deficiencies of the main foundation strategies in social and political systems (Social Engineering, Foundationalism and Invisible Hand theories) are explained by the necessity of a synthesis of different kinds of rationality, i.e., goal-rationality, norm-rationality and rightness and weighing rationality. The anthropological basis of the theory is a distinction between homo finalis and homo socialis. At the institutional level, this conception leads to a synthesis of the rule of law and the welfare state. At the political level, this (...) implies a retonsideration of the principles of democracy and political planning. (shrink)

Los sesgos cognitivos afectan negativamente la toma de decisiones en todas las esferas de la vida, incluyendo las decisiones de los jueces. La imposibilidad de eliminarlos por completo de la práctica del derecho, o incluso de controlar sus efectos, contrasta con el anhelo de que las decisiones judiciales sean el resultado exclusivo de un razonamiento lógico-jurídico correcto. Frente el efecto sistemático, recalcitrante y porfiado de los sesgos cognitivos, una posible estrategia para disminuir su efecto es enfocarse, no en modificar el (...) comportamiento de los agentes judiciales, sino en moldear su entorno para que los sesgos tengan menos oportunidades de aparecer. En particular, es más provechoso concentrar los esfuerzos en identificar aquellas reglas procesales que faciliten o limiten el efecto de los sesgos. En este ensayo propongo un diálogo fructífero entre el derecho y la psicología que puede llevar a mejorar la calidad de los sistemas judiciales. La propuesta está basada en la creación de guías de práctica judicial que puedan servir de base para la creación de protocolos procesales que limiten en la medida de lo razonable sus efectos negativos y conduzcan a mejores decisiones judiciales. (shrink)

The article examines the feasibility and the possibility of «the language of sociology» usage in jurisprudence. It is proved that «the language of sociology» not only promotes the implementation of the methodological function of law, but actively supports «the spirit of law» in the studying of social processes. It is emphasized that the coexistence in the modern society of two systems of norms - social legal and social non-legal - requires the search for differentiation criteria. As such criteria, it is (...) proposed to use the criterion of coercion and the criterion of the consideration procedure. (shrink)