- Précis of Causation and free will.Carolina Sartorio - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1513-1516.details
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Normative Verantwortung für Handlungen Anderer. Eine Untersuchung im Rahmen der stit -Theorie.Sarah Ganter & Heinrich Wansing - 2005 - Facta Philosophica 7 (2):167-187.details
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Making a Difference in a Deterministic World.Carolina Sartorio - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (2):189-214.details
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Flickers of Freedom and Moral Luck.Carolina Sartorio - 2019 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):93-105.details
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A Partial Defense of the Actual-Sequence Model of Freedom.Carolina Sartorio - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):107-120.details
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A new asymmetry between actions and omissions.Carolina Sartorio - 2005 - Noûs 39 (3):460–482.details
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Actual Causes and Free Will.Carolina Sartorio - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (45):147-165.details
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Nudging in interpersonal contexts.Yashar Saghai - 2013 - American Journal of Bioethics 13 (6):33-34.details
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Rescatando los casos Mele/Robb.Pablo Rychter - 2018 - Quaderns de Filosofia 5 (1).details
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Rescuing Mele/Robb-Style Cases.Pablo Rychter - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (4):689-705.details
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Does Free Will Require Alternative Possibilities?Pablo Rychter - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (45):131-146.details
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Imitation, conscious will and social conditioning.Daniel Rueda Garrido - 2020 - Mind and Society 20 (1):85-102.details
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A conditional theory of trying.David-Hillel Ruben - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):271-287.details
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Raising Responsibility: Motherhood and Moral Luck.Sheryl Tuttle Ross - 2009 - Hypatia 24 (1):56-69.details
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Freedom as Satisfaction? A Critique of Frankfurt's Hierarchical Theory of Freedom.Christian F. Rostbøll - 2004 - SATS 5 (1):131-146.details
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Decision-Making and Self-Governing Systems.Adina L. Roskies - 2016 - Neuroethics 11 (3):245-257.details
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50 Years of responsibility without alternative possibilities: guest editors’ introduction.Jaster Romy & Keil Geert - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (9):1143-1148.details
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Semikompatybilizm J. M. Fischera w kontekście alternatywnych możliwości działań.Krzysztof Rojek - 2015 - Idea. Studia Nad Strukturą I Rozwojem Pojęć Filozoficznych 27:177-197.details
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Causal deviance and the ascription of intent and blame.Ross Rogers, Mark D. Alicke, Sarah G. Taylor, David Rose, Teresa L. Davis & Dori Bloom - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (3):404-427.details
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The limits of limited-blockage Frankfurt-style cases.Michael Robinson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):429-446.details
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Self-Inflicted Frankfurt-Style Cases and Flickers of Freedom.Michael Robinson - forthcoming - The Journal of Ethics:1-23.details
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Robust flickers of freedom.Michael Robinson - 2019 - Social Philosophy and Policy 36 (1):211-233.details
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Modified Frankfurt-type counterexamples and flickers of freedom.Michael Robinson - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (2):177-194.details
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Flickering the W‐Defense.Michael Robinson - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):198-210.details
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Semicompatibilismo, Responsabilidade e Manipulação.Leonardo Mello Ribeiro - 2011 - Ethic@ - An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 10 (2):255-279.details
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Doxastic Voluntarism and the Function of Epistemic Evaluations.Steven L. Reynolds - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (1):19-35.details
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The causal structure of Frankfurt‐ and PAP‐style cases.Matthew Rellihan - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.details
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Rightly or for Ill: The Ethics of Individual Memory.Alison Reiheld - 2018 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 28 (4):377-410.details
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Divine Command Theory and Theistic Activism.Simin Rahimi - 2012 - Heythrop Journal 53 (4):551-559.details
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An aristotelian approach to cognitive enhancement.Lubomira Radoilska - 2010 - Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (3):365–375.details
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Two Intuitions about Free Will: Alternative Possibilities and Intentional Endorsement.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Christian List - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):155-172.details
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Moral Bio-enhancement, Freedom, Value and the Parity Principle.Jonathan Pugh - 2019 - Topoi 38 (1):73-86.details
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Anti-luck epistemology and the Gettier problem.Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):93-111.details
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Online Responsibility: Bad Samaritanism and the Influence of Internet Mediation.Saskia E. Polder-Verkiel - 2012 - Science and Engineering Ethics 18 (1):117-141.details
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Free Will, Determinism and the “Problem” of Structure and Agency in the Social Sciences.Nigel Pleasants - 2019 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 49 (1):3-30.details
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Omissões.Ulysses Pinheiro - 2006 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 47 (113):159-183.details
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Practical philosophy and the Gettier Problem: is virtue epistemology on the right track?Christian Piller - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):73-91.details
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Beware of Safety.Christian Piller - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (4):01-29.details
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The elements of responsibility.Philip Pettit - 2005 - Philosophical Books 46 (3):210-219.details
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On Carolina Sartorio’s Causation and Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1535-1543.details
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Moral Bioenhancement, Freedom and Reason.Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (3):263-268.details
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Living without free will: The case for hard incompatibilism.Derk Pereboom - 2002 - The Journal of Ethics 6 (3):477-488.details
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Hard incompatibilism and its rivals.Derk Pereboom - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):21 - 33.details
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Further thoughts about a Frankfurt-style argument.Derk Pereboom - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):109 – 118.details
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Frankfurt examples, derivative responsibility, and the timing objection1.Derk Pereboom - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):298-315.details
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Can’t We All Just be Compatibilists?: A Critical Study of John Martin Fischer’s My Way.John Perry - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (2):157-166.details
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Can God Be Free?Derk Pereboom - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):121-127.details
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Principles of Criminal Liability from the Semiotic Point of View.Michał Peno & Olgierd Bogucki - 2020 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 34 (2):561-578.details
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J.D. Velleman, On Being Me: A Personal Invitation to Philosophy (with illustrations by Emily C. Bernstein). Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2020. ISBN 978-0-691-20095-8, $12.95, Hbk. [REVIEW]Daniel Peixoto Murata - 2022 - Journal of Value Inquiry 56 (2):319-333.details
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Does doxastic responsibility entail the ability to believe otherwise?Rik Peels - 2013 - Synthese 190 (17):3651-3669.details
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