Este texto aborda la concepción de la propiedad republicana-jeffersoniana y defiende que el principio político-filosófico que subyace a la misma es el del pacto fiduciario. Para ello se exponen las características de las relaciones fiduciarias diferenciándolas a su vez de las contractuales. Para ilustrar este tipo de relaciones, se abordan dos casos de estudio estrechamente relacionados en el republicanismo de Jefferson: las instituciones políticas y la propiedad. Se pretende así mostrar que su concepción republicana-fiduciaria es la que alimenta el principio (...) de la “utilidad pública” de la propiedad privada presente todavía hoy en el constitucionalismo moderno y democrático. This paper addresses the Jeffersonian-republican conception of property and defends that the political-philosophical principle that underlies it is that of the fiduciary agreement. In order to do so, the characteristics of fiduciary relationships are exposed, differentiating them from the contractual ones. To illustrate this type of relationships, two closely related case studies in Jefferson’s republicanism are addressed: political institutions and property. The aim is thus show that his republican-fiduciary rationale is the one that feeds the principle of eminent domain of private property which is still present in modern and democratic constitutionalism. (shrink)

Republicanism is increasingly attracting more attention from political philosophy. However, a mere hermeneutical approach it is usually used, which tends to neglect the political, social and economic circumstances that shaped this tradition of thought. This article addresses the modern conception of republican freedom with the North American and the French case through the work of two of their most representative figures, Thomas Jefferson and Maximilien Robespierre. The article defends that the political, juridical and economic government – the republican political economy– (...) devised by both, keeps important similarities that the current political philosophy cannot ignore. To illustrate this relationship, it is shown that both thinkers received a deep and similar influence of natural law philosophy and of fiduciary theory when thinking and trying to implement their models of government and their idea of ownership. (shrink)

This article presents a conceptual investigation into the value impacts and relations of algorithms in the domain of justice and security. As a conceptual investigation, it represents one step in a value sensitive design based methodology. Here, we explicate and analyse the expression of values of accuracy, privacy, fairness and equality, property and ownership, and accountability and transparency in this context. We find that values are sensitive to disvalue if algorithms are designed, implemented or deployed inappropriately or without sufficient consideration (...) for their value impacts, potentially resulting in problems including discrimination and constrained autonomy. Furthermore, we outline a framework of conceptual relations of values indicated by our analysis, and potential value tensions in their implementation and deployment with a view towards supporting future research, and supporting the value sensitive design of algorithms in justice and security. (shrink)

Though we cherish freedom and equality, there are human relations we commonly take to be morally permissible despite the fact that they essentially involve an inequality specifically of freedom, i.e., parental and fiduciary relations. In this article, I argue that the morality of these relations is best understood through a very old and dangerous concept, the concept of status. Despite their historic and continuing abuses, status relations are alive and well today, I argue, because some of them are necessary. We (...) must therefore carefully specify the conditions in which such status relations may morally obtain, as well as the duties of virtue and duties of right to which all parties are subject when it does (including a duty of care) to clearly articulate the ways in which these putatively moral status relations that essentially involve an asymmetry of autonomy (status relations) can go well or badly even within the context of the Kantian tradition from which our current legal and social practices arose. To this end, I offer Kant's own concept of status as a promising one because in Kant's theory, status is a nexus of virtue and right that is reducible to neither property nor contract but akin to each in familiar ways. Once status is admitted as an alternative to property and contract, status may be extended beyond Kant's domestic paradigm, most perspicuously to institutional ethics. In this article, I sketch a status-based theory of stakeholding that locates environmental impact, institutional oppression, and other significant features of our moral landscape within a Kantian framework of duties rich enough to more accurately characterize the complexities of stakeholding than current tradition has allowed. (shrink)