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  1. Moral Monsters, Significance, and Meaning in Life.Chad Mason Stevenson - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-18.
    Can a moral monster - a person whose life is characterised by immoral actions - live a meaningful life? Pre-theoretical intuitions appear divided. For some, moral monsters can't live a meaningful life because they were immoral, while for others they did because morality is irrelevant. So what is the relationship between morality and meaning? This article contends that both sides are partially correct but for the wrong reasons: moral monsters don’t live meaningful lives, but morality is irrelevant for meaning. First, (...)
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  • II. Eisenberg and self‐obligations.Nicholas Fotion - 1970 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 13 (1-4):458-461.
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  • The Paradox of Duties to Oneself.Daniel Muñoz - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):691-702.
    Philosophers have long argued that duties to oneself are paradoxical, as they seem to entail an incoherent power to release oneself from obligations. I argue that self-release is possible, both as a matter of deontic logic and of metaethics.
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  • Duties to oneself and the concept of morality.Paul D. Eisenberg - 1968 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 11 (1-4):129 – 154.
    Why is it that most among the relatively few moral philosophers since Kant who, like J. S. Mill, have discussed the question whether there can be moral duties to oneself, have answered it negatively? One reason is that those philosophers have supposed that all moral action must be, inter alia, social; and they may have thought so because of their commitment to what is here called a 'corporationist' moral view. But such a conception of morality as social is objectionable because (...)
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