This essay critically analyzes Luciano Floridi’s ontological theory of informational privacy. Organized into two main parts, Part I examines some key foundational components of Floridi’s privacy theory and it considers some of the ways in which his framework purports to be superior to alternative theories of informational privacy. Part II poses two specific challenges for Floridi’s theory of informational privacy, arguing that an adequate privacy theory should be able to: (i) differentiate informational privacy from other kinds of privacy, including psychological (...) privacy; and (ii) distinguish between descriptive and normative aspects of informational privacy in a way that differentiates a (mere) loss of privacy from a violation of privacy. I argue that Floridi’s privacy theory, in its present form, does not explicitly address either challenge. However, I also argue that his ontological theory provides us with a novel way of analyzing the impact that digital technologies have had for informational privacy. I conclude by suggesting that Floridi’s privacy framework can be interpreted as containing the elements of a “personality theory of privacy,” which would be useful to examine in a separate study. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to better qualify the problem of online trust. The problem of online trust is that of evaluating whether online environments have the proper design to enable trust. This paper tries to better qualify this problem by showing that there is no unique answer, but only conditional considerations that depend on the conception of trust assumed and the features that are included in the environments themselves. In fact, the major issue concerning traditional debates surrounding online (...) trust is that those debates focus on specific definitions of trust and specific online environments. Ordinarily, a definition of trust is assumed and then environmental conditions necessary for trust are evaluated with respect to such specific definition. However, this _modus operandi_ fails to appreciate that trust is a rich concept, with a multitude of meanings and that there is still no strict consensus on which meaning shall be taken as the proper one. Moreover, the fact that online environments are constantly evolving and that new design features might be implemented in them is completely ignored. In this paper, the richness of the philosophical discussions about trust is brought into the analysis of online trust. I first provide a set of conditions that depend on the definition of trust that can be assumed and then discuss those conditions with respect to the design of online environments in order to determine whether they can enable (and under which circumstances) trust. (shrink)

This paper provides a general philosophical groundwork for the theoretical and applied normative evaluation of information generally and digital information specifically in relation to the good life. The overall aim of the paper is to address the question of how Information Ethics and computer ethics more generally can be expanded to include more centrally the issue of how and to what extent information relates and contributes to the quality of life or the good life , for individuals and for society. (...) To answer that question, the paper explores and provides by way of a theoretical groundwork for further research, the concept of wisdom understood as a type of meta - knowledge as well as a type of meta - virtue , which can enable one to both know in principle what a good life is and how to successfully apply that knowledge in living such a life in practice. This answer will be based on the main argument presented in this paper that the notion of wisdom understood as being at once a meta - epistemological , meta - axiological and meta - eudemonic concept, provides the essential conceptual link between information on the one hand and the good life on the other. If, as we are told, this is the Age of Information, both the theoretical examination and analysis of the question of how information relates to the good life and the provision of an adequate answer to that question are essential for developing a deeper understanding of how to evaluate the theoretical and practical implications and ramifications of information for the good life, for individuals and societies generally. (shrink)

It has been argued that moral problems in relation to Information Technology (IT) require new theories of ethics. In recent years, an interesting new theory to address such concerns has been proposed, namely the theory of Information Ethics (IE). Despite the promise of IE, the theory has not enjoyed public discussion. The aim of this paper is to initiate such discussion by critically evaluating the theory of IE.

This paper offers an analytical description of the ethics of game design and its influence in the ethical challenges computer games present. The paper proposes a set of game design suggestions based on the Information Ethics concept of Levels of Abstraction which can be applied to formalise ethical challenges into gameplay mechanics; thus allowing game designers to incorporate ethics as part of the experience of their games. The goal of this paper is twofold: to address some of the reasons why (...) computer games present ethical challenges, and to exploit the informational nature of games to suggest how to develop games with ethics at the core of their gameplay. (shrink)

In her article 'What is Information Ethics?', Mathieson seeks to establish a new framework for Information Ethics, contesting the 'rival theories' of Van Den Hoven and of Floridi. However, when the arguments are examined in terms of Object Oriented Modelling conventions, the concepts in question appear in a different light.

The philosophy of information (PI) is a new area of research with its own field of investigation and methodology. This article, based on the Herbert A. Simon Lecture of Computing and Philosophy I gave at Carnegie Mellon University in 2001, analyses the eighteen principal open problems in PI. Section 1 introduces the analysis by outlining Herbert Simon's approach to PI. Section 2 discusses some methodological considerations about what counts as a good philosophical problem. The discussion centers on Hilbert's famous analysis (...) of the central problems in mathematics. The rest of the article is devoted to the eighteen problems. These are organized into five sections: problems in the analysis of the concept of information, in semantics, in the study of intelligence, in the relation between information and nature, and in the investigation of values. (shrink)

Floridi’s ontocentric ethics is compared with Spinoza’s ethical and metaphysical system as found in the Ethics. Floridi’s is a naturalistic ethics where he argues that an action is right or wrong primarily because the action does decrease the ‹entropy’ of the infosphere or not. An action that decreases the amount entropy of the infosphere is a good one, and one that increases it is a bad one. For Floridi, ‹entropy’ refers to destruction or loss of diversity of the infosphere, or (...) the total reality consisting of informational objects. The similarity with Spinoza is that both philosophers refer to basic reality as a foundation for normative judgments. Hence they are both ethical naturalists. An interpretation of both Floridi and Spinoza is offered that might begin to solve the basic problems for any naturalistic ethics. The problems are how a value theory that is based on metaphysics could maintain normative force and how normative force could be justified when there appear to be widely differing metaphysical systems according to the many cultural traditions. I argue that in Spinoza’s and presumably in Floridi’s system, there is no separation between the normative and the natural from the beginning. Normative terms derive their validity from their role in referring to action that leads to a richer and fuller reality. As for the second problem, Spinoza’s God is such that He cannot be fully described by mere finite intellect. What this translates to the contemporary situation of information ethics is that there are always bound to be many different ways of conceptualizing one and the same reality, and it is the people’s needs, goals and desires that often dictate how the conceptualizing is done. However, when different groups of people interact, these systems become calibrated with one another. This is possible because they already belong to the same reality. (shrink)

I consider the foundational issue of whether we have a right to information that is fundamental in being independent of other rights and general in protecting all information. To this end, I distinguish two kinds of morally relevant value an entity might have, i.e. intrinsic and instrumental value, and explain the role that each has in determining whether a person has a fundamental moral interest in that entity. Next, I argue that, by itself, the claim that some entity E has (...) an informative nature does not justify believing that E has either intrinsic value or instrumental value. Accordingly, I conclude that whatever protection morality provides to our interests in information, such protection does not rise to the level of a right that is either general in the sense that it applies to all information or fundamental in the sense that it is not derived from other more basic rights. (shrink)

Is it OK to lie to Siri? Is it bad to mistreat a robot for our own pleasure? Under what condition should we grant a moral status to an artificial intelligence system? This paper looks at different arguments for granting moral status to an AI system: the idea of indirect duties, the relational argument, the argument from intelligence, the arguments from life and information, and the argument from sentience. In each but the last case, we find unresolved issues with the (...) particular argument, which leads us to move to a different one. We leave the idea of indirect duties aside since these duties do not imply considering an AI system for its own sake. The paper rejects the relational argument and the argument from intelligence. The argument from life may lead us to grant a moral status to an AI system, but only in a weak sense. Sentience, by contrast, is a strong argument for the moral status of an AI system—based, among other things, on the Aristotelian principle of equality: that same cases should be treated in the same way. The paper points out, however, that no AI system is sentient given the current level of technological development. (shrink)

The task of this paper is to ground the notion of cyberethics of co-operation. The evolution of modern society has resulted in a shift from industrial society towards informational capitalism. This transformation is a multidimensional shift that affects all aspects of society. Hence also the ethical system of society is penetrated by the emergence of the knowledge society and ethical guidelines for the information age are needed. Ethical issues and conflicts in the knowledge society are connected to topics of ecological (...) and social sustainability. For information ethics and cyberethics, the sustainable design of society, social, and socio-technological systems is important. In this context the notions of sustainability and co-operation are discussed. Based on these categories, the approach of cyberethics of co-operation can be theoretically grounded. (shrink)

En los últimos años la «Ética de la Información» ha llegado a tener sentidos distintos para los distintos investigadores que trabajan en una amplia variedad de disciplinas. Esta situación es lamentable, ya que ha producido cierta confusión sobre la naturaleza específica y el alcance de la EI. En el presente artículo se defiende una Ética de la Información que sostiene que el comportamiento y el estatus de los objetos informacionales qua objetos informacionales puede tener un significado moral que vaya más (...) allá de la función instrumental que les atribuyen otras perspectivas éticas y que, por lo tanto, mantiene que pueden contribuir a determinar de manera normativa los deberes éticos y los derechos legalmente exigibles. (shrink)

Information plays a major role in any moral action. ICT have revolutionized the life of information, from its production and management to its consumption, thus deeply affecting our moral lives. Amid the many issues they have raised, a very serious one, discussed in this paper, is labelled the tragedy of the Good Will. This is represented by the increasing pressure that ICT and their deluge of information are putting on any agent who would like to act morally, when informed about (...) actual or potential evils, but who also lacks the resources to do much about them. In the paper, it is argued that the tragedy may be at least mitigated, if not solved, by seeking to re-establish some equilibrium, through ICT themselves, between what agents know about the world and what they can do to improve it. (shrink)

In recent years, “Information Ethics” (IE) has come to mean different things to different researchers working in a variety of disciplines, including computer ethics, business ethics, medical ethics, computer science, the philosophy of information, social epistemology and library and information science. Using an ontocentric approach, this paper seeks to define the parameters of IE and thereby increase our understanding of the moral challenges associated with Information Communication Technologies.

I describe the emergence of Floridi’s philosophy of information (PI) and information ethics (IE) against the larger backdrop of Information and Computer Ethics (ICE). Among their many strengths, PI and IE offer promising metaphysical and ethical frameworks for a global ICE that holds together globally shared norms with the irreducible differences that define local cultural and ethical traditions. I then review the major defenses and critiques of PI and IE offered by contributors to this special issue, and highlight Floridi’s responses (...) to especially two central problems – the charge of relativism and the meaning of ‹entropy’ in IE. These responses, conjoined with several elaborations of PI and IE offered here by diverse contributors, including important connections with the naturalistic philosophies of Spinoza and other major Western and Eastern figures, thus issue in an expanded and more refined version of PI and IE – one still facing important questions as well as possibilities for further development. (shrink)

Purpose– This paper aims to demonstrate that computing social issues courses are often being taught by articulating the social impacts of different computer technologies and then applying moral theories to those impacts. It then argues that that approach has a number of serious drawbacks.Design/methodology/approach– A bibliometric analysis of ETHICOMP papers is carried out. Papers from early in the history of ETHICOMP are compared to recent years, so as to determine if papers are more or less focused on social scientific examinations (...) of issues or on ethical evaluations of impacts of technology. The literature is examined to argue the drawbacks of the impact approach.Findings– Over time, ETHICOMP papers have moved away from social scientific examinations of computing to more philosophic and ethical evaluations of perceived impacts of computing. The impact approach has a number of drawbacks. First, it is based on a technological deterministic style of social explanation that has been in disrepute in the academic social sciences for decades. Second, it uses an algorithmic approach to ethics that simplifies the social complexity and uncertainty that is the reality of socio-technological change.Research limitations/implications– The methodology used in this paper is limited in several ways. The bibliometric analysis only examined five years of ETHICOMP papers, while the literature review focused on published computing education research. It is possible that neither of these forms of evidence reflects actual common teaching practice.Practical implications– It is hoped that the arguments in this paper will convince teaching practitioners to modify the way they are teaching computing social issues courses: that is, the authors hope to convince educators to add more focus on the social context of computing.Originality/value– The use of bibliometric analysis in this area is unique. The paper’s argument is perhaps unusual as well. (shrink)

The paper presents, firstly, a brief review of the long history\nof information ethics beginning with the Greek concept of parrhesia\nor freedom of speech as analyzed by Michel Foucault. The recent concept\nof information ethics is related particularly to problems which arose\nin the last century with the development of computer technology and\nthe internet. A broader concept of information ethics as dealing\nwith the digital reconstruction of all possible phenomena leads to\nquestions relating to digital ontology. Following Heidegger{\textquoteright}s\nconception of the relation between ontology and metaphysics, (...) the\nauthor argues that ontology has to do with Being itself and not just\nwith the Being of beings which is the matter of metaphysics. The\nprimary aim of an ontological foundation of information ethics is\nto question the metaphysical ambitions of digital ontology understood\nas today{\textquoteright}s pervading understanding of Being. The\nauthor analyzes some challenges of digital technology, particularly\nwith regard to the moral status of digital agents. The author argues\nthat information ethics does not only deal with ethical questions\nrelating to the infosphere. This view is contrasted with arguments\npresented by Luciano Floridi on the foundation of information ethics\nas well as on the moral status of digital agents. It is argued that\na reductionist view of the human body as digital data overlooks the\nlimits of digital ontology and gives up one basis for ethical orientation.\nFinally issues related to the digital divide as well as to intercultural\naspects of information ethics are explored {\textendash} and long\nand short-term agendas for appropriate responses are presented. (shrink)

In this paper, a critique will be developed and an alternative proposed to Luciano Floridi’s approach to Information Ethics (IE). IE is a macroethical theory that is to both serve as a foundation for computer ethics and to guide our overall moral attitude towards the world. The central claims of IE are that everything that exists can be described as an information object, and that all information objects, qua information objects, have intrinsic value and are therefore deserving of moral respect. (...) In my critique of IE, I will argue that Floridi has presented no convincing arguments that everything that exists has some minimal amount of intrinsic value. I will argue, however, that his theory could be salvaged in large part if it were modified from a value-based into a respect-based theory, according to which many (but not all) inanimate things in the world deserve moral respect, not because of intrinsic value, but because of their (potential) extrinsic, instrumental or emotional value for persons. (shrink)

Purpose Moor designated two major problem sources typifying the social and ethical implications of computer technologies, namely, “policy vacuum” and “conceptual muddles.” Motivated by Moor’s seminal definition and Floridi’s conceptualization of information and communication technologies as re-ontologizing technologies, this study aims to explore Omani undergraduates’ cognition regarding ICT ethics. Design/methodology/approach Adopting a grounded theory approach for the constant comparative thematic analysis, the constituents of ICT ethics-related cognition among undergraduates and influencing factors were scrutinized. Qualitative data were gathered via focus group (...) discussions with undergraduates and interviews with academics and information systems professionals at Sultan Qaboos University. Findings In total, 10 thematic categories revolving around a core category, constructing conceptual perceptions of and attitudes toward the realms constituting ICT ethics using an ontological, object-oriented approach, emerged from the comparative analysis. Undergraduates were found to adopt an applied approach when defining professional ICT ethics codes and policies, with a particular focus on information privacy and integrity. Research limitations/implications This qualitative study was conducted at a single research site. This may restrict the generalizability of the findings. Postgraduates were not considered when designing this qualitative inquiry. Originality/value The findings of the study hold theoretical and methodological significance with regard to ICT ethics-related cognition in the era following the fourth industrial revolution by sustaining feminist ethics in this research. Ultimately, the study developed a substantive theory scrutinizing the constitutive elements of ICT ethics-related cognition among Generation Z. (shrink)

Library information science (LIS) should develop its foundation in terms of a philosophy of information (PI). This seems a rather harmless suggestion. Where else could information science look for its conceptual foundations if not in PI? However, accepting this proposal means moving away from one of the few solid alternatives currently available in the field, namely, providing LIS with a foundation in terms of social epistemology (SE). This is no trivial move, so some reasonable reluctance is to be expected. To (...) overcome it, the proposal needs to be more than just acceptable; it must be convincing. In Floridi (2002a), I have articulated some of the reasons why I believe that PI can fulfill the foundationalist needs better than SE can. I won’t rehearse them here. I find them compelling, but I am ready to change my mind if counterarguments become available. Rather, in this contribution, I wish to clarify some aspects of my proposal (Floridi, 2002a) in favor of the interpretation of LIS as applied PI. I won’t try to show you that I am right in suggesting that PI may provide a foundation for LIS better than SE. My more modest goal is to remove some ambiguities and possible misunderstandings that might prevent the correct evaluation of my position, so that disagreement can become more constructive. (shrink)