Solidarität wird in Krisenzeiten sowie bei Ungerechtigkeit und Marginalisierung gefordert. Sie tritt dabei in unterschiedlichen Reichweiten und Akteurskonstellationen auf und basiert auf verschiedenen Motiven und Ausgangslagen. Julia Masurkewitz-Möller nimmt sich dieser Vielfalt an und erarbeitet eine Systematisierung der Solidarität, die Ordnung in den begrifflichen Dschungel des Konzepts bringt. Sie zeigt, dass verschiedene Solidaritätsformen trotz ihrer Unterschiede einen gemeinsamen Kern und eine Beziehung zueinander haben - und damit die Transformationen von Solidaritätsformen möglich machen.

Smith’s statements on wealth and happiness are paradoxical. On the one hand, Smith states that individuals’ pursuit of wealth is beneficial for society because it leads to economic growth and establishes rank and order in society. On the other hand, he appears to say that pursuit of wealth leaves individuals unhappy. Griswold refers to this as ‘comic irony’. In this paper, by examining what Smith says about wealth and happiness, we attempt to resolve this paradox. Towards this end, we analyze (...) the unconscious that is implicit in the Theory of Moral Sentiments. As we will describe, analyzing Smith’s statements by considering the role of the unconscious implies that the pursuit of great wealth can make individuals happy. (shrink)

The paper points out that Adam Smith’s famous argument about the “invisible hand” (IH) of markets can be inverted. While the IH argument suggests that the baker and butcher do what is in their costumers’ interests not because they care for their costumers, but out of their own self-interest, one can also defend the converse claim: if one cares for other people and finds a way to satisfy their needs, one can expect that those others will be willing to pay (...) for the satisfaction of their needs. The paper argues that the IH argument has a strong link to the view that the ultimate goal of management should be “profit maximization” and to neo-liberalism’s tenet that in a market economy where companies attempt to maximize profits, a “socially optimal” allocation will be achieved. It is argued, however, that profit maximization is well-defined only within a mathematical model, while real-world decision-making requires one to choose the “relevant set” of options before any assessment of associated profits can be attempted. “Profit maximization” is therefore characterized as a heuristic for managerial decision-making, and it is pointed out that it is by no means essential for management to be successful and sustainable. The inverse IH argument supports natural alternatives, such as Prahalad and Hart’s “bottom-of-the-pyramid” and Yunus’s “social entrepreneurship” approach. Both require the manager to focus on people’s needs first, and regard the “money-making” aspect as secondary. (shrink)

(2005). Wonder in the face of scientific revolutions: Adam Smith on Newton's ‘Proof’ of Copernicanism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 697-732. doi: 10.1080/09608780500293042.

ABSTRACT This paper has three main aims. First, to make good on recent suggestions that Adam Smith offers a genealogy of the origins of religious belief. This is done by offering a systematic reconstruction of his account of religion in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, demonstrating that Smith there offers a naturalised account of religious belief, whilst studiously avoiding committing himself to the truth of any such belief. Second, I seek to bring out that Smith was ultimately less interested in (...) the truth of religious beliefs than in evaluating and understanding the place of religion in healthy ethical living. Third, I put Smith’s account into contrast with the more famous treatment offered by Nietzsche (as well as Bernard Williams’s later, Nietzschean, reflections), and suggest that Smith offers us the more plausible picture of both religion and morality, a finding of both historical and contemporary philosophical import. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide some insights for a normative theory of corporate political activities. Such a theory aims to provide theoretical tools to investigate the legitimacy of corporate political involvement and allows us to determine which political activities and relations with government regulators are appropriate or inappropriate, permissible or impermissible, obligatory or forbidden for corporations. After having explored what I call the “normative presumption of legitimacy” of CPAs, this paper identifies three different plausible strategies to criticize (...) and object to corporate political involvement: the “egalitarian” strategy, the “corporate citizenship” strategy, and the “market failures” strategy. It constitutes an attempt to develop the market failures approach to reflect on CPAs. My main claim is that within such an account, the idea that corporations have a license to operate considerably limits their right to engage in political activities. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this paper, I address the question of what we are really after when we seek Smithian mutual sympathy; I also show how the answer I propose can be used to illuminate a crucial feature of Smith's moral philosophy. The first section develops a Smithian response to egoistic interpretations of the desire for mutual sympathy. The second section identifies a number of different self- and other-relevant ways in which one could desire mutual sympathy. Some of these different ways of desiring (...) mutual sympathy comprise a spectrum of degrees of self-centredness; others comprise a spectrum of degrees of other-centredness. The third section shows that the spectra of ways of desiring mutual sympathy can be used to explain the kind of sincere, motivating attachment to morality characteristic of fully developed Smithian moral agents. (shrink)

Unfortunately, Adam Smith’s undeserved legacy as a proponent of laissez-faire and liberal institutions at the international scope inhibits profiting from his refined analysis of international affairs. I argue that the Wealth of Nations’ chapter on colonies contains Smith’s discussion of the sovereign’s adaptation to ignorance in global politics. I examine the sense in which the sovereign is ignorant according to Smith and how sovereigns adapt to ignorance with varying success. His comparative analysis suggests that reduction of one’s share in ignorance (...) is not always desirable, and a priori rejection of ignorance is impractical because it deprives of a potentially advantageous resource. A careful reading of his work enables learning from his approach to global politics, without filtering it through his ideas on the free market. (shrink)

This article analyzes the relationship between competition and justice in Adam Smith in order to determine to what extent competition can promote and undermine justice. I examine how competition features in two basic motivations for human action, “the propensity to truck barter and exchange,” and “the desire of bettering our condition.” Both can be traced back to the desire for recognition, but they operate in very different ways. The former manifests itself in social cooperation, chiefly commercial exchange and the division (...) of labor, and while it can take a competitive form, competitive success produces benefits for everyone. In contrast, the latter may manifest itself in win‐lose social competition. Commercial society harnesses both motivations, and both have negative as well as positive effects. However, while Smith explicitly addresses the negative effects of excessive specialization in the division of labor, it is less clear how he thinks the negative effects of social competition can be addressed. I argue that competition can undermine justice when (i) it pits people against each other and (ii) leads to psychological corruption. I conclude with some reflections on what a focus on competition adds to our understanding of Smith's work. (shrink)

This paper explores the presence of both relativistic and universalistic elements in Adam Smith’s moral philosophy. It argues that Smith is more sympathetic to the concerns of anthropologists than most philosophers have been, but still tries to uphold the possibility of moral judgments that transcend cultural contexts. It also argues that the tensions between these aspects of his thought are not easy to resolve, but that Smith’s sensitivity to the issues that give rise to them makes him a useful figure (...) with whom to think through the relationship between anthropology and moral philosophy to this day. (shrink)

Teleological thinking about money reasons from what money is for to both how it ought to be used and what forms it should take. One type, found in Aristotle’s argument against usury, takes teleological considerations alone to decisively settle normative questions. Another type, found in Locke’s argument about monetary durability, takes teleological considerations to contribute to the settling of normative questions, but sees them as one consideration among many. This paper endorses the type made by Locke while rejecting the type (...) made by Aristotle, and identifies further teleological tendencies in the work of Adam Smith and other philosophers. (shrink)

El siguiente trabajo tiene como fin analizar las bases psicológicas y la estructura de la moral en la Teoría de los sentimientos morales de Adam Smith, a partir de las nociones de alteridad, diferencia y asimetría. Se intentará mostrar la función fundamental que tiene la interacción asimétrica con otro ser humano en la configuración de una moral basada en la imparcialidad del juicio, que emerge a partir de una progresiva alteración de la conciencia de sí. Esto implica que la conciencia (...) moral es una conciencia determinada por el recibimiento de la alteridad, cuyo juicio no se caracteriza por la autorreferencia, sino por la heterorreferencia: la referencia última en la que un sujeto se apoya para juzgar se halla en el otro, o en los otros, en cuanto espectadores actuales o potenciales de su conducta, y no en sí mismo. A partir de aquí, se mostrará cómo la noción de igualdad, que subyace a la justicia como momento primario de la moral, es en realidad un momento segundo y se construye a partir de una estructura de asimetría que es ubicua en la teoría de Smith. (shrink)

In Adam Smith’s Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations the term ‘rational’ occurs only twice. Neither of these uses assigns the property of rationality either to human beings or to economic agents. Despite that, Smith is widely recognised as the founder of modern mainstream economics, a science which is defined by the assumption of the rationality of an economic agent. This paper aims to locate and discuss the notion of rationality which is implied by Smith’s (...) work. To achieve that a double-track approach is taken. First, the current paper reconstructs Smith’s general view on human nature which was presented mainly in his earlier book The Theory of Moral Sentiments. This is followed by a discussion of Smith’s theses on selected mechanisms which drive the economy as presented in The Wealth of Nations. (shrink)