- A Teleofunctionalist Solution to the Problem of Deviant Causal Chains of Actions.Jakob Roloff - 2022 - Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy (3-4):247-261.details
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The Structure of Orthonomy.Michael Smith - 2004 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55:165-193.details
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Intentions and self-referential content.Tomis Kapitan - 1995 - Philosophical Papers 24 (3):151-166.details
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De Se Content and Action Generalisation.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2017 - Philosophical Papers 46 (2):315-344.details
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Can I Only Intend My Own Actions?Luca Ferrero - 2013 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford studies in agency and responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. (1) 70-94.details
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Actions, Reasons, and Intentions: Overcoming Davidson's Ontological Prejudice.John Michael McGuire - 2007 - Dialogue 46 (3):459-479.details
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Objective and epistemic gradability: Is the new angle on the Knobe effect empirically grounded?Tomasz Zyglewicz & Bartosz Maćkiewicz - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (2):234-256.details
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Thinking by doing: Rylean regress and the metaphysics of action.Markos Valaris - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3395-3412.details
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Knowing what you are doing: Action‐demonstratives in unreflective action.Markos Valaris - 2020 - Ratio 33 (2):97-105.details
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Agency, Teleological Control and Robust Causation.Marius Usher - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):302-324.details
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The Renaissance of the Anti-Causal Theory of Action.Yudai Suzuki - 2016 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 49 (2):5-25.details
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Minimally Creative Thought.Dustin Stokes - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (5):658-681.details
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The Causal Autonomy of Reason Explanations and How Not to Worry about Causal Deviance.Karsten R. Stueber - 2013 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (1):24-45.details
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Anti-intellectualism, instructive representations, and the intentional action argument.Alison Ann Springle & Justin Humphreys - 2021 - Synthese (3):7919-7955.details
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Explaining action.Kieran Setiya - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (3):339-393.details
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Intention as action under development: why intention is not a mental state.Devlin Russell - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (5):742-761.details
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Shared Agency and Contralateral Commitments.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (3):359-410.details
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Shared agency and contralateral commitments.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (3):359-410.details
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Prediction, Authority, and Entitlement in Shared Activity.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):626-652.details
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Teleology and mentalizing in the explanation of action.Uwe Peters - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):2941-2957.details
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Trying slips: Can Davidson and Hornsby account for mistakes and slips?Kay Peabody - 2005 - Philosophia 33 (1-4):173-216.details
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Mental action.Antonia Peacocke - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (6):e12741.details
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Attempts.Jonathan D. Payton - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):363-382.details
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Deviant Formal Causation.Sarah K. Paul - 2011 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5 (3):1-24.details
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The Omissions Account of the Knobe Effect and the Asymmetry Challenge.Katarzyna Paprzycka - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (5):550-571.details
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Sneddon on Action and Responsibility.Katarzyna Paprzycka - 2008 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):69-88.details
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Must false consciousness be rationally caused?Katarzyna Paprzycka - 1998 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 28 (1):69-82.details
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Lowe's Argument Against the Psychoneural Token Identity Thesis.Katarzyna Paprzycka - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (3):372-396.details
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Knowledge of consequences: an explanation of the epistemic side-effect effect.Katarzyna Paprzycka-Hausman - 2018 - Synthese 197 (12):5457-5490.details
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False consciousness of intentional psychology.Katarzyna Paprzycka - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):271-295.details
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Action explanation and its presuppositions.Lilian O’Brien - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):123-146.details
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Motivation in agents.Christian Miller - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):222–266.details
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Is there a place for intention in an analysis of intentional action?Alfred Mele - 1999 - Philosophia 27 (3-4):419-432.details
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Side-effect actions, acting for a reason, and acting intentionally.John Michael McGuire - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (3):317 - 333.details
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Action individuation: a normative functionalist approach.Chauncey Maher - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (1):99-116.details
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A regulative theory of basic intentional omissions.Philippe A. Lusson - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8399-8421.details
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Let me go and try.Kirk Ludwig - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (3):340-358.details
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Collective intentional behavior from the standpoint of semantics.Kirk Ludwig - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):355–393.details
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Action Unified.Yair Levy - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly:pqv056.details
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Desires, Dispositions and Deviant Causal Chains.John Hyman - 2014 - Philosophy 89 (1):83-112.details
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Representation in action.Alec Hinshelwood - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.details
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How to make do with events.Alec Hinshelwood - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):245-258.details
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Contexts and Constraints on Use.Geoff Georgi - 2019 - Theoria 87 (1):136-151.details
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Intending, acting, and doing.Luca Ferrero - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup2):13-39.details
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In Defence of Ungrounded Desires: Against Raz's Classical Account of Agency.Stephen Everson - 2004 - European Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):283-303.details
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Beliefs as inner causes: the (lack of) evidence.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (6):850-877.details
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Intentional omissions.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):158-177.details
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Are Events Things of the Past?Julian Bacharach - 2021 - Mind 130 (518):381-412.details
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Two ways of relating to (and acting for) reasons.Caroline T. Arruda & Daniel J. Povinelli - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (5):441-459.details
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Shared Intention and Reasons for Action.Caroline T. Arruda - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (6):596-623.details
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