El presente artículo ofrece un análisis del concepto de continuidad, tal como fue desarrollado por dos de sus principales exponente, Leibniz y Peirce. Comienza por definir el significado del concepto, señalando las diferentes propiedades del continuum identificadas en ambos autores. Después señala las consecuencias y aplicaciones filosóficas que el concepto tiene para ambos filósofos, en especial para la ontología. En primer lugar, expone lo que Leibniz llamó la ley de continuidad y sus diferentes versiones. Luego, se habla de lo que (...) Peirce denominó «sinequismo», que constituye el conjunto de ideas de este filósofo acerca de la continuidad y de sus implicaciones filosóficas. Aquí se intenta mostrar, especialmente, como el sinequismo constituye la clave para la comprensión de muchos problemas lógicos, epistemológicos y metafísicos, como el de la validez de los axiomas de la lógica, la justificación del conocimiento, el dualismo mente cuerpo, el evolucionismo y el realismo acerca de los universales. (shrink)

This essay shows the logical interpretation of the perception in Peirce to highlight Leibniz’s influence on the conception of associative representation. This influence conditions Peirce’s interpretation of Kant’s intuitive apprehension and initiates the interpretation of the individual as essentially relational. That concept is deepened by Peirce’s studies on the logic of relations and even more on the logic of continuity. The relational individual is the key concept for a possible social-political interpretation of the continuous by Peirce. The relationship between individual (...) and continuous, based on the notions of possible and relation, offers the model to conceive the ego as originally social. The relational nature of the individual is also analysed with reference to the doctrine of chances. In this context, it emerges clearly the relationship of logic with society and with Peirce’s political conceptions. This paradigm can also be traced back to the analyses by Leibniz (studies of natural law). (shrink)

A close reading of Descartes’ works, particularly his Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii, calls into question the common interpretation of Peirce’s ‘Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man’ and ‘Some Consequences of Four Incapacities’ as being anti-Cartesian. In particular, Descartes’ conception of intuition differs from Peirce’s, and on one plausible reading of Descartes his intuitionism actually mirrors Peirce’s inferentialism in key respects. Given these similarities between Descartes and Peirce, the dogmatic status of the anti-Cartesian interpretation of Peirce becomes evident.

Four years after completing his Ph.D. on “The Psychology of Kant,” one of Peirce’s most famous students, John Dewey, published a compendium of Leibniz’s main theses, his 1888 Leibniz’s New Essays.1 Such a move from critical to pre-critical rationalism seems to echo Peirce’s judgment that to fully understand Kant, a thorough familiarity with Leibniz’s philosophy is an indispensable preliminary (N 2:186, 1899); for Kant himself “was reposing in a firm belief in the metaphysics of Leibnitz as theologized by Wolff when (...) he first read the book of Hume.” (W 1:104, 1863) Peirce himself started his reflection with the study of Kant’s thought. The purpose of the present paper is to demonstrate that his actual implicit.. (shrink)

The work has two parts. The first part is about Peirce and his ideas about the continuum. There are considered the connection of his theory of continuity with his loic and his philosophy. In the second part Peirce's ideas are compared with models of todays logic and mathematics. There is considerd constructive mathematics, the logic of perception from Bell, Blau's Logic of reflection and a model of Myrvold. Then there is developed a new model.