Recently, Caterina Moruzzi has appealed to Ted Sider’s case for continuant exdurantism and the availability of a “parallel move” in musical ontology to promote a specific version of musical work exdurantism. In this article, I argue that her version of musical exdurantism undermines the prospects for making the parallel move, but I go on to sketch two alternatives that do not. In Section I, I outline apparent persistence-parallels between ordinary material objects and musical works. In Section II, I sketch a (...) transposable case for accepting continuant exdurantism. In Section III, I introduce Moruzzi’s exdurantism. In Section IV, I introduce her selected rivals—the type-token theory of Julian Dodd and an austere musical perdurantism due to Ben Caplan and Carl Matheson. In Section V, I argue that several of Moruzzi’s commitments undermine her motivation from the “parallel move.” In sections VI and VII, I sketch alternative versions of musical exdurantism that are better positioned to adopt the parallel move. (shrink)

Realism about types is the view that types are abstract and repeatable objects. Although type realists seem to agree that types, unlike properties, are objects in their own right, they argue that there is a metaphysically intimate tie between the existence conditions of types and properties. In particular, most type realists believe that types are, in a certain sense, determined by the properties that underlie them. I argue that this is a mistake, especially for those type realists who believe that (...) social and cultural types such as works of music and fiction or words are artifacts. I offer an alternative version of type realism where social and cultural types are dependent objects that should be understood in analogy with concrete artifacts. (shrink)