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Contrastive Semantics for Deontic Modals.Justin Snedegar - 2013 - In Martijn Blaauw (ed.), Contrastivism in philosophy. New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.details
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Instrumental reasons.Niko Kolodny - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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The Varieties of Normativity.Derek Clayton Baker - 2017 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 567-581.details
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Moral Relativism in Context.James R. Beebe - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):691-724.details
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Agency and Reasons in Epistemology.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherstdetails
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Biting the Bullet on Moral Twin Earth.Michael Rubin - 2014 - Philosophical Papers 43 (2):285-309.details
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Contextualism in Ethics.Gunnar Björnsson - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell.details
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Weak and Strong Necessity Modals: On Linguistic Means of Expressing "A Primitive Concept OUGHT".Alex Silk - 2021 - In Billy Dunaway & David Plunkett (eds.), Meaning, Decision, and Norms: Themes From the Work of Allan Gibbard. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Maize Books. pp. 203-245.details
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Normativity in Language and Law.Alex Silk - 2019 - In Toh Kevin, Plunkett David & Shapiro Scott (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Defining Normativity.Stephen Finlay - 2019 - In Toh Kevin, Plunkett David & Shapiro Scott (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 62-104.details
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Disagreement Lost and Found.Stephen Finlay - 2017 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12. Oxford University Press. pp. 187-205.details
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The many ‘oughts’ of deliberation.John Pittard - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2617-2637.details
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Toward a pluralist and teleological theory of normativity.David Copp - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):21-37.details
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Intrinsic values and reasons for action.Ralph Wedgwood - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):342-363.details
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The Conceptual Foundation of Morality.Gal Yehezkel - 2021 - Springer.details
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Aristotelian Naturalism vs. Mutants, Aliens and the Great Red Dragon.Scott Woodcock - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (4):313-328.details
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One Ought Too Many.Justin Snedegar Stephen Finlay - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):102-124.details
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Contrastivism About Reasons and Ought.Justin Snedegar - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (6):379-388.details
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How to embed an epistemic modal: Attitude problems and other defects of character.Alex Silk - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (7):1773-1799.details
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Ought, Agents, and Actions.Mark Schroeder - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (1):1-41.details
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The promise and perils of hybrid moral semantics for naturalistic moral realism.Michael Rubin - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):691-710.details
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On Necessity and Comparison.Aynat Rubinstein - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):512-554.details
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Relational good and the multiplicity problem.Connie S. Rosati - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):205-234.details
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Indeterminacy and Normativity.Giulia Pravato - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2119-2141.details
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On the Defensibility and Believability of Moral Error Theory : Reply to Evers, Streumer, and Toppinen.Jonas Olson - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4):461-473.details
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Why Epistemic Reductionism Won’t Save the Moral Error Theorist.Alex Murphy - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):53-69.details
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Conjuring Ethics from Words.Jonathan McKeown-Green, Glen Pettigrove & Aness Webster - 2012 - Noûs 49 (1):71-93.details
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Modality, expected utility, and hypothesis testing.WooJin Chung & Salvador Mascarenhas - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-40.details
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Moral Disagreement and Moral Semantics.Justin Khoo & Joshua Knobe - 2016 - Noûs:109-143.details
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A Logical Theory for Conditional Weak Ontic Necessity in Branching Time.Fengkui Ju - forthcoming - Studia Logica:1-34.details
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A Logical Theory for Conditional Weak Ontic Necessity Based on Context Update.Fengkui Ju - 2023 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 32 (5):777-807.details
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What ought probably means, and why you can’t detach it.Stephen Finlay - 2009 - Synthese 177 (1):67 - 89.details
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Recent work on normativity.Stephen Finlay - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):331-346.details
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One Ought Too Many.Stephen Finlay & Justin Snedegar - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):102-124.details
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Errors upon errors: a reply to joyce.Stephen Finlay - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):535 - 547.details
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Weight for Stephen Finlay.Daan Evers - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):737-749.details
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The Standard-Relational Theory of 'Ought' and the Oughtistic Theory of Reasons.Daan Evers - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):131-147.details
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The End‐Relational Theory of ‘Ought’ and the Weight of Reasons.Daan Evers - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (3):405-417.details
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Moral Contextualism and the Problem of Triviality.Daan Evers - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):285-297.details
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Jonas Olson’s Evidence for Moral Error Theory.Daan Evers - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4):403-418.details
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Whither anankastics?Billy Dunaway & Alex Silk - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):75-94.details
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Amorality.Dale Dorsey - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (2):329-342.details
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The Aim of Belief and the Goal of Truth: Reflections on Rosenberg.Matthew Chrisman - 2016 - In Pedro Schmechtig & Martin Grajner (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms, and Goals. De Gruyter. pp. 357-382.details
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Consequence and Contrast in Deontic Semantics.Fabrizio Cariani - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):396-416.details
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Breakdown of Moral Judgment.Eric Campbell - 2014 - Ethics 124 (3):447-480.details
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A Means-End Account of Explainable Artificial Intelligence.Oliver Buchholz - 2023 - Synthese 202 (33):1-23.details
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The Type-B Moral Error Theory.Anthony Robert Booth - 2020 - Erkenntnis:1-19.details
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The Type-B Moral Error Theory.Anthony Robert Booth - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2181-2199.details
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Do ‘Objectivist’ Features of Moral Discourse and Thinking Support Moral Objectivism?Gunnar Björnsson - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (4):367-393.details
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