This article puts forward a critical investigation and comparative assessment of Julia Kristeva's political writing on Europe and cosmopolitanism. Kristeva's reflections on the status of the stranger in the European religious and secular traditions, and her persistent argument on the need to constructively reformulate what is most conducive to a present and future cosmopolitanism from within those traditions and discourses, have already been recognized. What this article addresses is the need for a constructive critical dialogue with the themes and arguments (...) of Kristeva's writing on these issues in the context of recent writing on cosmopolitanism. The article is concerned with ethical cosmopolitanism, as Kristeva's thought mostly bears on the subjective, interpersonal and communal dimensions of cosmopolitanism. Two main problems are identified that crucially undermine Kristeva's thinking on Europe. First, Kristeva's views on the present and future of Europe repeatedly confine the idea of Europe to the representation of a very particular history of French modernity that is only tempered by occasional, comparative yet complementary, references to the USA. The second problem concerns the use of psychoanalytic theories of questionable validity to support cultural analyses and theoretical propositions of dubious value for a cosmopolitan ethos or politics. (shrink)

Much has been made of the power of the Internet and related communication technologies to serve as a new public sphere in which democracy can flourish. The evidence, however, has been limited; like the telephone and the postal letter before that, the Internet has powers as a capable tool for organizing social action and protest. Otherwise, though, it seems to have been co-opted by commercial interests and to be used by the public for arguments concerning already settled opinions, a far (...) cry from the fruitful and thoughtful debates demanded by a true public sphere. (shrink)

Habermas’ cosmopolitan project seeks to transform global politics into an emancipatory activity in order to compensate for the disempowering effects of globalization. The project is traced through three vicious circles which stem from Habermas’ commitment to intersubjectivity. Normative politics always raises a vicious circle because politics is only needed to the extent that an issue has become problematized through want of intersubjective agreement. At domestic level Habermas solves this problem by constitutionalizing transcendental presuppositions that political participants cannot avoid making. This (...) fix will not work at the global level because it is pre-political as between human individuals. Habermas therefore premises cosmopolitics on the transformation of nation-states into sites of participatory politics, engagement in which will eventually ignite a global cosmopolitan consciousness. This transformation depends on the constitutionalization of existing UN structures and their enforcement of an undefined and ‘uncontroversial’ core of human rights. Unable to ground this project in social practice, Habermas eventually disregards his own lodestar of intersubjectivity based in social practice by relying on the prediscursive concept of human dignity. This move is not merely philosophically inconsistent; it also opens the door to the moralization of politics and the imposition of human rights down the barrel of a gun. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to present a critical assessment of Jürgen Habermas' reformulation of Kant's philosophical project Toward Perpetual Peace. Special attention is paid to how well Habermas' proposed multi-level institutional model fares in comparison with Kant's proposal—a league of states. I argue that Habermas' critique of the league fails in important respects, and that his proposal faces at least two problems. The first is that it implies a problematic asymmetry between powerful and less powerful states. The second (...) is that it entails creating a global police force that has an obligation to intervene against egregious human rights violations worldwide, and that this seems incompatible with the idea that every person has an innate right to freedom. There are important normative constraints relevant for institutional design in the international domain that Habermas does not take sufficiently into account. However, this does not mean that Kant's league cannot be supplemented with more comprehensive forms of institutional cooperation between states. On the basis of my assessment of the multi-level model, I propose a hybrid model combining elements from Kant and Habermas. (shrink)

In this article, Zygmunt Bauman's deep-seated utopian sensibilities are dissected and discussed. It is shown how Bauman already early on in his career took a keen interest in the topic of utopia and how he throughout the years has continued to pursue the idea of utopia - its perversions and possibilities. The article suggests that Bauman is basically an ‘ambivalent utopian’ - that he, on the one hand, regards utopianism as an important and ineradicable constant in the human-being-in-the-world, something creating (...) the hopeful possibility for a better world and a brighter future, but also that he, on the other hand, is concerned with attempts to turn utopia into a ‘project’ or a ‘concrete reality’. Bauman's utopian ambivalence owes perhaps as much to the inherently two-sided nature of utopian ideas as to his own personal experiences throughout his life in the 20th century. (shrink)

Tackling global injustice requires appropriate and effective institutions as well as cosmopolitan solidarity. This paper assumes that the ‘constitutionalized world society’ theorized by Habermas offers a viable proposal to make the protection and promotion of human rights more feasible. His account of solidarity, however, reveals a conundrum: If strong forms of solidarity grow out of shared political institutions and a related collective identity, but it is precisely those institutions that we need to enhance at the global level, then how can (...) we build sufficient solidarity to support this process? Habermas relies on a global consensus on human rights, but I argue that his version of cosmopolitan solidarity is too weak to motivate the measures needed to fully realize economic, social and cultural rights and the package of institutional reforms that he proposes. We thus need a narrative of the human condition that can lend additional support to the idea of human rights and cosmopolitan duties. I find the seeds of such a position, which I call cosmocommonism, in the work of Nancy. Having shown how this can motivate cosmopolitanism and support for human rights, I then consider in the conclusion its compatibility with the political institutions that Habermas proposes. (shrink)