The characteristics of inductivist historiography of science, as practised by earlier scientist/historians, and Whig historiography, as practised by earlier political historians, are described, according to the accounts of Agassi and Butterfield. It is suggested that the writings of Geikie on the history of geology allow us to characterize him as a Whig/inductivist historian of science who formulated anachronistic judgements. It is further suggested that his writings have had a considerable long-term effect on interpretations of the history of geology. The character (...) of Geikie's historiography is related to his social, political and religious views, his historicism, and his romantic enthusiasm for Nature. His methodological pronouncements are examined: he believed that the present is the key to the past, and also that the past is the key to the present. He was an empiricist and inductivist. These epistemological and methodological views impinged on his historiography of science. If one attempts to criticize Geikie's historiography, though one may try to judge his work according to the norms of his own day and age, historical anachronism cannot be avoided entirely and one may oneself be charged with acting ‘Whiggishly’. Historians of science, in the process of professionalization, have accepted the historiographical norms of general historians , but in so doing have inherited a problem that arises whenever they contemplate earlier historical writings. It is suggested that there may be more room for Whiggish historiography of science than is presently deemed acceptable. Alternatively, one may wish to draw a careful distinction between science and its meta-discipline, the historiography of science. Whig historiography conflates the two, and the work of Geikie provides a good illustration of this. (shrink)

Methodological criticism may be defined as the critique of scientific practice in the light of methodological principles, and critical methodology as the study of proper methods of criticism; the problem is that of the interaction between the scientific methods which give methodological criticism its methodological character and the critical methods which give it its character of criticism. These ideas and this problem are illustrated by an examination of Karl Popper's critique of Marxian social science. It is argued that though Popper's (...) favorable articulations of Marx are valuable, his unfavorable criticism is invalid, the grounds of my argument being certain ideas in critical methodology relating to the distinctions between theory and practice, between inaccurate and invalid criticism, and between the justification of favorable criticism and the justification of unfavorable criticism. (shrink)

The topic of history-of-science explanation is first briefly introduced as a generally important one for the light it may shed on action theory, on the logic of discovery, and on philosophy''s relations with historiography of science, intellectual history, and the sociology of knowledge. Then some problems and some conclusions are formulated by reference to some recent relevant literature: a critical analysis of Laudan''s views on the role of normative evaluations in rational explanations occasions the result that one must make aconceptual (...) distinction between evaluations and explanations of belief, and that there are at leastthree subclasses of the latter, rational, critical, and theoretical; I then discuss the problem of whether explanations of discoveries are self-evidencing and predictive by focusing on views of Hempel and Nickles, and I attempt a formalization of some aspects of the problem. Finally, a more systematic and concrete analysis is undertaken by using as an example the explanation of Galileo''s rejection of space-proportionality, and it is argued that the historical explanation of scientific beliefs is a type of logical analysis. (shrink)