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  1. Aristotle’s Critique of Plato’s Theory of Innate Knowledge.David Bronstein - 2016 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 19 (1):126-139.
    In Posterior Analytics 2.19, Aristotle argues that we cannot have innate knowledge of first principles because if we did we would have the most precise items of knowledge without noticing, which is impossible. To understand Aristotle’s argument we need to understand why he thinks we cannot possess these items of knowledge without noticing. In this paper, I present three different answers to this question and three different readings of his argument corresponding to them. The first two readings focus on the (...)
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  • The Origins of Dialectic in Ordinary Discourse.Lee Franklin - 2016 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 19 (1):88-104.
    The opening discussion of the Meno features a halting conversation in which Meno struggles at length to answer Socrates’ question, “What is Virtue?” Whereas Socrates demands a unitary account, presenting Virtue as one, Meno repeatedly speaks of Virtue in plurality. Through the opposing sides of this conflict, Plato highlights impediments that appear to prevent ordinary speakers from inquiring into nature. These include the fallibility of ordinary beliefs and statements, and the inability of ordinary speakers to countenance properties as entities in (...)
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  • Is Plato an Innatist in the Meno?David Bronstein & Whitney Schwab - 2019 - Phronesis 64 (4):392-430.
    Plato in the Meno is standardly interpreted as committed to condition innatism: human beings are born with latent innate states of knowledge. Against this view, Gail Fine has argued for prenatalism: human souls possess knowledge in a disembodied state but lose it upon being embodied. We argue against both views and in favor of content innatism: human beings are born with innate cognitive contents that can be, but do not exist innately in the soul as, the contents of states of (...)
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  • XII-Escaping One's Own Notice Knowing: Meno's Paradox Again.Mary Margaret McCabe - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):233-256.
  • Escaping One's Own Notice Knowing: Meno's Paradox Again.Mary Margaret McCabe - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):233 - 256.
    The complex way Meno's paradox is presented in the Meno forces reflection on both the external conditions on inquiry—its objects—and its internal conditions—the state of mind of the person who inquires. The theory of recollection does not fully account for the internal conditions—as Plato makes clear in the critique of Meno's puzzle to be found in the Euthydemus. I conclude that in the Euthydemus Plato is inviting us to reject the externalist account of knowledge urged on Socrates by the sophists (...)
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  • Definování Areté V Platónově Dialogu Menón.František Weis - 2014 - E-Logos 21 (1):1-15.
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