At Phaedo 59b Echecrates asks Phaedo who was present on the day when Socrates drank the hemlock in prison. Various Athenians are named, then various foreigners, but when Echecrates subsequently asks if two other foreigners, Aristippus and Cleombrotus, were present, Phaedo replies that they were said to be in Aegina. After this fleeting reference to Cleombrotus, Plato does not mention him again in the Phaedo or any other dialogue; and yet in later antiquity a certain Cleombrotus of Ambracia rose to (...) fame in connection with the Phaedo. Callimachus is our earliest source for the anecdote which immortalized the Ambracian : Επας ‘Ἥλιε αρε’ Κλεμβρτος μβρακιτης λατ' φ' Ψηλο τεεος ες δην, ζιον οδν δν θαντου κακν, λλ Πλτωνος ν τ περ Ψυς γρμμ' ναλεζμενος. (shrink)

Este trabajo pretende elucidar los rasgos generales de la metafísica de los megáricos en contra de las interpretaciones tradicionales que les atribuyen la defensa de un monismo numérico o una teoría de las Formas. Con base en los testimonios sobre Euclides y Estilpón de Mégara, intentaré mostrar que la metafísica megárica se caracteriza principalmente por el desarrollo de los conceptos de unidad e identidad de cada cosa consigo misma, lo que conlleva el rechazo de la diferencia y, en consecuencia, de (...) cualquier tipo de cambio. Esta perspectiva no excluye la existencia de múltiples entidades que, sin embargo, no son Formas. Por esta razón, los megáricos no desarrollan un monismo de tipo numérico, sino que su visión es coherente con un monismo de tipo predicativo que impugna la posibilidad de adjudicar atributos múltiples a una misma entidad. This paper purports to clarify the general features of Megarian metaphysics against two traditional interpretations which ascribe to this philosophical group either the defense of a numerical monism or a theory of Forms. Based on the testimonies of Euclid and Stilpo of Megara, I will aim to show that a main characteristic of Megarian metaphysics is the development of the concepts of unity and identity of each thing to itself, which involves a disavowal of difference as a possible property and, consequently, of any kind of change. I also intend to show that, although this standpoint does not exclude the existence of multiple entities, it implies that these entities are not Forms. Consequently, the Megarians do not develop a numerical monism but a predicational one, according to which the adscription of many predicates to the same entity is rejected. (shrink)