Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Self-Knowledge and Hume's Phenomenology of the Passions.Margaret Watkins - 2021 - Philosophy 96 (4):577-602.
    Taxonomies of the passions have long claimed to serve a quest for self-knowledge, by specifying conditions under which certain passions arise, formal objects they possess, and qualities essential to their particular feelings. I argue that David Hume's theory of the passions provides resources for a different kind of self-knowledge – a sceptical self-knowledge depending on our ability to articulate how the passions feel rather than always identifying our passions as tokens of an identifiable passion-type. These resources are distinctions between four (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Imagination and Experimentalism in Hume’s Philosophy.Andrew Ward - 2012 - Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):165-175.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • Hume's Theory of Pity and Malice.Samuel C. Rickless - 2013 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (2):324-344.
    (2013). Hume's Theory of Pity and Malice. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 324-344. doi: 10.1080/09608788.2012.692664.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Strength of Mind and the Calm and Violent Passions.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (3):1-21.
    Hume’s distinction between the calm and violent passions is one whose boundaries are not entirely clear. However, it is crucial to understanding his motivational theory and to identifying an unusual virtue he calls “strength of mind,” the motivational prevalence of the calm passions over the violent. In this paper, I investigate the boundaries of the calm passions and consider the constitution of strength of mind and why Hume regards it as an admirable trait. These are provocative issues for two reasons. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • Imperceptible Impressions and Disorder in the Soul: A Characterization of the Distinction between Calm and Violent Passions in Hume.Katharina Paxman - 2015 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 13 (3):265-278.
    Hume's explanation of our tendency to confuse calm passions with reason due to lack of feeling appears to present a tension with his claim that we cannot be mistaken about our own impressions. I argue that the calm/violent distinction cannot be understood in terms of presence/absence of feeling. Rather, for Hume the presence or absence of disruption and disordering of natural and/or customary modes of thought is the key distinction between the calm and violent passions. This reading provides new explanations (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Hutcheson's Relation to Stoicism in the Light of his Moral Psychology.Christian Maurer - 2010 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 8 (1):33-49.
    Without questioning Hutcheson's general affinities with the Stoics, this article focuses on two important differences in moral psychology that show the limits of the appropriation of Stoicism in Hutcheson's ethics of benevolence. First, Hutcheson's distinction between calm affections and violent passions does not fully match with the Stoic distinction between constantiæ and perturbationes, since the emotion of sorrow remains in Hutcheson's table of the calm affections. As far as sorrow as a public affection is concerned, this first point is tied (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Hume on Pride, Vanity and Society.Enrico Galvagni - 2020 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 18 (2):157-173.
    Pride is a fundamental element in Hume's description of human nature. An important part of the secondary literature on Hume is devoted to this passion. However, no one, as far as I am aware, takes seriously the fact that pride often appears in pairs with vanity. In Book 2 of the Treatise, pride is defined as the passion one feels when society recognizes his connection to a ‘cause’, composed by a ‘subject’ and a (positive) ‘quality’. Conversely, no definition of vanity (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Hume's motivational distinction between natural and artificial virtues.James Fieser - 1997 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 5 (2):373 – 388.
    (1997). Hume's motivational distinction between natural and artificial virtues. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 373-388.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Feeling, Impulse and Changeability: The Role of Emotion in Hume's Theory of the Passions.Katharina A. Paxman - unknown
    Hume’s “impressions of reflection” is a category made up of all our non-sensory feelings, including “the passions and other emotions.” These two terms for affective mental states, ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’, are both used frequently in Hume’s work, and often treated by scholars as synonymous. I argue that Hume’s use of both ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’ in his discussions of affectivity reflects a conceptual distinction implicit in his work between what I label ‘attending emotions’ and ‘fully established passions.’ The former are the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • What is Wrong with Reid's Criticism of Hume on Moral Approbation?Laurent Jaffro - 2006 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (2):11-26.
    In his Essays on the Active Powers, Thomas Reid criticises Hume 's theory of moral judgment and argues that it is untenable. The aim of this paper is to show that Reid shares more with his target than is ordinarily acknowledged. The author suggests that the opposition between “cognitivism” and “non-cognitivism” concerning the role of feelings in moral judgment tends to obscure assumptions held in common by both philosophers about the nature of feelings.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•