RÉSUMÉLe «clair» et le «distinct» comptent parmi les concepts les plus importants de la théorie cartésienne de la connaissance. Il n'est pas étonnant dès lors qu'il se soit trouvé quelques divergences quant à la façon dont ces concepts doivent être compris. Mais jusqu'à tout récemment, les chercheurs ne se sont guère attardés sur ces divergences, alors pourtant que certaines d'entre elles sont fort remarquables. Ainsi certaines interprétations de la théorie soutiennent que le fait de contraindre la volonté est la marque (...) des idées claires et distinctes, tandis que cela est rejeté par d'autres. Certaines encore soutiennent que le clair et le distinct sont susceptibles de degrés, tandis que d'autres ne sont pas d'accord. Mon objectif dans cet article est d'esquisser une théorie générale capable de rendre compte, dans ces cas comme dans un certain nombre d'autres, de cette variété d'interprétations du clair et du distinct qui est enracinée dans le corpus cartésien même. J'appelle cette théorie «générale» dans la mesure où les diverses interprétations évoquées sont par rapport à elle comme des espèces par rapport à un genre. Ma reconstruction de la théorie générale trouve son appui textuel dans l'ensemble du corpus cartésien. Le gros de mes efforts, cependant, consiste à retracer la théorie dans un texte qui fut l'un des premiers écrits de Descartes : les Régies pour la direction de l'esprit. (shrink)

It is generally assumed that Descartes invokes “objective being in the intellect” in order to explain or describe an idea’s status as being “of something.” I argue that this assumption is mistaken. As emerges in his discussion of “materially false ideas” in the Fourth Replies, Descartes recognizes two senses of ‘idea of’. One, a theoretical sense, is itself introduced in terms of objective being. Hence Descartes can’t be introducing objective being to explain or describe “ofness” understood in this sense. Descartes (...) also appeals to a pretheoretical sense of ‘idea of’. I will argue that the notion of objective being can’t serve to explain or describe this “ofness” either. I conclude by proposing an alternative explanation of the role of objective being, according to which Descartes introduces this notion to explain the mind’s ability to attain clear and distinct ideas. (shrink)

Leibniz is unclear about the nature of pleasure. In some texts, he describes pleasure as a perception of perfection, while in other texts he describes pleasure as being caused by a perception of perfection. In this article, I disambiguate two senses of “perception of perfection”, which clarifies Leibniz’s considered position. I argue that pleasure is a perception of an increase in a substance’s power which is caused by a substance’s knowledge of a perfection of the universe or God. This reading (...) helps clarify the nature of Leibnizian happiness. Happiness is a cognitive process (akin to a mood), constituted fundamentally out of pleasure, which is grounded in increases in a substance’s power. A rational substance will sustain its happiness so long as it is more powerful than it is weak, and it is engaging in activities that increase its power. (shrink)

Berkeley argues that our ideas cannot represent external objects, because only an idea can resemble an idea. But he does not offer any argument for the claim that an idea can represent only what it resembles - a premise essential to his argument. I argue that this gap can be both historically explained and filled by examining the debates between Cartesians and sceptics in the late seventeenth century. Descartes held that representation involves two relations between an idea and its object (...) ? resemblance and causation ? and that these relations are very closely linked to each other. I look at variations upon this claim in later Cartesians, especially Desgabets and Régis. I also examine the critics who attacked this claim, especially Huet, Foucher, and Du Hamel, who developed arguments similar to Berkeley's but concluded that (Cartesian) representation is simply impossible. I also argue that Malebranche, although an adherent of the Cartesian theory of intentionality, used a modified version of this argument to argue for his claim that ideas do not exist in the mind at all. These thinkers, and especially Malebranche, provide the context in which we should understand Berkeley. (shrink)

We propose a novel reading of Descartes' views on the nature of pain, thirst, and hunger: imperativism. According to imperativism, rather than (exclusively) having intentional contents individuated by a set of correctness conditions specifying the way the world is, pain thirst, and hunger have contents individuated by satisfaction conditions, which specify the way the world ought to be. Unlike representationalist treatments, the imperativist reading satisfies the unique health-preserving role Descartes sets out for pain, thirst, and hunger, without inflating his austere (...) metaphysics of res extensa. (shrink)

Descartes maintained that sensations of color and the like misrepresent the material world in normal circumstances. Some prominent scholars have argued that, to explain this Cartesian view, we must attribute to Descartes a causal account of sensory representation. I contend that neither the arguments motivating this reading nor the textual evidence offered in its support is sufficient to justify such attribution. Both textual and theoretical reasons point in the direction of an (at least partial) internalist account of Descartes' views on (...) sensory representation. (shrink)