Los críticos que han interpretado el pensamiento de Feyerabend como un relativismo radical no hacen justicia a su intencionalidad, y se muestran incapaces de comprender la unidad de su obra, en particular, su abandono posterior de los ideales relativistas. Se busca distinguir las diversas posiciones de Feyerabend frente al relativismo y exponer su reducción al absurdo de las nociones de la ciencia propias del positivismo lógico y del racionalismo crítico. Así mismo, se plantea cómo Feyerabend, ante la ausencia de un (...) criterio para discernir la tarea científica, postula un relativismo, pero, al final de su vida, busca elaborar una metafísica de la abundancia que supere las coordenadas de aquel. Critics who have interpreted Feyerabend's work as radical relativism do not do justice to his intentions and do not understand the unity of his work, in particular, his later abandonment of relativist ideals. This article seeks to distinguish the diverse Feyerabend's positions regarding relativism and exposes his reduction to absurdity of the ideas of science belonging to logical positivism and critical rationalism. It also addresses the way in which Feyerabend postulated relativism when faced with the absence of criteria to discern the scientific task. It argues, however, that at the end of his life Feyerabend seeked to construct a metaphysics of abundance in order to surpass relativism. (shrink)

The purpose of the following article is to draw attention to main problems of scientific values as they were stated by Paul Feyerabend. Various philosophers and epistemologists have always tried to prove chosen principles and objectives, but only few dared to jeopardize their fundamentals. Stereotypes of searching for ultimate truth ceased to hold; however, scientific coordinates are still not qualified. Underlying ambiguities often remain unarticulated. Among those who ventured to shed light on them were the philosophers of post-positivistic branch. One (...) of those who questioned science values in social, cultural, and philosophical approaches the most rigidly was Paul Feyerabend. By means of typical political concepts he detected basic objectives of scientists. Our main methodological tools in this research are comparative analyses of the sources and immanent critique of Feyerabend’s arguments. The scientific novelty is based on our core objective to clarify substantial obstacles for homogeneity of science. Does such homogeneity or unity exist at any level? Feyerabend’s answer is a weak “yes”. He accepts such unity only as a useful assumption or a myth. In one of his latest books, Conquest of Abundance, he calls it a “flag” for the “people doing science.” As Feyerabend diagnosed faults of relativism, instrumentalism, and realism – all of them are threatened by the same menace of being invalid to response the world “at face value” – we have to deal somehow with topics denounced by him. In conclusion, we show important implications for the creation of a specific worldview at the intersection of philosophy and science. Considering a number of negatives, in the article we elicit fruitful ideas of Feyerabend, and contextually question them without resorting to a superficial reproach. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to investigate appropriate methods for educating students into citizenship within a pluralistic state and to explain why civic education is itself important. In this discussion, I will offer suggestions as to how students might be best prepared for their future political roles as participants in a democracy, and how we, as theorists, ought to structure institutions and curricula in order to ensure that students are adequately trained for political decision making. The paper is divided (...) into six sections. In the first two sections, I argue that community is a learned understanding and that such education,even when it supports liberal commitments,cannot be neutral. I use the social contract tradition as an entrance into the perpetual nature of conflict within a pluralist society. In the third and fourth sections, I develop a pedagogy geared towards educating students into what I call cognitive conflict, and argue that the arts, widely understood, should be privileged over other disciplines. In the fifth section, I examine two difficulties inherent inmy pedagogy — first that it seems to demandthat all perspectives be taught, and second that it seems to promote anxiety among students. In the final section, I ask that political theory reexamine the role of harmony in justice. I conclude that a managed conflictis a more acceptable organizational description of liberal political structures. (shrink)

The debate on the origins of modern humans is one of the oldest and most controversial in the field of palaeoanthropology. In the 1860s the debate was established in the evolutionary context and, as a conflict between two major schools and various sub-schools, it has continued up until the present day. The opposing schools were and still are, at best, in only partial alignment on the major scientific issues. Each of them is founded in its own metaphysics and focuses on (...) an exclusive set of observations that it is capable of explaining. It would appear, therefore, that the history and present state of modern human origins research may be interpreted, in terms of Kuhn's philosophy of science, as an example of a pre-paradigm scientific dispute. This interpretation shows the immaturity of modern human origins research and calls for the re-examination of palaeoanthropology's basic theoretical propositions as well as of this sciencie's controversial relationship with the society. (shrink)

From the 1970s onwards, Feyerabend argues against the freedom of science. This will seem strange to some, as his epistemological anarchism is often taken to suggest that scientists should be free of even the most basic and obvious norms of science. His argument against the freedom of science is heavily influenced by his case study of the interference of Chinese communists in mainland China during the 1950s wherein the government forced local universities to continue researching traditional Chinese medicine rather than (...) Western medicine. Feyerabend claims this move was justifiable and, eventually, vindicated by the resulting research which was beneficial for locals and the West at large. The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive overview and analysis on Feyerabend’s views on the freedom of science and his social commentary on US science funding policy that follows therefrom. This proves to be exceedingly difficult because Feyerabend’s writings on the subject are filled with gaps, unnoticed tensions, and cognitive dissonance. Still, I think Feyerabend’s scattered insights and the contradictions that emerge lead to an interesting microcosm of the issues contained in the freedom of science debate. (shrink)

Feyerabend is infamous for his defense of pluralism, which he extends to every topic he discusses. Disagreement, a by-product of this pluralism, becomes a sign of flourishing critical communities. In Feyerabend’s political works, he extends this pluralism from science to democratic societies and incorporates his earlier work on scientific methodology into a procedure for designing just policy. However, a description and analysis of Feyerabend’s conception of disagreement is lacking. In this paper, I reconstruct and assess Feyerabend’s conception of disagreement, with (...) a particular emphasis on the role of experts, and its role in the formation of science policy. I go on to assess this argument in light of recent literature on manufactured disagreement on politically contentious science policy. I conclude by suggesting some prospects and problems for de-idealizing Feyerabend’s position on disagreement to see whether it may be plausibly implemented. (shrink)

Abstract Paul Feyerabend is famous for presenting a scathing indictment of modern experts as a threat to democracy. While commentators have questioned the accuracy of his portrayal of experts, they have not assessed the accuracy of his depiction of laypeople. Although Feyerabend has political reasons for wanting to demythologize grandiose notions of expertise, his political project hinders clear thinking about the question by idealizing the alternative lay perspective.

La erosión de la confianza en las capacidades epistémicas de la ciudadanía tiene en su raíz la radical separación entre hechos y valores que el pragmatismo ha considerado como clave de nuestra cultura. Hoy es posible superar el dualismo sobre la base de un conjunto de virtudes y disposiciones individuales que son tanto éticas como epistémicas. Este entrelazamiento entre lo ético y lo epistémico pone de manifiesto la imbricación entre una concepción deliberativa de la democracia con su exigencia de una (...) ética cívica y los requerimientos de una ética de la investigación científica en el marco de una sociedad democrática. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article asks whether the philosophy of Paul K. Feyerabend can be reasonably classified as postmodernist, a label applied to him by friends and foes alike. After describing some superficial similarities between the style and content of both Feyerabend’s and postmodernist writings, I offer three more robust characterisations of postmodernism in terms of relativism, ‘incredulity to metanarratives’, and ‘depthlessness’. It emerges that none of these characterisations offers a strong justification for classifying Feyerabend as ‘postmodern’ in any significant sense. Indeed, what (...) does emerge is that Feyerabend’s work was fundamentally informed by a humanitarian vision of the value of science that is, in fact, strikingly modern. (shrink)

This article explores three aspects of interpretation—musical interpretation of notated Western art music, hermeneutics, and poetry —based on ongoing music education research focusing on the learning of musical interpretation within the one-to-one context of higher music education. The broad philosophic poetic inquiry of interpretation has the form of an autoethnodrama containing both haiku and found poetry. Poetry is both used as a process of inquiry and as a means of representation. The autoethnodrama explores the author’s struggle with finding his cogito (...) for conducting arts-based research and touches upon his personal history. Through the combination of autoethnodrama and a philosophic poetic inquiry, he finds a deeper understanding of musical interpretation, usage of poetry and autoethnodrama in research, as well as of his personhood. Concluding reflections on one possible way of interpreting the autoethnodrama in relation to teaching and learning of musical interpretation within higher music education are also presented. (shrink)

We analyse insufficient epistemic pluralism and associated problems in science-based policy advice during the COVID-19 pandemic drawing on specific arguments in Paul Feyerabend’s philosophy. Our goal is twofold: to deepen our understanding of the epistemic shortcomings in science-based policy during the pandemic, and to assess the merits and problems of Feyerabend’s arguments for epistemic pluralism as well as their relevance for policy-making. We discuss opportunities and challenges of integrating a plurality of viewpoints from within and outside science into policy advice (...) thus contributing to discussions about normative issues concerning evidence and expertise in policy-making. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to provide an interpretation of Feyerabend's metaphysics of science as found in late works like Conquest of Abundance and Tyranny of Science. Feyerabend's late metaphysics consists of an attempt to criticize and provide a systematic alternative to traditional scientific realism, a package of views he sometimes referred to as “scientific materialism.” Scientific materialism is objectionable not only on metaphysical grounds, nor because it provides a poor ground for understanding science, but because it implies problematic (...) claims about the epistemic and cultural authority of science, claims incompatible with situating science properly in democratic societies. I show how Feyerabend's metaphysical view, which I call “the abundant world” or “abundant realism,” constitute a sophisticated and challenging form of ontological pluralism that makes interesting connections with contemporary philosophy of science and issues of the political and policy role of science in a democratic society. (shrink)

This inaugural handbook documents the distinctive research field that utilizes history and philosophy in investigation of theoretical, curricular and pedagogical issues in the teaching of science and mathematics. It is contributed to by 130 researchers from 30 countries; it provides a logically structured, fully referenced guide to the ways in which science and mathematics education is, informed by the history and philosophy of these disciplines, as well as by the philosophy of education more generally. The first handbook to cover the (...) field, it lays down a much-needed marker of progress to date and provides a platform for informed and coherent future analysis and research of the subject. -/- The publication comes at a time of heightened worldwide concern over the standard of science and mathematics education, attended by fierce debate over how best to reform curricula and enliven student engagement in the subjects There is a growing recognition among educators and policy makers that the learning of science must dovetail with learning about science; this handbook is uniquely positioned as a locus for the discussion. -/- The handbook features sections on pedagogical, theoretical, national, and biographical research, setting the literature of each tradition in its historical context. Each chapter engages in an assessment of the strengths and weakness of the research addressed, and suggests potentially fruitful avenues of future research. A key element of the handbook’s broader analytical framework is its identification and examination of unnoticed philosophical assumptions in science and mathematics research. It reminds readers at a crucial juncture that there has been a long and rich tradition of historical and philosophical engagements with science and mathematics teaching, and that lessons can be learnt from these engagements for the resolution of current theoretical, curricular and pedagogical questions that face teachers and administrators. (shrink)

What would it mean to apply quantum theory, without restriction and without involving any notion of measurement and state reduction, to the whole universe? What would realism about the quantum state then imply? This book brings together an illustrious team of philosophers and physicists to debate these questions. The contributors broadly agree on the need, or aspiration, for a realist theory that unites micro- and macro-worlds. But they disagree on what this implies. Some argue that if unitary quantum evolution has (...) unrestricted application, and if the quantum state is taken to be something physically real, then this universe emerges from the quantum state as one of countless others, constantly branching in time, all of which are real. The result, they argue, is many worlds quantum theory, also known as the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. No other realist interpretation of unitary quantum theory has ever been found. Others argue in reply that this picture of many worlds is in no sense inherent to quantum theory, or fails to make physical sense, or is scientifically inadequate. The stuff of these worlds, what they are made of, is never adequately explained, nor are the worlds precisely defined; ordinary ideas about time and identity over time are compromised; no satisfactory role or substitute for probability can be found in many worlds theories; they can't explain experimental data; anyway, there are attractive realist alternatives to many worlds. Twenty original essays, accompanied by commentaries and discussions, examine these claims and counterclaims in depth. They consider questions of ontology - the existence of worlds; probability - whether and how probability can be related to the branching structure of the quantum state; alternatives to many worlds - whether there are one-world realist interpretations of quantum theory that leave quantum dynamics unchanged; and open questions even given many worlds, including the multiverse concept as it has arisen elsewhere in modern cosmology. A comprehensive introduction lays out the main arguments of the book, which provides a state-of-the-art guide to many worlds quantum theory and its problems. (shrink)

The goal of this dissertation is to reconstruct, critically evaluate, and apply the pluralism of Paul Feyerabend. I conclude by suggesting future points of contact between Feyerabend’s pluralism and topics of interest in contemporary philosophy of science. I begin, in Chapter 1, by reconstructing Feyerabend’s critical philosophy. I show how his published works from 1948 until 1970 show a remarkably consistent argumentative strategy which becomes more refined and general as Feyerabend’s thought matures. Specifically, I argue that Feyerabend develops a persuasive (...) case against rationalism, or the thesis that there exist normative and exclusive rules of scientific rationality. In Chapter 2, I reconstruct Feyerabend’s pluralism and detail its relationship to his humanitarianism and epistemological anarchism. I understand Feyerabend’s pluralism as the combination of the principles of proliferation and tenacity. I show the evolution and justification of these principles from Feyerabend’s early papers until the late 1970s. In Chapter 3, I defend Feyerabend’s pluralism from its most prominent criticisms. I then clarify that Feyerabend’s pluralism amounts to a conception of the logic of theory pursuit and modify his view using insights from C.S. Peirce, Pierre Duhem, and Michael Polanyi. From Peirce, I show how economic, sociological, and value-laden features of theory pursuit may be used to constrain proliferation and tenacity. From Duhem and Polanyi, I try to show the proper role of tacit knowledge within a Feyerabendian framework. Finally, I show what implications Feyerabend’s pluralism has for models of distributing funds within scientific communities. I contend that it provides a more promising model that the ‘well-ordered science’ proposal advanced by numerous philosophers and social scientists. Specifically, I aim to understand what taking Feyerabend’s pluralism seriously entails for principles of balancing funding allocation decisions and the role of peer-review in evaluating the potential success of research proposals. I conclude by suggesting future lines of research for further analyzing and applying Feyerabend’s pluralism. (shrink)

This chapter examines from a philosophical perspective the work on contemporary science education developed in the literature of the cultural studies of science education (CSSE) field. The aim is to focus attention on the conceptual bases of the CSSE work. Part 1 begins with an introduction to cultural studies of science (CSS), presenting foundational philosophical and sociological work that has been influential in the CSSE field. In Part 2 attention turns to the cultural studies of science education. Representative CSSE works (...) that illustrate central and controversial theses are examined, and strengths and weaknesses of these theses are indicated. Part 3 focuses on philosophical concepts related to science and science education; issues that have emerged in Parts 1 and 2 are addressed. (shrink)