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  1. Implementation as Resemblance.André Curtis-Trudel - 2021 - Philosophy of Science 88 (5):1021-1032.
    This article advertises a new account of computational implementation. According to the resemblance account, implementation is a matter of resembling a computational architecture. The resemblance account departs from previous theories by denying that computational architectures are exhausted by their formal, mathematical features. Instead, they are taken to be permeated with causality, spatiotemporality, and other nonmathematical features. I argue that this approach comports well with computer scientific practice and offers a novel response to so-called triviality arguments.
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  • Colligation in modelling practices: From Whewell’s tides to the San Francisco Bay Model.Claudia Cristalli & Julia Sánchez-Dorado - 2021 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 85:1-15.
  • Scientific representation and dissimilarity.Brandon Boesch - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5495-5513.
    In this essay, I examine the role of dissimilarity in scientific representation. After briefly reviewing some of the philosophical literature which places a strong emphasis on the role of similarity, I turn to examine some work from Carroll and Borges which demonstrates that perfect similarity is not valuable in the representational use of maps. Expanding on this insight, I go on to argue that this shows that dissimilarity is an important part of the representational use of maps—a point I then (...)
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  • On the Thinking Brains and Tinkering with the Scientific Models.Majid Davoody Beni - 2018 - Axiomathes 28 (1):37-51.
    The paper aims to provide a detailed assessment of Tim Crane’s recent invocation of the notion of scientific models in the way of dealing with the issue of the brain’s representational states. In this paper, I assess Crane’s proposal under a charitable and a less charitable reading. I argue that Crane’s use of scientific models is at best compatible with his expression of psychological realism. However, Crane’s use of model-based strategy by no means underlay, support, or strengthen his psychological realism. (...)
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