Switch to: References

Citations of:

Nativism and the Nature of Thought in Reid's Account of Our Knowledge of the External World

In Terence Cuneo Rene van Woudenberg (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 156--179 (2004)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Thomas Reid's Common Sense Philosophy of Mind.Todd Buras - 2019 - In Rebecca Copenhaver (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Early Modern and Modern Ages: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 4. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 298-317.
    Thomas Reid’s philosophy is a philosophy of mind—a Pneumatology in the idiom of 18th century Scotland. His overarching philosophical project is to construct an account of the nature and operations of the human mind, focusing on the two-way correspondence, in perception and action, between the thinking principle within and the material world without. Like his contemporaries, Reid’s treatment of these topics aimed to incorporate the lessons of the scientific revolution. What sets Reid’s philosophy of mind apart is his commitment to (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Is Thomas Reid a Direct Realist about Perception?Hagit Benbaji - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):1-29.
    The controversy over the interpretative issue—is Thomas Reid a perceptual direct realist?—has recently had channelled into it a host of imaginative ideas about what direct perception truly means. Paradoxically enough, it is the apparent contradiction at the heart of his view of perception which keeps teasing us to review our concepts: time and again, Reid stresses that the very idea of any mental intermediaries implies scepticism, yet, nevertheless insists that sensations are signs of objects. But if sensory signs are not (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Empiricism, Time-Awareness, and Hume's Manners of Disposition.Adrian Bardon - 2007 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 5 (1):47-63.
    The issue of time-awareness presents a critical challenge for empiricism: if temporal properties are not directly perceived, how do we become aware of them? A unique empiricist account of time-awareness suggested by Hume's comments on time in the Treatise avoids the problems characteristic of other empiricist accounts. Hume's theory, however, has some counter-intuitive consequences. The failure of empiricists to come up with a defensible theory of time-awareness lends prima facie support to a non-empiricist theory of ideas.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations