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Another way logic might be normative

Synthese 199 (3):5861-5881 (2021)

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  1. No cause for collapse.Dustin Gooßens & Andrew Tedder - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-19.
    We investigate a hitherto under-considered avenue of response for the logical pluralist to collapse worries. In particular, we note that standard forms of the collapse arguments seem to require significant order-theoretic assumptions, namely that the collection of admissible logics for the pluralist should be closed under meets and joins. We consider some reasons for rejecting this assumption, noting some prima facie plausible constraints on the class of admissible logics which would lead a pluralist admitting those logics to resist such closure (...)
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  • A simple solution to the collapse argument for logical pluralism.Diego Tajer - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Many philosophers have argued that logical pluralism is not compatible with the normativity of logic. They developed different versions of the collapse argument: if two logics are correct, then the weaker one will be normatively irrelevant. In this paper, I argue that the collapse argument is based on a controversial premise: the assumption that every logic can be characterized by the same bridge principle. I provide a solution to the collapse argument based on the modification of this premise, maintaining both (...)
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  • Double Trouble for Logical Pluralists.J. W. Evershed - 2021 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 121 (3):411-424.
    According to tradition, logic is normative for reasoning. According to many contemporary philosophers of logic, there is more than one correct logic. What is the relationship between these two strands of thought? This paper makes two claims. First, logic is doubly normative for reasoning because, in addition to constraining the combinations of beliefs that we may have, logic also constrains the methods by which we may form them. Second, given that logic is doubly normative for reasoning, a wide array of (...)
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  • Logical Disagreement.Frederik J. Andersen - 2024 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrews
    While the epistemic significance of disagreement has been a popular topic in epistemology for at least a decade, little attention has been paid to logical disagreement. This monograph is meant as a remedy. The text starts with an extensive literature review of the epistemology of (peer) disagreement and sets the stage for an epistemological study of logical disagreement. The guiding thread for the rest of the work is then three distinct readings of the ambiguous term ‘logical disagreement’. Chapters 1 and (...)
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