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  1. Public opinion and political philosophy: The relation between social-scientific and philosophical analyses of distributive justice. [REVIEW]Adam Swift - 1999 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (4):337-363.
    This paper considers the relation between philosophical discussions of, and social-scientific research into popular beliefs about, distributive justice. The first part sets out the differences and tensions between the two perspectives, identifying considerations which tend to lead adherents of each discipline to regard the other as irrelevant to its concerns. The second discusses four reasons why social scientists might benefit from philosophy: problems in identifying inconsistency, the fact that non-justice considerations might underlie distributive judgments, the way in which different principles (...)
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  • Voting in Bad Faith.Joanne C. Lau - 2014 - Res Publica 20 (3):281-294.
    What is wrong with participating in a democratic decision-making process, and then doing something other than the outcome of the decision? It is often thought that collective decision-making entails being prima facie bound to the outcome of that decision, although little analysis has been done on why that is the case. Conventional perspectives are inadequate to explain its wrongness. I offer a new and more robust analysis on the nature of voting: voting when you will accept the outcome only if (...)
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  • Democracy and the Common Good: A Study of the Weighted Majority Rule.Katharina Berndt Rasmussen - 2013 - Dissertation, Stockholm University
    In this study I analyse the performance of a democratic decision-making rule: the weighted majority rule. It assigns to each voter a number of votes that is proportional to her stakes in the decision. It has been shown that, for collective decisions with two options, the weighted majority rule in combination with self-interested voters maximises the common good when the latter is understood in terms of either the sum-total or prioritarian sum of the voters’ well-being. The main result of my (...)
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