Rollback arguments focus on long sequences of actions with identical initial conditions in order to explicate the luck problem that indeterminism poses for libertarian free will theories (i.e. the problem that indeterministic actions appear arbitrary in a free-will undermining way). In this paper, I propose a rollback argument for probability incompatibilism, i.e. for the thesis that free will is incompatible with all world-states being governed by objective probabilities. Other than the most prominently discussed rollback arguments, this argument explicitly focusses on (...) the ability to act otherwise. It argues that the negligible probability of the relative frequencies in overall rollback patterns being relevantly different indicates that even the ability to act otherwise with regard to individual actions is not free-will enabling. My proposed argument provides probability incompatibilists with a tool to argue against a classical event-causal response to the luck problem, while it can still motivate an agent-causal response to it. (shrink)

By means of the Rollback Argument, this paper argues that metaphysically robust probabilities are incompatible with a kind of control which can ensure that free actions are not a matter of chance. Our main objection to those (typically agent-causal) theories which both attribute a kind of control to agents that eliminates the role of chance concerning free actions and ascribe probabilities to options of decisions is that metaphysically robust probabilities should be posited only if they can have a metaphysical explanatory (...) role but probabilities can explain anything only if chance has a role. First, we reconstruct the Rollback Argument. Second, we criticize the standard ways of reconciling non-chancy control with metaphysically robust probabilities. Finally, we respond to those worries that are related to the thought experiment of the Rollback Argument. (shrink)