Seit Dodds’ Anwendung des Begriffs „Schamkultur“ auf die griechische Kultur genießt das Thema Scham die besondere Aufmerksamkeit der Gräzisten. Basierend auf einer detaillierten Analyse der relevanten Belegstellen im gesamten platonischen Corpus und einer kritischen Auseinandersetzung mit den vorherigen einschlägigen Forschungen, versucht die vorliegende Arbeit Platons Konzeption der Scham systematisch zu erläutern, und zwar thematisch unter den folgenden vier Perspektiven: dem sokratischen elenchos, der Wahrheitsliebe, dem Moralverständnis sowie der Moralerziehung im Staat. Die Studie zielt einerseits darauf ab, aufzuzeigen, dass Platons Verständnis (...) von Scham nicht so unreif ist, wie man bislang dachte; andererseits möchte sie vor Augen führen, dass Platon Scham nicht, wie traditionell angenommen, als nur negativ erachtet, sondern ihre positive Rolle in verschiedenen Gebieten durchaus anerkennt. Es wird gezeigt, dass Scham und die ihr verwandten Emotionen von Bedeutung sowohl für den platonischen Sokrates als auch für die platonische Philosophie im Ganzen sind, auch wenn der Begriff „Schamkultur“ wohl keine zutreffende Bezeichnung für seine Zeit darstellt. (shrink)

The paper aims to investigate the relationship between ἐρωτικὴ τέχνη and ἐλεγκτικὴ τέχνη in Plato’s early dialogues, and especially in the Charmides, through a close exam of the role of ἀντέρως in the dialogical practice and exchanges. In the light of Socrates’ reshaping of the roles of ἐραστής and ἐρώμενος in his view of παιδεία – exemplarily shown in the Symposium – I will analyse some passages of Socrates’ conversations in the Charmides by focusing on the interaction between the one (...) who examines and the one who answers within the elenctic procedure. (shrink)

Platonic dialogues are self-concealing, presenting ideas by indirection or in riddling form, often exploring a difficulty or aporia without arriving at a solution. Since philosophers have begun to see Plato's work as imbued with irony, double meaning, and ambiguity, literary techniques that accommodate such layered meanings become a necessary adjunct to interpretation. The dialogue Politicus explores through an aporetic process a central Platonic concern, the relation between ideal and real. Close analysis of the important section dealing with law and constitutions (...) reveals some of the complexity. By his wayward conduct of the argument, the Eleatic stranger repeatedly forces reevaluation of earlier arguments or conclusions. At the close of the cosmic myth , the Stranger warned against confusing the divine monarch, a true shepherd, with his mortal counterpart, the best ruler, whose discovery is the aim of the dialogue. The distinction that was made then is simple in context, but complex in view of the conclusion at 303b8-c5 that the participants in all governments except the ideal monarchy are supreme wizards and fakers. The truly real statesman thus recedes into a distance remote from the world of practical politics, while the familiar regimes are marked as irretrievably flawed and inauthentic. The ability of the fake statesmen to deceive by impersonating the true king also means that it may be impossible to make the crucial distinction between king and tyrant, since either may disregard the laws. The strange fable of legalism run wild confirms the ludicrous and destructive results of rigid obedience to law, but concludes that rigidity is necessary to the false regimes. The corollary is that seekers after truth, like Socrates or even the Stranger himself, must always be rejected by law-based societies. (shrink)

With the late Author’s kind permission, the present text is published here in a somewhat abbreviated and modified translation that has been given appropriate subheadings and supplemented with an extensive bibliography. Its German original from 1996 has been translated into French and English. The purpose of the present translation is to make the Polish reader acquainted with the important and innovative account of Plato’s philosophy that has been put forward by the Tübingen School whose one of the most prominent co-founders (...) was Hans Joachim Krämer. While this text is devoted to Plato’s critique of writing, it also presents Plato’s agrapha dogmata as an important supplement to the written dialogues. A fuller overview of the major assumptions of this new interpretation is to be found in the recently published Gesammelte Ansätze zu Platon. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to show that Plato uses contradictions in the Republic as an impulse to think and to advance in the ascent to the Idea of the good. The procedure to dissolve the main contradictions in the text is that of aphairesis, complementary to that of prosthēsis. Also if they are explicitly named just at the beginning and at the end of the ascent, I will show that aphairesis and prosthēsis are consistently applied throughout the ascendant (...) argument of Republic I-VII. Starting with the separation of the opposites at the sensible level, the process will continue separating the rational and the irrational in the soul and culminate when explicitly naming the aphairesis of the One/Good at the intelligible level. As will be seen, the opposites in question are unity and indeterminate/indefinite multiplicity. But also if named, the culminating aphairēsis of the Idea of the Good will not be consistently developed in the Republic. Some important allusions to it will also be found in the Parmenides allowing us to solve the main unresolved contradictions in the Republic in consonance with the theory of principles of the agrapha dogmata. (shrink)

The present paper is the first Polish translation of the following excerpts from the Author’s original and innovative book entitled Platon : IV 4. a) Kritik der Schriftlichkeit; b) Hören des Richtiges, Verfehlen der Wahrheit: Platons Kritik der Mündlichkeit; IX 1. Schriftlicher Dialog und mündliches Prinziepiendenken; 2. Einheit und Vielheit: Ein Rekonstruktionsversuch; 3. Mündliche Lehre als Ergänzung des schriftlichen Dialogs. The book represents a new paradigm in research on Plato and the topics developed in it constitute a concise and coherent (...) account of Plato’s critique of writing and orality as well as the related theory of principles. While these issues continue to be an area of scholarly debate, the authors groundbreaking proposals provide an invaluable point of reference for anyone truly interested in Plato’s philosophy. We are extremely grateful to the Author as well as the Publisher for their permission to publish a Polish translation of the aforementioned parts of this excellent book. (shrink)

In Plato’s Phaedrus, Socrates asserts that madness is a good thing if it comes from the gods, and demonstrates this using the example of love. Eroticism becomes thereby philosophy, the lover a philosopher, with Plato’s Socrates serving as prototype. The question remains, however, how madness can be reconciled with a philosophical search for truth which relies entirely on rationality. This question must be considered within the context of the growing antagonism between irrationality and rationality, enlightenment and counter-enlightenment, cultic ritual and (...) reason, in the fifth century. Evidence of this antagonism forms a helpful background for interpretation of the question of the role of insanity in the philosophy of the Platonic Socrates. It can be shown that Plato gives Socrates characteristics from the context of contemporary counter-enlightenment and thereby transforms these and integrates them into philosophy. This process can be clearly demonstrated by means of the comparison of Socrates with a gadfly in the Apology. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Plato’s notion of the care of the self is his remedy to the psychological malady he refers to as ‘wandering’. The wandering self requires care, and a close reading of the Platonic corpus indicates self-cultivation means stabilizing the soul in accordance with its intelligent nature. I then argue that Plato appropriates the ethical injunction to care for the soul and draws from it an important epistemological consequence. Specifically, his view is that a wandering soul’s (...) instability renders it incapable of philosophical cognition. To engender a healthy soul, one must participate in dialectic. (shrink)

Plato is commonly considered a metaphysical dualist conceiving of a world of Forms separate from the world of particulars in which we live. This paper explores the motivation for postulating that second world as opposed to making do with the one we have. The main objective is to demonstrate that and how everything, Forms and all, can instead fit into the same world. The approach is exploratory, as there can be no proof in the standard sense. The debate between explaining (...) Plato’s ontology with a single world and requiring a two-world model to make sense of the same thing is typically about scouring the Platonic corpus for evidence and turning to Aristotle for help where we need it. The aim here is to dig deeper than what either of them, or anyone else, has said or implied about the number or worlds, searching instead for any insight that might be gained from the way Forms are supposed to exist versus what we ourselves might understand by existence. Although the paper is, at its most basic level, about the existence of the Forms, the intention is not to prove that they exist, nor to evaluate the proofs and objections already on record, but to consider how they might exist and what follows if they do. Dialogue toward consensus on why we think the Forms exist, and why we think they do not, could perhaps provide a smoother “second sailing” in waters where we have been unable to agree whether they do and where they would if they did. (shrink)

Despite Diotima’s irresistible virtues and attractiveness across the millennia, she spells trouble for philosophy. It is not her fault that she has been misunderstood, nor is it Plato’s. Rather, I suspect, each era has made of Diotima what it desired her to be. Her malleability is related to the assumption that Plato invented her, that she is a mere literary fiction, licensing the imagination to do what it will. In the first part of my paper, I argue against three contemporary (...) ‘majority views’ about Diotima that I regard as false. The first is that we can be certain she is fictional;1 a second is that Diotima is our best evidence for Plato’s feminism; the third, that she is Plato’s mouthpiece for the higher mysteries in the Symposium. After I have set aside what I regard as false, I proceed in the second half of my paper to develop Diotima’s positive contribution to philosophical psychology, her naturalistic account of the psyche as mortal, unified, and developmental. Whether the view Plato assigns to her is one that he held I do not pretend to know; but it is a powerful, defensible, and coherent view that inspired positive aspects of Freudian psychology in the twentieth century. Freud’s insight, in fact, makes clear how erōs can be developed in relation to the bad as well as the good. (shrink)

A commentary on the Symposium as a challenge and a gift to Athens. I begin with a reflection on three dates: 416 bce, the date of Agathon’s victory party, c. 400, the approximate date of Apollodorus’ retelling of the party, and c. 375, the approximate date of the ‘publication’ of the dialogue, and I argue that Plato reminds his contemporary Athens both of its great poetic and legal and scientific traditions and of the historical fact that the way late fourth (...) century Athens appropriated them in some way led to the city’s demise at the turn of the century; thus the dialogue is Plato’s challenge to his contemporary Athens to recognize and overcome its flawed relation to its cultural resources. Heard in this way, the key moments are Aristophanes’ implied critique of Pausanias and Eryximachus and Socrates’ implied critique of Aristophanes and Agathon. Proceeding by a close reading, I argue that Plato exposes, for those moved to rise to his challenge, the failure of his great predecessors to conceive the divine in a way that, worthy of the height and otherness divinity requires, can provide substantive orientation for the burgeoning new reason that animates the city’s culture. (shrink)

The article tries to prove that the famous formula "epekeina tês ousias" has to be understood in the sense of being beyond being and not only in the sense of being beyond essence. We make hereby three points: first, since pure textual exegesis of 509b8–10 seems to lead to endless controversy, a formal proof for the metaontological interpretation could be helpful to settle the issue; we try to give such a proof. Second, we offer a corollary of the formal proof, (...) showing that not only self-predication of the form of the Good, but of any form is not possible, that is: no form of F has the form of F. Third, we apply Spinoza’s distinction between an ens imaginarium and a chimaera to Plato’s Idea of the Good. (shrink)