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  1. In Defense of the Basic Argument for Vegetarianism.James Simpson - 2021 - Journal of Animal Ethics 11 (2):53-59.
    In a recent article, Timothy Hsiao criticizes the basic argument for moral vegetarianism. In this connection, Hsiao offers an interesting, original argument (that I'll christen Hsiao's Argument) with the conclusion that human consumption of meat solely for the purposes of nutrition trumps the welfare interests of nonhuman animals. In this article, however, I'll argue that if Hsiao's Argument isn't to be problematically circular, we have very strong grounds for thinking that it is either unsound or invalid. Toward the end of (...)
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  • Sentience, Rationality, and Moral Status: A Further Reply to Hsiao.Stephen Puryear - 2016 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 29 (4):697-704.
    Timothy Hsiao argues that animals lack moral status because they lack the capacity for the sort of higher-level rationality required for membership in the moral community. Stijn Bruers and László Erdős have already raised a number of objections to this argument, to which Hsiao has replied with some success. But I think a stronger critique can be made. Here I raise further objections to three aspects of Hsiao's view: his conception of the moral community, his idea of root capacities grounded (...)
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  • On a Failed Defense of Factory Farming.Stephen Puryear, Stijn Bruers & László Erdős - 2017 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 30 (2):311-323.
    Timothy Hsiao attempts to defend industrial animal farming by arguing that it is not inherently cruel. We raise three main objections to his defense. First, his argument rests on a misunderstanding of the nature of cruelty. Second, his conclusion, though technically true, is so weak as to be of virtually no moral significance or interest. Third, his contention that animals lack moral standing, and thus that mistreating them is wrong only insofar as it makes one more disposed to mistreat other (...)
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  • Hsiao on the Moral Status of Animals: Two Simple Responses.Timothy Perrine - 2019 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 32 (5):927-933.
    According to a common view, animals have moral status. Further, a standard defense of this view is the Argument from Consciousness: animals have moral status because they are conscious and can experience pain and it would be bad were they to experience pain. In a series of papers :277–291, 2015a, J Agric Environ Ethics 28:11270–1138, 2015b, J Agric Environ Ethics 30:37–54, 2017), Timothy Hsiao claims that animals do not have moral status and criticizes the Argument from Consciousness. This short paper (...)
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  • Industrial Farming is Not Cruel to Animals.Timothy Hsiao - 2017 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 30 (1):37-54.
    Critics of industrial animal agriculture have argued that its practices are cruel, inhumane, or otherwise degrading to animals. These arguments sometimes form the basis of a larger case for the complete abolition of animal agriculture, while others argue for more modest welfare-based reforms that allow for certain types of industrial farming. This paper defends industrial farming against the charge of cruelty. As upsetting as certain practices may seem, I argue that they need not be construed as cruel or inhumane. Any (...)
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  • A Carnivorous Rejoinder to Bruers and Erdös.Timothy Hsiao - 2015 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 28 (6):1127-1138.
    In an earlier paper, I defended the moral permissibility of eating meat against sentience-based arguments for moral vegetarianism. The crux of my argument was that sentience is not an intrinsically morally salient property, and that animals lack moral status because they lack a root capacity for rational agency. Accordingly, it is morally permissible to consume meat even if doing so is not strictly necessary for our nutrition. This paper responds to critiques of my argument by Bruers :705–717, 2015) and Erdös. (...)
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