Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.

This paper focuses on the emergent neo-Jamesian perspective concerning the phenomenology of art and aesthetic experience. Starting from the distinction between nucleus and fringe in the stream of thought described by William James, it can be argued that our appreciation of a work of art is guided by a vague and blurred perception of a much more powerful content, of which we are not fully aware. Accordingly, a work of art is seen as a kind of metaphor of our mental (...) life, objectified to be able to reach out to a much larger audience. However, it is a “realistic” theory rooted in evolutionary psychology, which claims that our mind developed within a framework shaped by environmental pressures. The aesthetics illustrated by several novelists develops a paradigm for this theory. The search for the neuronal correlates of stream of consciousness allows to make a comparison with the recent findings of neuroaesthetics and to reject its claim that it is unnecessary to take phenomenology and psychology into account. (shrink)

What is the goal of creativity? Is it just a symbolic reshuffling or a moment of semantic extension? Similar to the contrast between syntax and semantics, creativity has an internal and an external aspect. Contrary to the widespread view that emphasises the problem-solving role of creativity, here we consider whether creativity represents an authentic moment of ontological discovery and semantic openness like Schopenhauer and Picasso suggested. To address the semantic aspect of creativity, we take advantage of recent externalist models of (...) the mind suggesting that the mind is more than symbol recombination. (shrink)

Next SectionThis article argues against two dominant accounts of the nature of nostalgia. These views assume that nostalgia depends, in some way, on comparing a present situation with a past one. However, neither does justice to the full range of recognizably nostalgic experiences available to us – in particular, ‘Proustian’ nostalgia directed at involuntary autobiographical memories. Therefore, the accounts in question fail. I conclude by considering an evaluative puzzle raised by Proustian nostalgia when it is directed at memories that the (...) nostalgist herself regards as non-veridical. (shrink)

In this article, I argue for an essentialist account of cyborgs. This means that one condition for being a cyborg is to possess phenomenal consciousness, ‘what it feels like’ to undergo an experience. In this context, I make two related claims: (1) the metaphysical claim that it is essential to cyborgs to have phenomenal consciousness due to their being augmented human beings, and (2) the related claim that this metaphysical constraint need not apply to cyborg-like entities, which may or may (...) not be augmented humans and so might not possess phenomenal consciousness. In support of these claims, I argue that cyborgs without phenomenal consciousness would lose information-processing abilities essential to the human condition and would be better understood as androids with biological body parts. First, I briefly characterize phenomenal consciousness in the context of the Mind–Body Problem. Then I introduce the Mind–Technology Problem and claim that it is better suited to frame the relevant discussion. In a second step, I argue that phenomenal consciousness is a vital feature of the human mind as it is fundamental for practices that relate what it feels to have an experience to other minds capable of such experiences, as in the arts. Briefly, thus, I argue that, without phenomenal consciousness, there is no art, and that art involves information-processing abilities essential to the human condition. Then I describe two different kinds of entity that might be considered cyborgs in the context of enhancement, distinguishing between cyborgs and cyborg-like entities. Finally, I argue that entities that do not possess phenomenal consciousness cannot be classified as cyborgs, since without it, an essential capacity of human experience, to be affected by the expressive arts, is absent. (shrink)

Following text places in dialogue or applies to a certain conception of aesthetic experience a vast set of experimental evidences extracted from the inquiry of other mental phenomena, in particular the subjective experience of emotions and feelings. Comimg from António Damásio the beam master, the skeleton, the base, the structure of all my argument. My main hypothesis is that certain objects and situations activate cerebral dispositional hyper-spaces associated to the ocurrence of phenomena like sensation of beauty, pleasure and joy. I (...) consider that the emergency of an aesthetic experience must be understood as resulted of a sensible perception that set in motion a somatic-cognitive routine function of the detonation of a pattern of dispositionals neural patterns.O texto a seguir apresenta em diálogo ou aplica a uma certa concepção de experiência estética um amplo conjunto de evidências experimentais retirado da investigação de outros fenômenos mentais, em particular a experiência subjetiva de emoções e sentimentos. Provém de António Damásio a viga mestra, o esqueleto, a base, a estrutura de toda a minha argumentação. Minha principal hipótese é a de que certos objetos e situações ativam hiper-espaços dispositivos cerebrais associados à ocorrência de fenômenos como sensação de beleza, prazer e alegria. Proponho que a emergência de uma experiência estética deve ser compreendida como resultado de uma percepção sensível que aciona uma rotina somático-cognitiva, função do disparo de um padrão de padrões neurais dispositivos. (shrink)

What does it mean to be an aesthetic beholder? Is it different than simply being a perceiver? Most theories of aesthetic perception focus on 1) features of the perceived object and its presentation or 2) on psychological evaluative or emotional responses and intentions of perceiver and artist. In this chapter I propose that we need to look at the process of engaged perception itself, and further that this temporal process of be- coming a beholder must be understood in its embodied, (...) contextual and dynamic speci- ficity. Through both phenomenological and neuroscientific explorations I analyze what is characteristic about a more “aesthetic stance” and argue that there is a certain asym- metry between beholder and beheld, which has to do with a disengagement of goal- directed action, and which allows for other kinds of perceptual involvement than in a more “practical stance”. It is a multi-disciplinary project integrating a sensorimotor no- tion of aesthetic affordances, 18th century philosophy, and large-scale brain network findings. What ensues is a new dynamic framework for future empirical and theoretical research on aesthetic perception. (shrink)