In the present paper, I intend to systematically revisit Thomas Luckmann’s account of the relation between phenomenology and sociology and to assess its strengths and weaknesses in terms of constructive criticism. In order to achieve this aim, I will proceed in three steps. First, I will reconstruct the Luckmannian approach by means of an exhaustive analysis of his programmatic texts. Second, I will identify its strengths and merits. And finally, I will discuss its shortcomings and try to correct them in (...) two ways, namely, by bringing Luckmann into a dialogue with other sociological-theoretical and phenomenological accounts, and by counteracting some of his problematic claims with alternative insights contained in his own work. (shrink)

Although James and Schutz provide us with the most insightful investigations of multiple realities that we come across in philosophical, psychological and sociological literature, hardly any critical studies have addressed James’s and Schutz’s conceptions of multiple realities alongside each other. This paper fills this gap. The paper demonstrates that James and Schutz were concerned with the same set of issues in their respective accounts of multiple realities. It further shows the different ways in which James and Schutz understood multiple realities (...) and how they conceptualized the fundamental levels of reality’s constitution. It also provides a critical analysis of Schutz’s allegation that James’s analysis is psychologistic, arguing that this accusation is ungrounded and that Schutz’s epoche of the natural attitude in fact bolsters James’s analysis of belief. The paper concludes with a set of reflections on the heterogenous nature of paramount reality, bringing into question James’s and Schutz’s assumption that each reality is inwardly coherent, although incompatible with each other. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to systematically analyze Schutz’s phenomenological account of the typicality and habituality of everyday cognitive experience, and to identify the Husserlian leitmotifs that inform it. In order to do so, I will proceed in three steps. First, I will briefly present the main lines of Schutz’s theoretical project; second, I will scrutinize his Husserlian account of typification as a passive sort of interpretation; and finally, I will examine his –also Husserl-inspired– analysis of the structure and (...) genesis of the habitualized stock of knowledge at hand. (shrink)