When we think of scientific realism, there seem to be to ways to conceive of what it is about. The first is to see it as a view about scientific theories; the second is to see it as a view about the world. Some philosophers, most typically from Australia, think that the second way is the correct way. Scientific realism, they argue, is a metaphysical thesis: it asserts the reality of some types of entity, most typically, unobservable entities. I agree (...) that scientific realism has a metaphysical dimension, but I have insisted that it has other dimensions too. In my (1999), I took scientific realism to consist of three theses (or stances). (shrink)

In this paper I question the view that realism must delineate the basic ontological furniture of the world rather than giving arguments in semantic or epistemic terms for the existence of a mind-independent world. I call this view of stating and defending realism the Ontological Defence of Realism (or ODR) and take Devitt's account of realism as a paradigmatic case of ODR. I argue that ODR cannot block ' verificationist antirealism' because the specific (physical) nature of what exists is not (...) enough to secure the mindindependence of what exists and, additionally, every element purported to achieve this, it compromises seriously the idea that realism is primarily an ontological issue. I also stress that ODR is in tension with a plausible realist insight namely the priority of the world over our theorizing. Because of this tension ODR weakens realism in several domains with no good reason. Specifically, I argue that in these domains ODR faces a dilemma: either to reject realism or to take realism to be dependent on a reductive account violating the realist insight. My point is that we should keep realism and ontology distinct and that compliance with the realist insight initiates a better strategy for the defence of realism. I address three possible objections thereby further clarifying my point. I conclude by presenting my view about the relation between ontology and realism. (shrink)

In this paper I question the view that realism must delineate the basic ontological furniture of the world rather than giving arguments in semantic or epistemic terms for the existence of a mind-independent world. I call this view of stating and defending realism the Ontological Defence of Realism and take Devitt’s account of realism as a paradigmatic case of ODR. I argue that ODR cannot block ‘verificationist antirealism’ because the specific nature of what exists is not enough to secure the (...) mind-independence of what exists and, additionally, every element purported to achieve this, it compromises seriously the idea that realism is primarily an ontological issue. I also stress that ODR is in tension with a plausible realist insight namely the priority of the world over our theorizing. Because of this tension ODR weakens realism in several domains with no good reason. Specifically, I argue that in these domains ODR faces a dilemma: either to reject realism or to take realism to be dependent on a reductive account violating the realist insight. My point is that we should keep realism and ontology distinct and that compliance with the realist insight initiates a better strategy for the defence of realism. I address three possible objections thereby further clarifying my point. I conclude by presenting my view about the relation between ontology and realism. (shrink)

Scientific practice involves two kinds of induction. In one, generalizations are drawn about the states of a particular system of variables. In the other, generalizations are drawn across systems in a class. We can discern two questions of correctness about both kinds of induction: what distinguishes those systems and classes of system that are ‘projectible’ in Goodman’s sense from those that are not, and what are the methods by which we are able to identify kinds that are likely to be (...) projectible? In answer to the first question, numerous theories of ‘natural kinds’ have been advanced, but none has satisfactorily addressed both questions simultaneously. I propose a shift in perspective. Both essentialist and cluster property theories have traditionally characterized kinds directly in terms of the causally salient properties their members possess. Instead, we should focus on ‘dynamical symmetries’, transformations of a system to which the causal structure of that system is indifferent. I suggest that to be a member of natural kind it is necessary and sufficient to possess a particular collection of dynamical symmetries. I show that membership in such a kind is in turn necessary and sufficient for the presence of the sort of causal structure that accounts for success in both kinds of induction, thus demonstrating that has been answered satisfactorily. More dramatically, I demonstrate that this new theory of ‘dynamical kinds’ provides an answer to with methodological implications concerning the discovery of projectible kinds. (shrink)

When we examine the history of astronomy up to the end of the seventeenth century by considering the relation between mathematical astronomy and natural philosophy, it has been argued that there were two groups of philosophers and astronomers: instrumentalists and realists. However, this classification is deficient when we consider attitudes toward the explanatory power of mathematics in determining astronomical theories. I offer the solution of dividing realists into two subcategories—mathematical realists and physical realists. Mathematical realists include those who thought mathematics (...) could provide the real motions of celestial bodies. The physical realists, who include Ibn Rushd (Averroës), believed mathematics could not provide us with the real structure of the heavens. To avoid contradictions between the physical and mathematical models, the physical realists held that a mathematical model of the heavens should be designed by considering physics. I argue, in this article, that Francis Bacon can be considered a physical realist. (shrink)

Brian Ellis advances a robust species of realism he calls Physical Realism. Physical Realism includes an ontology comprising three kinds of universal and three kinds of particular: a six‐category ontology. After comparing Physical Realism to a modest two‐category ontology inspired by Locke, I mention two apparent difficulties a proponent of a six‐category ontology might address.1.

There is a perennial philosophical dream of a certain natural order for the natural kinds. The name of this dream is ‘the hierarchy requirement’. According to this postulate, proper natural kinds form a taxonomy which is both unique and traditional. Here I demonstrate that complex scientific objects exist: objects which generate different systems of scientific classification, produce myriad legitimate alternatives amongst the nonetheless still natural kinds, and make the hierarchical dream impossible to realize, except at absurdly great cost. Philosophical hopes (...) for a certain order in nature cannot be fulfilled. Natural kinds crosscut one another, ubiquitously so, and this crosscutting spells the end of the hierarchical dream. (shrink)

Whilst the concept of causal powers is central to much post-positivist social science in general, and to critical realism in particular, it has not been significantly developed by critical realists since the initial work of Harré and Madden and Bhaskar in the mid-1970s. To deepen our understanding of powers we need to start with a ‘package’ of related terms. In §1 of the paper I introduce this package, clear up some terminological ambiguity and inconsistency, and focus the discussion upon things, (...) properties and powers. The real problems begin when we try to figure out how things, properties and powers relate to one another. In §2 I introduce and evaluate three possible ontologies: an ontology where powers are primary; an ontology where properties are primary; and an ontology where neither properties, powers are primary, but all emerge to form a unity. The last ontology is defended. §3 deals with ambiguities surrounding three other terms that often crop up when discussing powers, namely, dispositional properties, transfactuals and processes. The net result is a far less ambiguous concept of powers, firmly anchored in an ontology of things, properties and powers as a unity. (shrink)

Concepts are the means by which we structure our understanding of the world and consequently the primary means by which we encounter it. It is commonly assumed that one of the essential characteristics of concepts – regardless of referent – is their stability, tending toward stasis;and, indeed, it can be hard to see how concepts can otherwise be systematic and productive, inthe way they are conventionally taken to be. Even the question has been raised whether conceptscan change; on some prominent (...) accounts, they cannot. The Unified Conceptual Space Theory – an extension of Conceptual Spaces Theory – makes the controversial claim that conceptsnot only are subject to change over an iterative lifecycle but that, at an underlying level, they are in a state of continuous motion; indeed, they must be to function as they do. Mere openness to change is not enough. Even the most seemingly fixed of concepts – mathematical concepts are the paradigm example – can be seen to evolve and continually be evolving as our understanding of mathematics evolves. UCST suggests that concepts possess an intrinsic tension that appears topresent a contradiction: to be able to apply in more or less the same way across unboundedly many contexts and to be able to combine coherently with other concepts,they must be relatively stable; and yet, since each new application context is, in some nontrivial way, different from every previous context in ways that do not fit within neat conceptual boundaries,they must adapt each time to fit. In a physical world we have reason to view as ultimately one of fluidity, of processes and motion rather than stable entities, concepts should probably have a similar nature. (shrink)

The problem of natural kind is considered to be a complicated problem in philosophy as it is linked to the problem of essence on the one hand and the problem of individuals on the other. While nominalists refuse to accept universals in their ontology, realists believe in natural kinds and endeavor to justify classification of things by appealing to existence of natural kinds and their essential properties. In the first part of this paper we briefly survey two kinds of criteria (...) for being a natural kind. In the second part we will evaluated the proposed criteria. Finally we conclude by the following six criteria: Reality and absoluteness, possessing of full essence, hierarchy, changelessness, categorization and contribution to identical theory. (shrink)

According to Johansson (2009: 22) an infinite regress is vicious just in case “what comes first [in the regress-order] is for its definition dependent on what comes afterwards.” Given a few qualifications (to be spelled out below (section 3)), I agree. Again according to Johansson (ibid.), one of the consequences of accepting this way of distinguishing vicious from benign regresses is that the so-called Russellian Resemblance Regress (RRR), if generated in a one-category trope-theoretical framework, is vicious and that, therefore, the (...) existence of tropes only makes sense if trope-theory is understood (minimally) as a two-category theory which accepts, besides the existence of tropes, also the existence of at least one universal: resemblance.1 I disagree. But how can that be? How can Johansson and I agree about what distinguishes a vicious from a benign regress, yet disagree about which regresses are vicious and which are benign? In this paper I attempt to answer that question by first setting out and defending the sense of viciousness which both Johansson and I accept, only to then argue that to be able to determine if a particular regress is vicious in this sense, more than features intrinsic to the regress itself must be taken into account. This is why, although the RRR as originally set out by Russell is vicious, the seemingly identical resemblance regress which ensues in a one-category (standard) trope-theoretical context is not (provided, that is, that we accept certain views about how the nature of tropes relates to the resemblance between tropes, and given that we set our theory in a truthmaker theoretical framework – all of which are standard assumptions for proponents of (the standard-version of) the trope-theory).2. (shrink)