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  1. Why Subjectivists About Welfare Needn't Idealize.Eden Lin - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):2-23.
    It is commonly thought that subjectivists about welfare must claim that the favorable attitudes whose satisfaction is relevant to your well-being are those that you would have in idealized conditions (e.g. ones in which you are fully informed and rational). I argue that this is false. I introduce a non-idealizing subjectivist view, Same World Subjectivism, that accommodates the two main rationales for idealizing: those given by Peter Railton and David Sobel. I also explain why a recent argument from Dale Dorsey (...)
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  • Attraction, Aversion, and Asymmetrical Desires.Daniel Pallies - forthcoming - Ethics.
    Many philosophers endorse the view that desires play an important role in well-being. I argue that, insofar as we endorse this general idea, we ought to believe that desire’s significance for well-being is derived from a pair of more fundamental attitudes: attraction and aversion. Attraction has wholly positive significance for well-being: its satisfaction is good for us, but its frustration is not bad for us. Aversion has wholly negative significance for well-being: its frustration is bad for us, but its satisfaction (...)
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  • Belief, Desire, and Giving and Asking for Reasons.Donald W. Bruckner & Michael P. Wolf - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (2):275-280.
    We adjudicate a recent dispute concerning the desire theory of well-being. Stock counterexamples to the desire theory include “quirky” desires that seem irrelevant to well-being, such as the desire to count blades of grass. Bruckner claims that such desires are relevant to well-being, provided that the desirer can characterize the object in such a way that makes it clear to others what attracts the desirer to it. Lin claims that merely being attracted to the object of one’s desire should be (...)
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  • Future Desires, the Agony Argument, and Subjectivism About Reasons.Eden Lin - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (1):95-130.
    Extant discussions of subjectivism about reasons for action have concentrated on presentist versions of the theory, on which reasons for present actions are grounded in present desires. In this article, I motivate and investigate the prospects of futurist subjectivism, on which reasons for present actions are grounded in present or future desires. Futurist subjectivism promises to answer Parfit's Agony Argument, and it is motivated by natural extensions of some of the considerations that support subjectivism in general. However, it faces a (...)
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