Lichtenberg, the German philosopher and physicist, once remarked: “It is almost impossible to carry the torch of truth through a crowd without singeing someone's beard.” Goethe, coeval with Lichtenberg, possessed by the conviction that he too was the bearer of truth, recked not whose beard was singed. Between his scientific attitude and his philosophic insight, however, a contradiction was patent, as revealed in his maxim that truth is a torch and that it is only with blinking eyes that we try (...) to get past it, whilst in actual terror of being burnt. (shrink)

When leading spectroscopists in Europe and America were engaged, during 1897, in exploring the recently-discovered Zeeman Effect, they were overtaken by a relatively obscure phsicist working in Dublin. Thomas Preston had previously been known only for his excellent textbooks. His achievement in discovering the Anomalous Zeeman Effect was immediately recognized, but his untimely death has deprived posterity until now of a full account of his life and qualities.

“Absence of evidence isn’t evidence of absence” is a slogan that is popular among scientists and nonscientists alike. This article assesses its truth by using a probabilistic tool, the Law of Likelihood. Qualitative questions (“Is E evidence about H ?”) and quantitative questions (“How much evidence does E provide about H ?”) are both considered. The article discusses the example of fossil intermediates. If finding a fossil that is phenotypically intermediate between two extant species provides evidence that those species have (...) a common ancestor, does failing to find such a fossil constitute evidence that there was no common ancestor? Or should the failure merely be chalked up to the imperfection of the fossil record? The transitivity of the evidence relation in simple causal chains provides a broader context, which leads to discussion of the fine-tuning argument, the anthropic principle, and observation selection effects. (shrink)

I argue that the standard way of formalizing the fine-tuning argument for design is flawed, and I present an alternative formalization. On the alternative formalization, the existence of life is not treated as the evidence that confirms design; instead it is treated as part of the background knowledge, while the fact that fine tuning is required for life serves as the evidence. I argue that the alternative better captures the informal line of thought that gives the fine-tuning argument its intuitive (...) plausibility, and I show that the alternative formalization avoids all of the most prominent objections to the fine-tuning argument, including the objection from observation selection effects, the problem of old evidence, the problem of non-normalizable probability measures and a further objection due to Monton. I conclude that the alternative formalization is the one that attention should be focused on. (shrink)

According to a certain kind of naïve or folk understanding of physical matter, everyday ‘solid’ objects are composed of a homogeneous, gap-less substance, with sharply defined boundaries, which wholly fills the space they occupy. A further claim is that our perceptual experience of the environment represents or indicates that the objects around us conform to this sort of conception of physical matter. Were this further claim correct, it would mean that the way that the world appears to us in experience (...) conflicts with the deliverances of our best current scientific theories in the following respect: perceptual experience would be intrinsically misleading concerning the structure of physical matter. I argue against this further claim. Experience in itself is not committed to, nor does it provide evidence for, any such conception of the nature of physical matter. The naïve/folk conception of matter in question cannot simply be ‘read-off’ from perceptual appearances. (shrink)

It is assumed that the motion of a particle in spacetime does not depend on the motion relative to it of any observer or of any frame of reference. Thus if the particle has an internal vibration of the type hypothesized by de Broglie, the phase of that vibration at any point in spacetime must appear to be the same to all observers, i.e., the same in all frames of reference. Each observer or reference frame will have its own de (...) Broglie wave for the particle. The phase of the particle's vibration must, by definition, be the same as that of all possible de Broglie waves at the point where the particle is. By superimposing all these possible de Broglie waves, a wave packet is formed centered in space on the particle. The formation of such a packet is discussed with the help of spacetime diagrams; the packet does not spread with time. The relevance of this packet to the wave mechanics of Schrödinger is discussed; it is also pointed out that any vibration can lead to such a packet. (shrink)

Die Frage, ob die Gültigkeit alternativer begrifflicher Strukturen empirisch entscheidbar oder eine Sache der willkürlichen Festsetzung ist, wird, eingeschränkt auf den Fall der physikalischen Geometrie, diskutiert. Die erkenntnistheoretischen Komponenten der empirischen Bestimmung von metrischen und topologischen Eigenschaften des physikalischen Raumes werden in der neueren Wissenschaftstheorie verfolgt. In Anschluß an die Auseinandersetzung zwischen A. Grünbaum und H. Putnam wird eine Interpretation des semantischen Status des Kongruenzprädikates vorgeschlagen, die Schwierigkeiten im Verhältnis von Intension und Extension dieses Terms beseitigen soll. Bei der Konfrontation (...) von Folgerungen aus der Konventionalitätsthese mit der dynamischen Raumtheorie, wie sie im Anschluß an Clifford von J. A. Wheeler entwickelt wurde, treten Unvereinbarkeiten auf, die in der Gegensätzlichkeit von absoluter und relationaler Raumauffassung gründen. (shrink)

The use of the Law of Likelihood (LL) as a general tool for assessing rival hypotheses has been criticized for its ambiguous treatment of background information. The LL endorses radically different answers depending on what information is designated as background versus evidence. I argue that once one distinguishes between two questions about evidentiary support, the ambiguity vanishes. I demonstrate this resolution by applying it to a debate over the status of the ‘fine-tuning argument’.

The ArgumentCassirer's analyses of twentieth-century physics from the perspective of the philosophy of science focuses on the concept of the object of scientific experience. Within his concept of functional knowledge, he takes a structural stance and claims that it is specifically this concept of the object that has paved the way for modern science. This article aims, first, to show that Cassirer's interpretation of Felix Klein's “Erlanger Programm” provided the impetus for this view. Then, it analyzes Kant's conception of objectivity (...) in order to examine whether Cassirer can rightfully claim that his view is a further development of transcendental principles. Finally, it is argued that it is Cassirer's concept of the object that enables him to integrate one decisive feature of scientific progress, namely, the increasinggeneralizationof the basic concepts of a science, into his conception of knowledge. This is illustrated in more detail through the example of the progression from Newton's mechanics to relativity theory. (shrink)

In spite of incomplete knowledge we are permanently forced to act in complex real-life situations. First, a modern concept of information, the non-trivial transition from information to knowledge, patterns of missing knowledge, and the concept of perspective notions are studied. The main sections review some guidelines for action under incomplete information. A modern view of the concepts of holism and wholeness reveals that (in contrast to some critics) general system theory does not require any metaphysical assumption or previously accepted worldview. (...) The concepts of holism and wholeness, as well as general system theory, are well-founded, even under strict criteria. (shrink)

A systematic effort is here made to express some of the general results of quantum mechanics in a conceptual form closer to ordinary language than is the case with most modern physics. Many of the implications of the theory appear much more clearly thereby, in particular the fact that the laws of quantum mechanics are only statistical propositions about classes, not referring to individual objects. Conversely, the microscopic structure of an object cannot be precisely defined in quantum mechanical terms. To (...) say that an object has a definite microscopic structure is an operationally meaningless statement; it is on the same level as saying in relativity that a selected coordinate system is “at rest.” This raises the need for a “theory of matching”: What is the best statement about the structure of an object, given that the tools of description are only statistical? A technique is known for this: the theory of inductive probabilities. There is no longer one true description but a manifold of statistical descriptions, some of which have a greater likelihood of being satisfactory than others. The main concrete application of this type of conceptual reasoning lies in its power to clean out the speculative underbrush which so far has prevented the transition from theoretical physics to theoretical biology. (shrink)

The reduction of a quantum mechanical wave function by the entry of a datum into the consciousness of an observer is used, in a semirealistic neurochemical model, to bring about excitation of a nerve cell in that observer's central nervous system. It is suggested that mind can induce muscular movements by choosing to note data originating from specialized elements of the nervous system. Only the freedom to note or not to note a relevant datum is postulated for the observer's mind; (...) the consequences of either choice are deterministic on the neural scale of events, so that quantum indeterminacy is consistent with physiological determinacy. The proposed mind-body coupling depends on the possibility of the biological evolution of a macroscopic device which has strikingly different neural correlates of its pure and mixed quantum states, respectively. An example of such a device is outlined in terms of components which are familiar from existing nervous systems. (shrink)

Starting with the example of irreducible quantum events, it is shown that other kinds of events also have an element of randomness. The hallmark of “genuine” events is their irreducibility to some previous conditions. A connection between this concept and the traditional notion of contingency is explored. This concept is further brought in connection with Peirce’s Firstness. Such a notion raises the problem of how to understand causation. It seems that causes deal with individual happenings. In fact, laws are only (...) general, while causal explanations necessarily involve localization in space and time and therefore indexical connection with events. When we deal with causes, we necessarily deal with their effects, which are shifted in space and delayed in time and so do not reveal the singularity of the event that is at the origin of the process. Our descriptions of events are really about the effects of the events, not the events themselves. This helps us to define what events are in all generality: an event is what cannot be fully described by our means although we have reason to assume that it is real. (shrink)

Religious discourse is in some way about the world, but its relation to other kinds of discourse – scientific historical, and moral – is a matter of dispute. Suggestions to avoid conflict with other kinds of discourse – the suggestion that religion invokes a distinct ‘language game’ and the suggestion that it should be taken as ‘basic’ for instance – have not, I argue, been successful. Essentially religion is involved in orienting us to the world and our goals, and orientation (...) has its own concerns. I ask what would be needed for successful orientation and suggest that talk about God my include elements which are essential for orientation. The argument suggests that the object of our orientation transcends the usual distinctions between the subjective and the objective. Perhaps this is the idea of the beatific vision. (shrink)

The late 19th-century Ignorabimus controversy over the limits of scientific knowledge has often been characterized as proclaiming the end of intellectual progress, and by implication, as plunging Germany into a crisis of pessimism from which Liberalism never recovered. My research supports the opposite interpretation. The initiator of the Ignorabimus controversy, Emil du Bois-Reymond, was a physiologist who worked his whole life against the forces of obscurantism, whether they came from the Catholic and Conservative Right or the scientistic and millenarian Left. (...) Du Bois-Reymond’s doubt that scientists would ever elucidate consciousness must therefore be seen as an endorsement, and not a rejection, of his faith in reason. (shrink)