At Protagoras 353de, Socrates gives three possible reasons for calling some pleasures `wrong'. Scholarly attention has focused on the second of these, according to which pleasures are `wrong' when they have negative consequences. This paper argues that the first reason (the pleasures are fleeting) corresponds to beliefs held by Democritus, among others; and that the third reason (the pleasant things “give pleasure in whatever way and for whatever reason“) is the view adopted by Socrates in the dialogue.

Relatively little attention has been paid to Socrates' argument against akrasia in Plato's "Protagoras" as an example of Socratic method. Yet seen from this perspective the argument has some rather unusual features: in particular, the presence of an impersonal interlocutor ("the many") and the absence of the crisp and explicit argumentation that is typical of Socratic elenchus. I want to suggest that these features are problematic, considerably more so than has sometimes been supposed, and to offer a reading of the (...) argument that accounts for them. My reading revolves around the connections between Socratic method, consistency and akrasia. I argue that Socrates' discussion of akrasia aims at exposing the interlocutor's inconsistency, and to this extent is typical of Socratic inquiry; but it is also untypical, insofar as Socrates' chief concern here is with the inconsistency between an interlocutor's statements and his actions (what I call "word-deed inconsistency") rather than, as more usually, inconsistency among an interlocutor's various statements ("word-word inconsistency"). I use this reading to show how the akrasia argument, despite its untypical features, is not just a variant, but in an important way a paradigm, of Socratic method. (shrink)

I advocate an ad hominem reading of the hedonism that appears in the final argument of the Protagoras. I that attribute hedonism both to the Many and to Protagoras, but my focus is on the latter. I argue that the Protagoras in various ways reflects Plato’s view that the sophist is an inevitable advocate for, and himself implicitly inclined toward, hedonism, and I show that the text aims through that characterization to undermine Protagoras’ status as an educator. One of my (...) objectives in the course of my arguments is to explore connections between the final argument of the Protagoras and the Man-Measure Doctrine as it is developed in the Theaetetus. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I focus on the hedonism in Plato's Protagoras and Gorgias, paying close, but not exclusive, attention to the recent discussion by Terence Irwin in his Plato's Moral Theory and his translation of and commentary on the Gorgias. ;I argue that there is a genuine ethical hedonism discussed in the Protagoras, but that we are not forced by considerations in the Protagoras to ascribe that hedonism to Socrates. Furthermore, I argue, contra Irwin, that Socrates is not committed to (...) hedonism by his earlier ethical views. In fact, I suggest, hedonism plays no real role in the logical structure of the main argument in the dialogue ;In the Gorgias Socrates is clearly out to attack some version of hedonism. This attack consists of two arguments: one attempting to show that pleasure has a property which goodness lacks, the other attempting to show that the identification of goodness and pleasure has unacceptable ethical consequences. When properly formulated, neither argument is successful against hedonism, but at best only against an identification of the good person with the pleased person, a doctrine which is logically independent from the first. There are, however, some passages in the Gorgias which suggest an argument whereby Plato may have supposed a refutation of this latter doctrine constituted a refutation of hedonism. I examine a number of ways in which the resulting argument is unsuccessful. ;In general, I argue that Socrates is not committed to accepting hedonism in the Protagoras, and hence, that there is no need to view these two dialogues as reflecting a fundamental change in Platonic ethics. We need not say that Plato's ethical views were based on hedonism in the Protagoras and based on its rejection in the Gorgias. Rather, both dialogues work toward standard Socratic doctrines such as the unity of the virtues and the happiness of the good person. (shrink)