Dotyczy: przestrzeń, czas, ciało, kognitywistyka, fenomenologia.

Edmund Husserl has argued that we can intuit essences and, moreover, that it is possible to formulate a method for intuiting essences. Husserl calls this method 'ideation'. In this paper I bring a fresh perspective to bear on these claims by illustrating them in connection with some examples from modern pure geometry. I follow Husserl in describing geometric essences as invariants through different types of free variations and I then link this to the mapping out of geometric invariants in modern (...) mathematics. This view leads naturally to different types of spatial ontologies and it can be used to shed light on Husserl's general claim that there are different ontologies in the eidetic sciences that can be systematically related to one another. The paper is rounded out with a consideration of the role of ideation in the origins of modern geometry, and with a brief discussion of the use of ideation outside of pure geometry. (shrink)

The hyletic component of kinaesthetic sensation has generally been treated with suspicion. It is usually set aside in favour of Husserl’s later analysis of kinaesthetic experience which emphasizes its practical dimension. I try to show that a nuanced understanding of the hyletic component allows us to consider its deeper temporal function. From a rather neglected passage in his Ding und Raum I show that Husserl was aware of the temporal peculiarity of kinaesthetic sensation: it is characterized by a unique kind (...) of “sameness”. I then try to explain how the hyletic dimension of kinaesthetic sensation is responsible for this peculiarity. By escaping the contingencies of protentional fulfilment kinaesthetic hyle merely unifies in an actual “belonging-together” our sensing of position and the motivation of the correlative appearances. It is on this basis that it fundamentally shapes at a passive-hyletic level the complex temporal dynamic of the practical dimension of kinaesthetic experience. (shrink)

EinleitungDer Begriff Kinästhese ist in der Husserl-Literatur durchaus geläufig. Trotzdem fehlt bis heute eine umfassende Erörterung seiner Bedeutung und seiner Spielformen sowie auch seiner konkreten Entwicklungsgeschichte bei Husserl.Zu erwähnen wären in dieser Hinsicht besonders: Claesges (1964), Claesges’ „Einleitung des Herausgebers“ zu Hua XVI, Drummond (1984), Melle (1983), S. 114–120, Piedade (2001), Przybylski (2006) und Mattens (2009). Vermutlich würde fast jeder Husserl-Kenner – wenn danach fragt – ohne weiteres antworten, Kinästhesen seien jene Bewegungsmöglichkeiten des leiblichen Subjekts, durch die sich seine Wahrnehmungsgegenstände (...) auf ihrer elementarsten Stufe (jene der sogenannten „Sinnesdinge“) konstituieren. Das ist bestimmt richtig, da für Husserl in der Tat Wahrnehmung ihre Gegenstände eben nicht in einer augenblicklichen „Impression“ voll erschließt, sondern sie vielmehr in mannigfaltigen Zusammenhängen von „Abschattungen“, d. h. in zusammenhängenden Sequenzen pa. (shrink)

The key to understanding self-identity is identifying the transcendental structures that make a temporally extended, continuous, and unified experiential life possible. Self-identity is rooted in the formal, temporalizing structure of intentional experience that underlies psychological continuity. Personal identity, by contrast, is rooted in the content of the particular flow of experience, in particular and primarily, in the convictions adopted passively or actively in reflection by a self-identical subject in the light of her social and traditional inheritances. Secondarily, a person’s identity (...) is rooted in others’ characterizations of that person in the light of the social conventions and constructs of the cultures and traditions that have shaped the personal identity of the ones who make the attributions. Personal identity, on this view, is fundamentally rooted in beliefs, traits—especially character traits—sentiments, and moods, that is, in the subject’s convictions about the true, the good, and the right—and in the commitments to the pursuit of (apparently) worthwhile goods and to the practical identities rooted in those convictions. (shrink)

Alva Noë’s strategy to solve the puzzle of perceptual presence entirely relies on the principle of presence as access. Unaccessed or unattended parts or details of objects are perceptually present insofar as they are accessible, and they are accessible insofar as one possesses sensorimotor skills that can secure their access. In this paper, I consider several arguments that can be opposed to this claim and that are chiefly related to the modal status of action, i.e. the fact that the action (...) that would secure access to the absent aspects is a possibility, something that can be done. The main difficulty Noë’s account must face is –as several situations demonstrate– that the action that should be performed for the absent aspects to be actually accessed does not have to be itself available for these aspects to be perceptually present. What matters for the absent aspects to be present is not their de facto accessibility, but their de jure accessibility. To overcome those difficulties, I propose to rely on a ternary model of the role of action possibilities in perceptual awareness. This model builds on Husserl’s analysis of the role of perceptual circumstances in perception and connection between sense registering and horizontal intentionality. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe aim of this narrow-focused text is to argue against the claim that the appresentation of unperceived features of objects that is implied in perceptual intentionality presupposes a reference to perceptions other subjects could have of these objects. This claim, as it has been defended by Dan Zahavi, rests upon an erroneous supposition about the modal status of the perceptual possibilities to which the perceived object refers, which shall not be interpreted as effectively realizable but as mere de jure possibilities, (...) perceptions that could have been realized in principle, but that are maybe beyond one’s reach considering one’s concrete factual powers and opportunities. Horizontal intentionality is better accounted for in terms of perceptions that one could have had because of one’s embodied character and the always open possibility of occupying another position with respect to the object. This modal ubiquity which is inherent to one’s being-in-space is what supports the field of de jure possibil... (shrink)