The Epilogue reviews the findings presented by indirect ontology. First, indirect ontology discovers a consistency to The Visible and the Invisible which has been overlooked. Secondly, it provides a resolution to problems which are first uncovered in his Phenomenology of Perception, notably the connection between tacit and spoken cogitos, as well as the relationship of silence to speech. Thirdly, indirect ontology serves as a useful tool in understanding the development of Merleau-Ponty's thought from its beginning in The Structure of Behavior (...) through his ontological phase. Finally, indirect ontology brings to clarity the uniqueness of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy which is often overlooked; this uniqueness points to the fact that Merleau-Ponty's thought seems to move in a direction different from many of his successors and interpreters. ;Chapter four of the dissertation begins a positive delineation of Being by means of the indirect ontology examined in the first three chapters. This chapter situates philosophy within the hyperdialectic, thus showing how philosophy can investigate the world from which thought emerges. Chapter five unites the sequential analyses of the first four chapters in order to provide a detailed account of how the natural world serves as the basis of all human expression. Chapter six builds upon the description of nature provided by indirect ontology; in this chapter the working notes of The Visible and the Invisible are examined in order to discuss the philosophy of history and of culture provided by indirect ontology. ;The first three chapters of the dissertation examine the ontology of Being provided by perception. Chapter one concerns itself with our radical dependence upon perception, our "perceptual faith" in the world. By examining Merleau-Ponty's discussion of traditional ontology the dissertation develops the differences between ontology and the perceptual process. In chapter two the gap between ontology and perception is eliminated by providing an ontology which conforms to the manner in which perception presents itself to the body. This union of perception and human expression is made possible by Merleau-Ponty's implementation of hyper-reflection, the theory that perception is itself a form of originary reflection. Hyper-reflection is used to explain the existence of myself, others, and thinking within a shared visible world. Chapter three investigates the natural dialectic or hyper-dialectic which holds between the perceived world and throught; the result is a view of the dialectic which insists that thought remains attached to the perceived world. ;The goal of this dissertation is to present a sustained examination of The Visible and the Invisible. In contrast to the critical literature on Merleau-Ponty which maintains that the work is fragmentary, the position taken in the dissertation is that The Visible and the Invisible is a consistent and cohesive work. The key to unlocking the inner format of The Visible and the Invisible lies in abandoning the popular assumption that the first three chapters of the work are primarily critiques of other philosophers' positions. The dissertation attempts to replace this assumption by seeking, within the resources of the text itself, a new meaning and order. ;In the working notes accompanying The Visible and the Invisible Merleau-Ponty provides the necessary interpretive tool for understanding the work in the form of an "indirect ontology." Indirect ontology is Merleau-Ponty's effort to explain how our perceptual contact with the world is itself the ontological format of all Being. The Visible and the Invisible attempts to account for all phases of human expression through this model. (shrink)

Pollock’s drip technique generated certain unconventional representational possibilities, including the possibility of expressing the pre-reflective involvement of an embodied, intentional subject in a perceptual world. Consequently, Pollock’s art can be understood to explore or investigate the pre-objective conditions of reflective and intellectual consciousness. His painting—here I consider Number 1, 1949—motivates viewers to consider the relationship between intention and meaning as it appears in both primordial and reflective dimensions of experience. The account proceeds in three stages. First, I review key features (...) of Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the pre-objective and attempt to clarify the reflexive nature of investigating it by considering his analysis of Paul Cézanne’s technique. Second, I consider Pollock’s technique and some critical responses to it, while analyzing some of its implications for a notion of pictorial address. Finally, I examine the perceptual effects of Number 1, 1949 and interpret them, following Merleau-Ponty’s lead, in view of a revised understanding of the relationship between automatism and intention. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception comprises two main levels of analysis: the description of the general foundation upon which all human perception occurs and that of the lived, situated aspects of perception, as experienced by individuals. These ‘structural’ and ‘situated’ accounts of perception assume, respectively, the existence of a pre-personal body, which all human beings possess in principle, and of a historical body, which is the product of an individual’s ‘synchronization’ with the world. A comprehensive and faithful description of human perceptual (...) experience must contain, simultaneously, the general, structural, individual, and situational elements involved in perception. It has also to show the ways in which these elements impact each other, leading to distinct outcomes. I propose, here, a situated account of perception that fulfills these requisites while confirming Merleau-Ponty’s insights and descriptions empirically, through cases of perceptual skill and learning in a large industrial plant near the Amazon rainforest in Brazil. (shrink)

The chiasm is usually considered the key notion for Merleau-Ponty’s later philosophy. I argue against a common conclusion, namely that ‘the chiasm’ is equivalent to ‘reversibility’. Even when the two terms are not taken as interchangeable, the precise nature of their relation has not been adequately established. Focusing exclusively on ‘reversibility’ has implications for a range of philosophical issues, including relations between self and other. The danger of substituting one term for the other is that existential relations are construed as (...) inversions, rather than as genuine exchanges. I examine two trajectories that can be discovered in ‘The Intertwining—The Chiasm’. The first is the inclusion of difference within a peculiar, extended sense of ‘reversibility’. The second is the development of a plurality of expressions, among which ‘reversibility’ is necessary but not sufficient. I go on to argue that Merleau-Ponty secures difference within the chiasm by supplementing the notion of reversibility with ‘imminence’, the idea that something has not yet occurred. I also propose that the figure of a threshold illuminates how the chiasm operates as a transition where both joining and differentiation occur. (shrink)

While Maurice Merleau-Ponty thought that the natural sciences could offer partial explanations of the world, he maintained that they were incomplete and further understanding required an existential analysis or a study of the pre-theoretical and pre-reflective structures that are the conditions of the possibility of experience. He offered a series of arguments against both the possibility of the sciences explaining the world in general and their ability to explain the phenomenon of perception in particular.In his paper, "Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenological Critique of (...) Natural Science," Thomas Baldwin pushes back on both of these positions, arguing that Merleau-Ponty offered insufficient proof of his... (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s seminal book, Phenomenology of Perception, stands as a positive resource for articulating both trans experiences and trans identities within both a wrong-body model and a multiple worlds of sense model of trans philosophy. I begin my paper by highlighting the complex relation between Talia Bettcher’s proposed multiple worlds of sense model and the wrong-body model. As the dismissal of either model appears undesirable, I suggest that we attempt to combine the two models. To (...) do this, I turn to Georgia Warnke’s contextual understanding of identity as I ultimately juxtapose her work with Merleau-Ponty in order to give a positive account of trans identities that will function as a bridge between Merleau-Ponty and Bettcher. I then turn to discuss the basic ideas within Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception that are used to ground Rubin’s wrong-body model. As I contend that Merleau-Ponty has more to offer what Rubin attributes to him, I then turn to key passages concerning Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the sexual schema and the intrinsic ambiguity of the body. By incorporating both concepts into a discussion of trans philosophy, I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology offers a non-essentialist account of sexuality that both phenomenologically legitimates and grounds the wide spectrum of trans experiences and trans identities as well as Warnke’s contextual identity through, what I call, our ambiguous-being-in-the-world. Such an account, I conclude, makes possible a combined wrong-body model and multiple worlds of sense model of trans philosophy. (shrink)