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  1. The Putnam-Goodman-Kripke Paradox.Robert Kowalenko - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (4):575-594.
    The extensions of Goodman’s ‘grue’ predicate and Kripke’s ‘quus’ are constructed from the extensions of more familiar terms via a reinterpretation that permutes assignments of reference. Since this manoeuvre is at the heart of Putnam’s model-theoretic and permutation arguments against metaphysical realism (‘Putnam’s Paradox’), both Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction and the paradox about meaning that Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein are instances of Putnam’s. Evidence cannot selectively confirm the green-hypothesis and disconfirm the grue-hypothesis, because the theory of which the green-hypothesis (...)
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  • Putnam’s model-theoretic argument (meta)reconstructed: In the mirror of Carpintero’s and van Douven’s interpretations.Krystian Jobczyk - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-37.
    In “Models and Reality”, H. Putnam formulated his model-theoretic argument against “metaphysical realism”. The article proposes a meta-reconstruction of Putnam’s model-theoretic argument in the light of two mutually compatible interpretations of it–elaborated by Manuel Garcia-Carpintero and Igor van Douven. A critical reflection on these interpretations and their adequacy for Putnam’s argument allows us to expose new theses coherent with Putnam’s reasoning and indicate new paths to improve this argument for our reconstruction task. In particular, we show that Putnam’s position may (...)
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  • Having an interpretation. [REVIEW]Leon Horsten - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (3):449 - 459.
    I investigate what it means to have an interpretation of our language, how we manage to bestow a determinate interpretation to our utterances, and to which extent our interpretation of the world is determinate. All this is done in dialogue with van Fraassen's insightful discussion of Putnam's model-theoretic argument and of scientific structuralism.
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  • Theoretical terms and the principle of the benefit of doubt.Igor Douven - 2000 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (2):135 – 146.
    The Principle of the Benefit of Doubt dictates that, whenever reasonably possible, we interpret earlier-day scientists as referring to entities posited by current science. Putnam has presented the principle as supplementary to his Causal Theory of Reference in order to make this theory generally applicable to theoretical terms. The present paper argues that the principle is of doubtful standing. In particular, it will be argued that the principle lacks a justification and, indeed, is unjustifiable as it stands.
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  • Fitch’s Paradox and Probabilistic Antirealism.Igor Douven - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):149-182.
    Fitch’s paradox shows, from fairly innocent-looking assumptions, that if there are any unknown truths, then there are unknowable truths. This is generally thought to deliver a blow to antirealist positions that imply that all truths are knowable. The present paper argues that a probabilistic version of antirealism escapes Fitch’s result while still offering all that antirealists should care for.
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  • The Indeterminacy of the Distinction between Objects and Ways of Being.Julio De Rizzo - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2923-2941.
    Few if any distinctions are more easily recognisable and assented to than that between _objects_, that is, things which are some ways, and that which they are, that is, _ways for objects to be_ (‘ways of being’ for short). In this paper I present an argument designed to show that this distinction is indeterminate in the sense that the truth-conditions of predicational sentences leave open what should count as an object and a way of being. The bulk of the argument (...)
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  • On the Referential Indeterminacy of Logical and Mathematical Concepts.Otávio Bueno - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (1):65 - 79.
    Hartry Field has recently examined the question whether our logical and mathematical concepts are referentially indeterminate. In his view, (1) certain logical notions, such as second-order quantification, are indeterminate, but (2) important mathematical notions, such as the notion of finiteness, are not (they are determinate). In this paper, I assess Field's analysis, and argue that claims (1) and (2) turn out to be inconsistent. After all, given that the notion of finiteness can only be adequately characterized in pure secondorder logic, (...)
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  • Two arguments against realism.Timothy Bays - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):193–213.
    I present two generalizations of Putnam's model-theoretic argument against realism. The first replaces Putnam's model theory with some new, and substantially simpler, model theory, while the second replaces Putnam's model theory with some more accessible results from astronomy. By design, both of these new arguments fail. But the similarities between these new arguments and Putnam's original arguments illuminate the latter's overall structure, and the flaws in these new arguments highlight the corresponding flaws in Putnam's arguments.
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