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  1. Inductive Risk in Macroeconomics: Natural Rate Theory, Monetary Policy, and the Great Canadian Slump.Gabriele Contessa - 2021 - Economics and Philosophy 37 (3):353-375.
    This paper has two goals. The first is to fill a gap in the literature on inductive risk by exploring the relevance of the notion of inductive risk to macroeconomics and monetary policy. The second goal is to draw some general lessons about inductive risk from the case discussed. The most important of these lessons is that the notion of inductive risk is no less relevant to the relationship between the proximate and distal goals of policy than it is to (...)
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  • Diagnostic Frameworks and Nursing Diagnoses: A Normative Stance.Renzo Zanotti & Daniele Chiffi - 2015 - Nursing Philosophy 16 (1):64-73.
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  • A Normative Analysis of Nursing Knowledge.Renzo Zanotti & Daniele Chiffi - 2016 - Nursing Inquiry 1 (23):04-11.
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  • A Normative Analysis of Nursing Knowledge.Renzo Zanotti & Daniele Chiffi - 2016 - Nursing Inquiry 23 (1):4-11.
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  • Values and Data Collection in Social Research.Julie Zahle - 2018 - Philosophy of Science 85 (1):144-163.
    In this article, I offer a partial analysis of the role of values in qualitative data collection in social research. The partial analysis shows that nonepistemic values have both required and permissible roles to play during this phase of research. By appeal to the analysis, I reject the ideal of value-free science as applied to qualitative data collection, and I demonstrate why two alternative ideals should likewise be dismissed as standards for values in qualitative data collection. Also, I briefly discuss (...)
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  • Distributing Epistemic and Practical Risks: A Comparative Study of Communicating Earthquake Damages.Li-an Yu - 2022 - Synthese 360 (5):1-24.
    This paper argues that the value of openness to epistemic plurality and the value of social responsiveness are essential for epistemic agents such as scientists who are expected to carry out non-epistemic missions. My chief philosophical claim is that the two values should play a joint role in their communication about earthquake-related damages when their knowledge claims are advisory. That said, I try to defend a minimal normative account of science in the context of communication. I show that these epistemic (...)
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  • Humanizing Science and Philosophy of Science: George Sarton, Contextualist Philosophies of Science, and the Indigenous/Science Project.Alison Wylie - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (3):256-278.
    A century ago historian of science George Sarton argued that “science is our greatest treasure, but it needs to be humanized or it will do more harm than good”. The systematic cultivation of an “historical spirit,” a philosophical appreciation of the dynamic nature of scientific inquiry, and a recognition that science is irreducibly a “collective enterprise” was, on Sarton’s account, crucial to the humanizing mission he advocated. These elements of Sarton’s program are more relevant than ever as philosophers of science (...)
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  • Accountability and Values in Radically Collaborative Research.Eric Winsberg, Bryce Huebner & Rebecca Kukla - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 46:16-23.
    This paper discusses a crisis of accountability that arises when scientific collaborations are massively epistemically distributed. We argue that social models of epistemic collaboration, which are social analogs to what Patrick Suppes called a “model of the experiment,” must play a role in creating accountability in these contexts. We also argue that these social models must accommodate the fact that the various agents in a collaborative project often have ineliminable, messy, and conflicting interests and values; any story about accountability in (...)
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  • Epistemic Trust in Science.Torsten Wilholt - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (2):233-253.
    Epistemic trust is crucial for science. This article aims to identify the kinds of assumptions that are involved in epistemic trust as it is required for the successful operation of science as a collective epistemic enterprise. The relevant kind of reliance should involve working from the assumption that the epistemic endeavors of others are appropriately geared towards the truth, but the exact content of this assumption is more difficult to analyze than it might appear. The root of the problem is (...)
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  • Epistemic Interests and the Objectivity of Inquiry.Torsten Wilholt - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 91:86-93.
    This paper advocates for making epistemic interests a central object of philosophical analysis in epistemology and philosophy of science. It is argued that the importance of epistemic interests derives from their fundamental importance for the notion of objectivity. Epistemic interests are defined as individuated by a set of objectives, each of which represents a dimension of the search for truth. Among these dimensions, specificity, sensitivity, and productivity are discussed in detail. It is argued that the relevance of productivity is often (...)
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  • Can Scientists Be Objective?Malcolm Williams - 2006 - Social Epistemology 20 (2):163 – 180.
    Objectivity and value freedom have often been conflated in the philosophical and sociological literature. While value freedom construed as an absence of social and moral values in scientific work has been discredited, defenders of value freedom bracket off methodological values or practices from social and moral ones. In this paper I will first show how values exist along a continuum and argue that science is and should be value based. One of these values is necessarily objectivity for science to be (...)
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  • Bias and Values in Scientific Research.Torsten Wilholt - 2009 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (1):92-101.
    When interests and preferences of researchers or their sponsors cause bias in experimental design, data interpretation or dissemination of research results, we normally think of it as an epistemic shortcoming. But as a result of the debate on science and values, the idea that all extra-scientific influences on research could be singled out and separated from pure science is now widely believed to be an illusion. I argue that nonetheless, there are cases in which research is rightfully regarded as epistemologically (...)
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  • The Irrelevance of Origins: Dementia, Advance Directives, and the Capacity for Preferences.Jason Adam Wasserman & Mark Christopher Navin - 2020 - American Journal of Bioethics 20 (8):98-100.
    We agree with Emily Walsh (2020) that the current preferences of patients with dementia should sometimes supersede those patients’ advance directives. We also agree that consensus clinical ethics guidance does a poor job of explaining the moral value of such patients’ preferences. Furthermore, Walsh correctly notes that clinicians are often averse to treating patients with dementia over their objections, and that this aversion reflects clinical wisdom that can inform revisions to clinical ethics guidance. But Walsh’s account of the moral value (...)
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  • On Value-Laden Science.Zina B. Ward - 2021 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 85:54-62.
    Philosophical work on values in science is held back by widespread ambiguity about how values bear on sci entific choices. Here, I disambiguate several ways in which a choice can be value-laden and show that this disambiguation has the potential to solve and dissolve philosophical problems about values in science. First, I characterize four ways in which values relate to choices: values can motivate, justify, cause, or be impacted by the choices we make. Next, I put my proposed taxonomy to (...)
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  • No One Solution to the “New Demarcation Problem”?: A View From the Trenches.Wendy E. Wagner - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 92:177-185.
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  • Epistemic Priority or Aims of Research? A Critique of Lexical Priority of Truth in Regulatory Science.Joby Verghese - 2022 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 22 (64):21-37.
    A general criterion for distinguishing between epistemic and non-epistemic values is that the former promotes the attainment of truth whereas the latter does not. Daniel Steel is a proponent of this criterion, although it was initially proposed by McMullin. There are at least two consequences of this criterion; it always prioritizes epistemic values over non-epistemic values in scientific research, and it overlooks the diverse aims of science, especially the aims of regulatory or policy-oriented science. This criterion assumes the lexical priority (...)
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  • Philosophical Import of Non-Epistemic Values in Clinical Trials and Data Interpretation.Joby Varghese - 2019 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 41 (2):14.
    In this essay, I argue that at least in two phases of pharmaceutical research, especially while assessing the adequacy of the accumulated data and its interpretation, the influence of non-epistemic values is necessary. I examine a specific case from the domain of pharmaceutical research and demonstrate that there are multiple competing sets of values which may legitimately or illegitimately influence different phases of the inquiry. In such cases, the choice of the appropriate set of values—epistemic as well as non-epistemic—should be (...)
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  • Objectivity for the Research Worker.Noah van Dongen & Michał Sikorski - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (3):1-25.
    In the last decade, many problematic cases of scientific conduct have been diagnosed; some of which involve outright fraud others are more subtle. These and similar problems can be interpreted as caused by lack of scientific objectivity. The current philosophical theories of objectivity do not provide scientists with conceptualizations that can be effectively put into practice in remedying these issues. We propose a novel way of thinking about objectivity for individual scientists; a negative and dynamic approach.We provide a philosophical conceptualization (...)
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  • Coupled Ethical-Epistemic Analysis as a Tool for Environmental Science.Sean A. Valles, Michael O’Rourke & Zachary Piso - 2019 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 22 (3):267-286.
    This paper presents a new model for how to jointly analyze the ethical and evidentiary dimensions of environmental science cases, with an eye toward making science more participatory and publically...
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  • Treatment Effectiveness and the Russo–Williamson Thesis, EBM+, and Bradford Hill's Viewpoints.Steven Tresker - 2022 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 34 (3):131-158.
    Establishing the effectiveness of medical treatments is one of the most important aspects of medical practice. Bradford Hill's viewpoints play an important role in inferring causality in medicine,...
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  • Non-Cognitive Values and Methodological Learning in the Decision-Oriented Sciences.Oliver Todt & José Luis Luján - 2017 - Foundations of Science 22 (1):215-234.
    The function and legitimacy of values in decision making is a critically important issue in the contemporary analysis of science. It is particularly relevant for some of the more application-oriented areas of science, specifically decision-oriented science in the field of regulation of technological risks. Our main objective in this paper is to assess the diversity of roles that non-cognitive values related to decision making can adopt in the kinds of scientific activity that underlie risk regulation. We start out, first, by (...)
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  • Inductive Risk, Understanding, and Opaque Machine Learning Models.Emily Sullivan - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science:1-13.
    Under what conditions does machine learning (ML) model opacity inhibit the possibility of explaining and understanding phenomena? In this paper, I argue that non-epistemic values give shape to the ML opacity problem even if we keep researcher interests fixed. Treating ML models as an instance of doing model-based science to explain and understand phenomena reveals that there is (i) an external opacity problem, where the presence of inductive risk imposes higher standards on externally validating models, and (ii) an internal opacity (...)
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  • Understanding From Machine Learning Models.Emily Sullivan - 2022 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (1):109-133.
    Simple idealized models seem to provide more understanding than opaque, complex, and hyper-realistic models. However, an increasing number of scientists are going in the opposite direction by utilizing opaque machine learning models to make predictions and draw inferences, suggesting that scientists are opting for models that have less potential for understanding. Are scientists trading understanding for some other epistemic or pragmatic good when they choose a machine learning model? Or are the assumptions behind why minimal models provide understanding misguided? In (...)
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  • Modelling Beyond Application: Epistemic and Non-Epistemic Values in Modern Science.Ekaterina Svetlova - 2014 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 28 (1):79-98.
    In recent years, philosophers of science have begun to realize that the clear separation of the creation of models in academia and the application of models outside science is not possible. When these philosophers address hybrid contexts in which science is entwined with policy, business, and other realms of society, these often practically oriented realms no longer represent ‘the surroundings’ of science but rather are considered an essential part of it. I argue—and demonstrate empirically—that the judgement of a theory or (...)
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  • Scientists’ Attitudes on Science and Values: Case Studies and Survey Methods in Philosophy of Science.Daniel Steel, Chad Gonnerman & Michael O'Rourke - 2017 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 63:22-30.
    This article examines the relevance of survey data of scientists’ attitudes about science and values to case studies in philosophy of science. We describe two methodological challenges confronting such case studies: 1) small samples, and 2) potential for bias in selection, emphasis, and interpretation. Examples are given to illustrate that these challenges can arise for case studies in the science and values literature. We propose that these challenges can be mitigated through an approach in which case studies and survey methods (...)
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  • Hollow Hunt for Harms.Jacob Stegenga - 2016 - Perspectives on Science 24 (5):481-504.
    Harms of medical interventions are systematically underestimated in clinical research. Numerous factors—conceptual, methodological, and social—contribute to this underestimation. I articulate the depth of such underestimation by describing these factors at the various stages of clinical research. Before any evidence is gathered, the ways harms are operationalized in clinical research contributes to their underestimation. Medical interventions are first tested in phase 1 ‘first in human’ trials, but evidence from these trials is rarely published, despite the fact that such trials provide the (...)
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  • Gender and Scientists’ Views About the Value-Free Ideal.Daniel Steel, Chad Gonnerman, Aaron M. McCright & Itai Bavli - 2018 - Perspectives on Science 26 (6):619-657.
    A small but growing body of philosophically informed survey work calls into question whether the value-free ideal is a dominant viewpoint among scientists. However, the survey instruments in used in these studies have important limitations. Previous work has also made little headway in developing hypotheses that might predict or explain differing views about the value-free ideal among scientists. In this article, we review previous survey work on this topic, describe an improved survey instrument, report results from an initial administration of (...)
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  • Climate Change and Second-Order Uncertainty: Defending a Generalized, Normative, and Structural Argument From Inductive Risk.Daniel Steel - 2016 - Perspectives on Science 24 (6):696-721.
    This article critically examines a recent philosophical debate on the role of values in climate change forecasts, such as those found in assessment reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. On one side, several philosophers insist that the argument from inductive risk, as developed by Rudner and Douglas among others, applies to this case. AIR aims to show that ethical value judgments should influence decisions about what is sufficient evidence for accepting scientific hypotheses that have implications for policy issues. (...)
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  • Acceptance, Values, and Probability.Daniel Steel - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 53:81-88.
  • Acceptance, Values, and Inductive Risk.Daniel Steel - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):818-828.
    The argument from inductive risk attempts to show that practical and ethical costs of errors should influence standards of evidence for accepting scientific claims. A common objection charges that this argument presupposes a behavioral theory of acceptance that is inappropriate for science. I respond by showing that the argument from inductive risk is supported by a nonbehavioral theory of acceptance developed by Cohen, which defines acceptance in terms of premising. Moreover, I argue that theories designed to explain how acceptance can (...)
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  • The Objectivity of Subjective Bayesianism.Jan Sprenger - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (3):539-558.
    Subjective Bayesianism is a major school of uncertain reasoning and statistical inference. It is often criticized for a lack of objectivity: it opens the door to the influence of values and biases, evidence judgments can vary substantially between scientists, it is not suited for informing policy decisions. My paper rebuts these concerns by connecting the debates on scientific objectivity and statistical method. First, I show that the above concerns arise equally for standard frequentist inference with null hypothesis significance tests. Second, (...)
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  • Do Political Attitudes Matter for Epistemic Decisions of Scientists?Vlasta Sikimić, Tijana Nikitović, Miljan Vasić & Vanja Subotić - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (4):775-801.
    The epistemic attitudes of scientists, such as epistemic tolerance and authoritarianism, play important roles in the discourse about rivaling theories. Epistemic tolerance stands for the mental attitude of an epistemic agent, e.g., a scientist, who is open to opposing views, while epistemic authoritarianism represents the tendency to uncritically accept views of authorities. Another relevant epistemic factor when it comes to the epistemic decisions of scientists is the skepticism towards the scientific method. However, the question is whether these epistemic attitudes are (...)
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  • Feyerabend’s Well-Ordered Science: How an Anarchist Distributes Funds.Jamie Shaw - 2018 - Synthese 198 (1):419-449.
    To anyone vaguely aware of Feyerabend, the title of this paper would appear as an oxymoron. For Feyerabend, it is often thought, science is an anarchic practice with no discernible structure. Against this trend, I elaborate the groundwork that Feyerabend has provided for the beginnings of an approach to organizing scientific research. Specifically, I argue that Feyerabend’s pluralism, once suitably modified, provides a plausible account of how to organize science. These modifications come from C.S. Peirce’s account of the economics of (...)
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  • What is Inductive Risk?: Kevin C. Elliott and Ted Richards : Exploring Inductive Risk: Case Studies of Values in Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, 312pp, $39.95 PB. [REVIEW]S. Andrew Schroeder - 2018 - Metascience 28 (1):29-32.
  • Using Democratic Values in Science: An Objection and Response.Andrew Schroeder - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (5):1044-1054.
    Many philosophers of science have argued that social and ethical values have a significant role to play in core parts of the scientific process. This naturally suggests the following question: when such value choices need to be made, which or whose values should be used? A common answer to this question turns to democratic values—the values of the public or its representatives. I argue that this imposes a morally significant burden on certain scientists, effectively requiring them to advocate for policy (...)
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  • The Structure and Function of Experimental Control in the Life Sciences.Jutta Schickore - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (2):203-218.
    This article presents a new framework for the analysis of experimental control. The framework highlights different functions for experimental controls in the realization of an experiment: experimental controls that serve as tests and experimental controls that serve as probes. The approach to experimental control proposed here can illuminate the constitutive role of controls in knowledge production, and it sheds new light on the notion of exploratory experimentation. It also clarifies what can and what cannot be expected from reviewers of scientific (...)
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  • Quatro Teses de Subdeterminação de Teorias Pelas Observações: Significados, Plausibilidades E Implicações.Guilherme Gräf Schüler & Rogério P. Severo - 2020 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 24 (2).
    Este artigo mostra que não há uma tese de subdeterminação de teorias científicas pelos indícios observacionais, mas várias. Identificamos quatro, com significados, plausibilidades e implicações distintos. Mostra-se que as mais fortes não passam de conjeturas, e que as mais fracas são mais plausíveis, mas não possuem implicações filosóficas robustas – em particular, não implicam o antirrealismo científico –, embora forneçam indícios de alternativas teóricas sistematicamente ignoradas na ciência, bem como do emprego de critérios em parte valorativos de escolha de teorias.
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  • Mess in Science and Wicked Problems.Jutta Schickore - 2020 - Perspectives on Science 28 (4):482-504.
    . This paper discusses the claim that science is “messy.” Part I argues first, that a good portion of today’s discussions about messy science is just a portrayal of familiar features of science in new terms. In the paper, I refer to this as “messy science talk.” Second, Part I draws out rhetorical functions of messy science talk, namely the denigration of science in the popular media and the celebration of the maverick. Part II identifies one way in which it (...)
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  • A Practical Philosophy of Complex Climate Modelling.Gavin A. Schmidt & Steven Sherwood - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (2):149-169.
    We give an overview of the practice of developing and using complex climate models, as seen from experiences in a major climate modelling center and through participation in the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project. We discuss the construction and calibration of models; their evaluation, especially through use of out-of-sample tests; and their exploitation in multi-model ensembles to identify biases and make predictions. We stress that adequacy or utility of climate models is best assessed via their skill against more naïve predictions. The (...)
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  • Author Meets Critics.Eric Schliesser - 2018 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 16 (3):272-282.
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  • Waiting for the Anthropocene.Carlos Santana - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (4):1073-1096.
    The idea that we are living in the Anthropocene, a new geological epoch defined by human activity, has gained substantial currency across the academy and with the broader public. Within the earth sciences, however, the question of the Anthropocene is hotly debated, recognized as a question that gets at both the foundations of geological science and issues of broad philosophical importance. For example, official recognition of the Anthropocene requires us to find a way to use the methods of historical science (...)
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  • Dos Defensas del Impurismo Epistémico.José Leonardo Annunziato Ruivo - 2019 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 64 (3):e35108.
    Una de las bases de la tradición epistémica es la idea de que intereses prácticos no se relacionan con las condiciones de verdad de las sentencias de atribución de conocimiento. Nombraremos a esta idea de purismo; e impurismoa la tesis de que factores prácticos son constitutivos de las condiciones de verdad de las sentencias de atribución de conocimiento. En la primer parte discutiremos la propuesta impurista de Heather Douglas, que utiliza la noción de “riesgo inductivo”. Para eso, aclararemos lo que (...)
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  • Green Design Tools: Building Values and Politics Into Material Choices.Christine Meisner Rosen, Alastair Iles & Akos Kokai - 2021 - Science, Technology, and Human Values 46 (6):1139-1171.
    Green design tools are emerging as a new response to the dilemmas that architects and designers face in preventing the toxic impacts of building construction. Environmental health advocates, scientists, and consulting firms are stepping in to provide designers with new tools—including science-based assessment methods, standards, databases, and software—intended to help structure and inform decision-making in sustainable design. We argue that green design tools play an important but largely uninvestigated role in giving designers new forms of influence while mediating how designers’ (...)
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  • Values in Science: The Case of Scientific Collaboration.Kristina Rolin - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (2):157-177.
    Much of the literature on values in science is limited in its perspective because it focuses on the role of values in individual scientists’ decision making, thereby ignoring the context of scientific collaboration. I examine the epistemic structure of scientific collaboration and argue that it gives rise to two arguments showing that moral and social values can legitimately play a role in scientists’ decision to accept something as scientific knowledge. In the case of scientific collaboration some moral and social values (...)
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  • Desarrollos y límites de la innovación responsable.Hannot Rodríguez - 2022 - Recerca.Revista de Pensament I Anàlisi 27 (2).
    La búsqueda institucional de una innovación responsable se ha centrado en gran parte en el control de los impactos negativos del progreso científico-tecnológico. Así, las propias dinámicas de la ciencia y la tecnología han tendido a abordarse como un fenómeno autónomo, impermeable al escrutinio crítico. Sin embargo, iniciativas más recientes de las políticas científicas de la UE, tales como Responsible Research and Innovation u Open Science, dicen abogar por que los propios procesos de ciencia e innovación sean objeto de debate (...)
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  • Why Causal Evidencing of Risk Fails. An Example From Oil Contamination.Elena Rocca & Rani Lill Anjum - 2019 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 22 (2):197-213.
    ABSTRACTMeasurements of environmental toxicity from long-term exposure to oil contamination have delivered inaccurate and contradictory results regarding the potential harms for humans and ecosyste...
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  • When Do Non-Epistemic Values Play an Epistemically Illegitimate Role in Science? How to Solve One Half of the New Demarcation Problem.Alexander Reutlinger - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 92:152-161.
    Solving the “new demarcation problem” requires a distinction between epistemically legitimate and illegitimate roles for non-epistemic values in science. This paper addresses one ‘half’ (i.e. a sub-problem) of the new demarcation problem articulated by the Gretchenfrage: What makes the role of a non-epistemic value in science epistemically illegitimate? I will argue for the Explaining Epistemic Errors (EEE) account, according to which the epistemically illegitimate role of a non-epistemic value is defined via an explanatory claim: the fact that an epistemic agent (...)
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  • What is epistemically wrong with research affected by sponsorship bias? The evidential account.Alexander Reutlinger - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (2):1-26.
    Biased research occurs frequently in the sciences. In this paper, I will focus on one particular kind of biased research: research that is subject to sponsorship bias. I will address the following epistemological question: what precisely is epistemically wrong with biased research of this kind? I will defend the evidential account of epistemic wrongness: that is, research affected by sponsorship bias is epistemically wrong if and only if the researchers in question make false claims about the evidential support of some (...)
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  • Fact-Value Entanglement in Positive Economics.Julian Reiss - 2017 - Journal of Economic Methodology 24 (2):134-149.
    This paper presents arguments that challenge what I call the fact/value separability thesis: the idea, roughly, that factual judgements can be made independently of judgements of value. I will look at arguments to the effect that facts and values are entangled in the following areas of the scientific process in economics: theory development, economic concept formation, economic modelling, hypothesis testing, and hypothesis acceptance.
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  • Habermas, Argumentation Theory, and Science Studies: Toward Interdisciplinary Cooperation.William Rehg - 2003 - Informal Logic 23 (2):161-182.
    This article examines two approaches to the analysis and critical assessment of scientific argumentation. The first approach employs the discourse theory that Jurgen Habermas has developed on the basis of his theory of communicative action and applied to the areas of politics and law. Using his analysis of law and democracy in his Between Facts and Norms as a kind of template, I sketch the main steps in a Habermasian discourse theory of science. Difficulties in his approach motivate my proposal (...)
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