In this article, I assess (1) whether some cyborgs and AI robots can theoretically be considered persons; and (2) how we will know if/when they have attained personhood. Since our discourses of personhood are inherently pluralistic and our concepts of both humanness and personhood are inherently nebulous, both some cyborgs, and some AI robots, I conclude, could theoretically be considered persons depending on what, exactly, one means by “person.” The practical problem of how we distinguish them from nonpersonal AI entities (...) is, however, both more important, and much more difficult to solve. In conversation with various secular and theological accounts of relational personhood, I argue that only by treating AI entities as persons by default might we avoid the potentially catastrophic consequences of mistakenly denying personhood to an entire group of eligible entities. (shrink)

Engagement with artificial intelligence (AI) can be highly beneficial for theology. This article maps the landscape of the various ways such engagement can occur. It begins by outlining the opportunities and limitations of computational theology before diving into speculative territory by imagining how robot theologians might think of divine revelation. The topic of AI and imago Dei is then reviewed, illustrating several ways AI can inform theological anthropology. The article concludes with a more speculative take on the possible implications of (...) AI for divine infinity, incarnation, theodicy, and demonic intelligence. (shrink)