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  1. A Simple Sequent System for Minimally Inconsisteny LP.Rea Golan - forthcoming - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-16.
    Minimally inconsistent LP (MiLP) is a nonmonotonic paraconsistent logic based on Graham Priest's logic of paradox (LP). Unlike LP, MiLP purports to recover, in consistent situations, all of classical reasoning. The present paper conducts a proof-theoretic analysis of MiLP. I highlight certain properties of this logic, introduce a simple sequent system for it, and establish soundness and completeness results. In addition, I show how to use my proof system in response to a criticism of this logic put forward by JC (...)
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  • Limits of Abductivism About Logic.Ulf Hlobil - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):320-340.
    I argue against abductivism about logic, which is the view that rational theory choice in logic happens by abduction. Abduction cannot serve as a neutral arbiter in many foundational disputes in logic because, in order to use abduction, one must first identify the relevant data. Which data one deems relevant depends on what I call one's conception of logic. One's conception of logic is, however, not independent of one's views regarding many of the foundational disputes that one may hope to (...)
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  • A Multi-Succedent Sequent Calculus for Logical Expressivists.Daniel Kaplan - 2018 - In Pavel Arazim & Tomáš Lávička (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2017. College Publications. pp. 139-153.
    Expressivism in logic is the view that logical vocabulary plays a primarily expressive role: that is, that logical vocabulary makes perspicuous in the object language structural features of inference and incompatibility (Brandom, 1994, 2008). I present a precise, technical criterion of expressivity for a logic (§2). I next present a logic that meets that criterion (§3). I further explore some interesting features of that logic: first, a representation theorem for capturing other logics (§3.1), and next some novel logical vocabulary for (...)
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  • Logical Form and the Limits of Thought.Manish Oza - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Toronto
    What is the relation of logic to thinking? My dissertation offers a new argument for the claim that logic is constitutive of thinking in the following sense: representational activity counts as thinking only if it manifests sensitivity to logical rules. In short, thinking has to be minimally logical. An account of thinking has to allow for our freedom to question or revise our commitments – even seemingly obvious conceptual connections – without loss of understanding. This freedom, I argue, requires that (...)
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  • Why Logical Pluralism?Colin R. Caret - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4947-4968.
    This paper scrutinizes the debate over logical pluralism. I hope to make this debate more tractable by addressing the question of motivating data: what would count as strong evidence in favor of logical pluralism? Any research program should be able to answer this question, but when faced with this task, many logical pluralists fall back on brute intuitions. This sets logical pluralism on a weak foundation and makes it seem as if nothing pressing is at stake in the debate. The (...)
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  • Proof-Theoretic Pluralism.Filippo Ferrari & Eugenio Orlandelli - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4879-4903.
    Starting from a proof-theoretic perspective, where meaning is determined by the inference rules governing logical operators, in this paper we primarily aim at developing a proof-theoretic alternative to the model-theoretic meaning-invariant logical pluralism discussed in Beall and Restall. We will also outline how this framework can be easily extended to include a form of meaning-variant logical pluralism. In this respect, the framework developed in this paper—which we label two-level proof-theoretic pluralism—is much broader in scope than the one discussed in Beall (...)
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  • Is There a Neutral Metalanguage?Rea Golan - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4831-4858.
    Logical pluralists are committed to the idea of a neutral metalanguage, which serves as a framework for debates in logic. Two versions of this neutrality can be found in the literature: an agreed upon collection of inferences, and a metalanguage that is neutral as such. I discuss both versions and show that they are not immune to Quinean criticism, which builds on the notion of meaning. In particular, I show that the first version of neutrality is sub-optimal, and hard to (...)
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  • Variations on Intra-Theoretical Logical Pluralism: Internal Versus External Consequence.Bogdan Dicher - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):667-686.
    Intra-theoretical logical pluralism is a form of meaning-invariant pluralism about logic, articulated recently by Hjortland :355–373, 2013). This version of pluralism relies on it being possible to define several distinct notions of provability relative to the same logical calculus. The present paper picks up and explores this theme: How can a single logical calculus express several different consequence relations? The main hypothesis articulated here is that the divide between the internal and external consequence relations in Gentzen systems generates a form (...)
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  • The Original Sin of Proof-Theoretic Semantics.Francesco Paoli & Bogdan Dicher - 2018 - Synthese 198 (1):615-640.
    Proof-theoretic semantics is an alternative to model-theoretic semantics. It aims at explaining the meaning of the logical constants in terms of the inference rules that govern their behaviour in proofs. We argue that this must be construed as the task of explaining these meanings relative to a logic, i.e., to a consequence relation. Alas, there is no agreed set of properties that a relation must have in order to qualify as a consequence relation. Moreover, the association of a consequence relation (...)
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  • Hopeful Monsters: A Note on Multiple Conclusions.Bogdan Dicher - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (1):77-98.
    Arguments, the story goes, have one or more premises and only one conclusion. A contentious generalisation allows arguments with several disjunctively connected conclusions. Contentious as this generalisation may be, I will argue nevertheless that it is justified. My main claim is that multiple conclusions are epiphenomena of the logical connectives: some connectives determine, in a certain sense, multiple-conclusion derivations. Therefore, such derivations are completely natural and can safely be used in proof-theoretic semantics.
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  • Correction to: Variations on intra-theoretical logical pluralism: internal versus external consequence.Bogdan Dicher - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):687-687.
    In the original publication of the article, in Definition 4, the sixth line which reads as.
    No categories
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  • Disagreement About Logic From a Pluralist Perspective.Erik Stei - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3329-3350.
    Logical pluralism is commonly described as the view that there is more than one correct logic. It has been claimed that, in order for that view to be interesting, there has to be at least a potential for rivalry between the correct logics. This paper offers a detailed assessment of this suggestion. I argue that an interesting version of logical pluralism is hard, if not impossible, to achieve. I first outline an intuitive understanding of the notions of rivalry and correctness. (...)
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  • Resolving Quine's Confict: A Neo-Quinean View of the Rational Revisability of Logic.Amanda Bryant - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Logic 14 (1).
    There is an apparent conflict in Quine’s work between, on the one hand, his clear commitment to the rational revisability of logic and, on the other, his principle of charitable translation and ‘change of logic, change of subject’ argument. I argue that the apparent conflict is mostly resolved under close exegesis, but that the translation argument normatively rules out collaborative revision and allows only revision by individuals. However, I articulate a Neo-Quinean view that preserves the rational acceptability of collaborative revision. (...)
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  • The Original Sin of Proof-Theoretic Semantics.Bogdan Dicher & Francesco Paoli - 2020 - Synthese:1-26.
    Proof-theoretic semantics is an alternative to model-theoretic semantics. It aims at explaining the meaning of the logical constants in terms of the inference rules that govern their behaviour in proofs. We argue that this must be construed as the task of explaining these meanings relative to a logic, i.e., to a consequence relation. Alas, there is no agreed set of properties that a relation must have in order to qualify as a consequence relation. Moreover, the association of a consequence relation (...)
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  • What is a Paraconsistent Logic?Damian Szmuc, Federico Pailos & Eduardo Barrio - 2018 - In Jacek Malinowski & Walter Carnielli (eds.), Contradictions, from Consistency to Inconsistency. Springer Verlag.
    Paraconsistent logics are logical systems that reject the classical principle, usually dubbed Explosion, that a contradiction implies everything. However, the received view about paraconsistency focuses only the inferential version of Explosion, which is concerned with formulae, thereby overlooking other possible accounts. In this paper, we propose to focus, additionally, on a meta-inferential version of Explosion, i.e. which is concerned with inferences or sequents. In doing so, we will offer a new characterization of paraconsistency by means of which a logic is (...)
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  • Weak Disharmony: Some Lessons for Proof-Theoretic Semantics.Bogdan Dicher - 2016 - Review of Symbolic Logic (3):1-20.
    A logical constant is weakly disharmonious if its elimination rules are weaker than its introduction rules. Substructural weak disharmony is the weak disharmony generated by structural restrictions on the eliminations. I argue that substructural weak disharmony is not a defect of the constants which exhibit it. To the extent that it is problematic, it calls into question the structural properties of the derivability relation. This prompts us to rethink the issue of controlling the structural properties of a logic by means (...)
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