This article tries to bring to light the mistaken idea that the words the law borrows from plain language, without explicit definition, should keep their original meaning; Although legal language and plain language are obviously close “friends”, they seem to be also “false friends”, because these words belonging to two different languages have, beyond their formal similarities, partially different meanings. For this purpose, this article provides a critical analysis of the reference of the belgian case law to the ordinary meaning (...) of words. This reference is analysed in relation to three different matters: interpretation, legality, and autonomy of criminal law. (shrink)

Con la intención de aclarar el significado de la legalidad y de sus principios, el artículo desarrolla aquellos aspectos de la concepción del derecho de Lon Fuller que demuestran que legalidad y exterminio son incompatibles. Después, cuestiona los planteamientos defendidos por los iuspositivistas en el debate sobre el derecho nazi, porque se basan en una incorrecta identificación entre derecho y orden social, lo que lleva a los iuspositivistas a valorar el derecho exclusivamente en función de su utilidad para el gobernante (...) y no en función de lo que supone para los gobernados. (shrink)

This paper discusses the place of philosophical naturalism in the philosophy of law, with special reference to Scandinavian Realism. Hägerström originated a non-cognitivist analysis of certain fundamental legal concepts, but he also proposed an error theory. The two approaches are incompatible, but were not always clearly distinguished. Among his followers, Olivecrona and Ross gradually abandoned the latter, at least from the late 1940s. Many accounts of their views are unclear, because the presence of these two kinds of analysis, their incompatibility, (...) and the gradual abandonment of one, has often been overlooked. A corollary of the discussion is that there are some important corrigenda in the entry “Naturalism in legal philosophy” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (shrink)

The author discusses a number of issues in the theory of legal sources. The first topic is whether sources should be conceived of as acts or texts. The alternatives are connected with two competing theories of legal interpretation (viz., the cognitive theory and the sceptical theory), which entail different concepts of legal rules and law‐making. The second topic is whether a “formal” or a “material” criterion of recognition of sources should be preferred. The third section is devoted to the analysis (...) of rules of change. Four theories of rules of change are discussed, and five kinds of such rules are distinguished. The fourth section concerns judicial law‐making, with special reference to the creation of new legal rules by constitutional courts. (shrink)