The purpose of socially responsible investing (SRI) is to: (1) allow investors to reflect their personal values and ethics in their choices, and (2) encourage companies to improve their ethical, social, and environmental performance. In order to achieve these ends, the means SRI fund managers employ include the use of negative screening, or the exclusion of companies involved in "sinful" industries. We argue that there are problems with this methodology, both at a theoretical and at a practical level. As a (...) consequence, current SRI offerings cannot accurately reflect the values and ethical beliefs they propose to represent. Moreover, the use of a priori criteria is potentially misleading, as we show by discussing examples of glue and wine making. Applying this flawed approach SRI funds fail to influence the direction of the firms they deem most in need of redirecting. Rather than engaging in the simple a priori assumption that some industries are "saints" while others are "sinners" (Freeman, 2007) we suggest a new framework upon which the SRI screening methodology could be grounded. Embracing the philosophical tradition of American pragmatism, we suggest that SRI methodology could be improved by engaging in an analysis based on (1) the actual impacts of the company's products and services, (2) the company's relationships with its specific, real stakeholders, and (3) the contingent environment (social, economic, political, legal, and cultural) in which the business operates. (shrink)

A satisfactory sociology of markets requires that both order and disorder in markets be addressed, yet sociologists have seemed more concerned with theorizing market stability and order. Change, however, is too fundamental a part of markets to receive so little sociological attention. One perspective that provides a fertile ground for moving ahead with developing an agenda for studying both stability and change in markets is American pragmatist social theory. This article therefore examines the influence of a pragmatist viewpoint on two (...) broad modern theoretical approaches that have implications for the sociology of markets, one focused on stabilization processes, the other on institutional designs for promoting change. Most particularly, it draws on work carried out from a pragmatist viewpoint and illustrates a pragmatic approach to change in markets using the case of the EU’s Forest, Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) action plan and initiative. (shrink)

It is argued here that understanding John Dewey's thought as that of a prodigal liberal or a fellow traveller does not capture the complexity of his work. It is also important to recognise the portion of his work that is historie morale. In the very best sense it is epic, encapsulating the hopes and dreams of a history of the American people in the early 1900s. It is a work that simultaneously pursues modernity and the past — for the sake (...) of coping with the present. It also calls attention to an unnoticed element in his work 'inexperience'. (shrink)

In this article I argue that the contested concept of Bildung, with its roots in the late 18th century, remains of interest in the postmodern era, even if there is also certainly a debate about it having had its day. In the specific discussion about Bildung and democracy, I suggest that Dewey's reconstructed concept of experience has several points in common with a more recent understanding of Bildung, at the same time as it can provide insight into how democracy can (...) be understood within the field of Bildung. In brief, in this article I suggest that if we wish to discuss democracy and Bildung, Dewey's notion of experience might offer a bridge between the two concepts, as well as an understanding of subjectivity, learning, and communication as a whole. Finally, I argue that communication is a necessary part of both democracy and Bildung—not because of certain human similarities, but because of the similarities in some of the problems which we humans encounter, and which we think are worth reflecting upon. (shrink)

Evaluation studies of the Bayh-Dole Act are generally concerned with the pace of innovation or the transgressions to the independence of research. While these concerns are important, I propose here to expand the range of public values considered in assessing Bayh-Dole and formulating future reforms. To this end, I first examine the changes in the terms of the Bayh-Dole debate and the drift in its design. Neoliberal ideas have had a definitive influence on U.S. innovation policy for the last thirty (...) years, including legislation to strengthen patent protection. Moreover, the neoliberal policy agenda is articulated and justified in the interest of competitiveness. Rhetorically, this agenda equates competitiveness with economic growth and this with the public interest. Against that backdrop, I use Public Value Failure criteria to show that values such as political equality, transparency, and fairness in the distribution of the benefits of innovation, are worth considering to counter the policy drift of Bayh-Dole. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is threefold: (i) to trace the idea of deliberation back in the history of philosophy and establish the link to the Kantian concept of public reason; (ii) to pave the way for rhetoric as a constituent part of public deliberation; (iii) to undertake an applied ethical approach to worldwide deliberation online. The two former aims are treated in part one of the paper, whereas the applied analysis is undertaken in part two. One important task is (...) to demonstrate in what ways the internet as a new and powerful venue for deliberation both challenges the old theories of public deliberation, and also points in the direction of certain revisions of our basic ideas about deliberation. (shrink)

This paper deals with forms of communication aiming at a better informed public or publics. The main idea is that democratic societies are dependent on toleration of a plurality of publics, and simultaneously there is a need for communication between the different publics. The ethos underlying this assumption is that democracy requires a transcendence of subjective conditions in order for the public(s) to gain legitimacy and recognition of opinions. Validity of opinions presupposes a public aspect that is available through communication. (...) More specifically, the validity in question is obtained through its claim on universality – i.e. the transcendence of purely private subjective conditions. This kind of validity is found in reflective judgment or enlarged thinking, as displayed in Kant’s third critique. In the last part of the paper it is discussed how new information technologies and the internet may contribute positively to facilitate modes of communication that are associated with the particularity at work in reflective thinking. Storytelling technologies and virtual realities are of particular interest in envisaging how this might work. (shrink)

The Rhetorical Presidency places great importance on the transformative power of political ideas. For Tulis, Progressive ideas informed the rhetorical practices of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson—practices that reconstituted the American presidency. They did so, in part, by trading on the ambiguous nature of the concept of “publicity”—which at once evoked liberal ideals of public deliberation and transparency, and modern practices of manipulative communication. In turn, the new practices of publicity revolutionized not only the American presidency, but American politics as (...) a whole. (shrink)

In this global village, it is relevant to look at two educational visionaries from two continents, John Dewey and Rabindranath Tagore. Dewey observed that the modern individual was depersonalized by the industrial and commercial culture. He, thus, envisioned a new individual who would find fulfillment in maximum individuality within maximum community, which was embodied in his democratic concept and educational philosophy. Tagore's educational vision was based on India's traditional philosophy of harmony and fullness. It focused on self-realization within the context (...) of international education. This article compares the educational visions of Dewey and Tagore and demonstrates that Tagore's international educational perspective adds to Dewey's concepts of social individual and democracy and that their perspectives have implications for contemporary education. (shrink)

Much of what makes Hayek so controversial can be found in The Road to Serfdom, the theoretical basis of which is provided by The Counter-Revolution of Science. The first book, a polemic against the “planning mentality,” did not defend complete laissez faire, but argued that planning disrupts the coordination between prices and supply and demand; that effective planning is thus impossible in a modern industrial society; that it is coercive; and, of course, that it leads to totalitarianism. In The Counter-Revolution (...) of Science, Hayek argued that the “planning mentality” is the result of the hubristic attempt to reconstruct society along scientific lines. But the likes of Edward Bellamy envisioned a planned but free society, while John Dewey contrasted planning, where people collectively choose their goals, against a planned economy that is coercively imposed. Hayek's welcome strictures against a scientistic society and an overly ambitious social science aside, his binary approach to intellectual history distorted through oversimplification. (shrink)

In this paper I defend a pure proceduralist conception of legitimacy that applies to epistemic democracy. This conception, which I call pure epistemic proceduralism, does not depend on procedure-independent standards for good outcomes and relies on a proceduralist epistemology. It identifies a democratic decision as legitimate if it is the outcome of a process that satisfies certain conditions of political and epistemic fairness. My argument starts with a rejection of instrumentalism–the view that political equality is only instrumentally valuable. I reject (...) instrumentalism on two grounds: (i) because it fails to respect reasonable value pluralism and to recognize the constitutive role of democratic procedures for legitimacy in pluralist societies, and (ii) because it neglects the constructive function of democratic decision-making. I then consider two alternatives to pure epistemic proceduralism: David Estlund's version of epistemic proceduralism and a Deweyan account of epistemic democracy. I argue that only pure epistemic proceduralism can make good on both shortcomings of instrumentalism, whereas each of the other two approaches only makes good on one and neglects the other. (shrink)

Inspired by the thinking of authors such as Andrew Feenberg, Tim Ingold and Richard Sennett, this article sets forth substantial criticism of the ‘social uprooting of technology’ paradigm, which deterministically considers modern technology an autonomous entity, independent and indifferent to the social world (practices, skills, experiences, cultures, etc.). In particular, the authors’ focus on demonstrating that the philosophy,methodology and experience linked to open source technological development represent an emblematic case of re-encapsulation of the technical code within social relations (reskilling practices). (...) Open source is discussed as a practice, albeit not unique, of community empowerment aimed at the participated and shared rehabilitation of technological production ex-ante. Furthermore, the article discusses the application of open source processes in the agro-biotechnological field, showing how they may support a more democratic endogenous development, capable of binding technological innovation to the objectives of social (reducing inequalities) and environmental sustainability to a greater degree. (shrink)

Using the recommendations of the Commission on Freedom of the Press, we ask today's media consumers how they rate the performance of modern American journalism. We employ original survey data collected from journalism students at a major Midwest university, framing our findings in the context of the commission's 1947 recommendations. The result is presentation of contemporary opinions about the performance of American media in the context of journalism ideals articulated more than 60 years ago.

There is interest in more and better interaction between civil society and actors developing nanotechnologies, nano-materials and nano-enabled products: government agencies but also branch organizations in the chemical sector position civil society organizations (CSOs) as ‘voices of civil society’, and invite CSOs to participate in multistakeholder events. In such events, CSOs are expected to articulate societal needs, issues and values so that these can be taken up by actors with institutional roles and mandates to develop and embed newly emerging nanosciences (...) and nanotechnologies (NEST). This article argues that such a division of moral labor between CSOs and nanotechnology actors is not productive to address NEST and its emerging societal issues. There is an assumption that societal issues are ‘out there’ and can be recognized by CSOs, while in fact, societal issues might co-evolve with new development trajectories and thus have to be discovered and articulated. More productive deliberation requires, ideally, overcoming the traditional division of moral labor between these two groups of actors: technology developers should also inquire into and articulate emerging societal issues, and CSOs should inquire into and reflect on actual development trajectories. In order to explore issues and repercussions that arise in such a repositioning, this article will discuss a bottom up experiment of such an interaction between a nanotechnology developer (DuPont) and a CSO (Environmental Defense Fund). Based on the empirical analysis of this bottom up experiment, tentative requirements will be developed for how joint inquiries between technology developers and CSOs can be realized on a larger scale in our society. (shrink)

Debates sometimes arise within democratic societies because of the fact that findings accepted in accordance with the standards of scientific research conflict with the beliefs of citizens. I use the example of the dispute about Darwinian evolutionary theory to explore what a commitment to democracy might require of us in circumstances of this kind. I argue that the existence of hybrid epistemologies – tendencies to acquiesce in scientific recommendations on some occasions and to defer to non-scientific authorities on others – (...) poses a serious problem for democratic decision-making. We need a shared conception of public reason, and it can only be secular. (shrink)

This introduction to the special issue on “Medicine, Health, and Publics” argues that a rhetorical understanding of publics offers conceptual, methodological, and practical benefits to health and medical humanities scholars.

Sport and game metaphors are ubiquitous in the culture and language of business. As evocative linguistic devices, such metaphors are morally neutral; however, if they are indicative of a deep structure of understanding that filters experience, then they have the potential to be ethically problematic. This article argues that there exists a danger for those who forget or confuse metaphor with definition: the metaphoric fallacy. Accordingly, business is like a game, but it is not the equivalent of a game. If (...) business is equated to a game, then the potentially negative implications for ethical content and the application of ethical theories are numerous. This article suggests a fresh approach to issues of contemporary business ethics discourse, by attending to the business-as-game metaphor. (shrink)

ABSTRACTJack Knight and James Johnson argue in The Priority of Democracy that democracy should be theorized and justified pragmatically: Democratic deliberations should be given a central coordinating role in society not because they realize any particular abstract ideal, but because they would elicit the information needed to solve real-world problems. However, Knight and Johnson rely on a naïve economic understanding of knowledge that assumes implausibly that individuals know what they need to know and need only aggregate thier separate beliefs. It (...) is precisely because we may not know what we need to know that we need to continually test our ideas. Contra Knight and Johnson, moreover, we ought to accept that our ability to interpret social experiments properly is questionable. A pragmatic approach to social inquiry, therefore, ought to investigate what beliefs political actors actually bring to collective decisions rather than how theoretically perfect beliefs ought to be elicited and aggregated. (shrink)

Contemporary moral psychology has been enormously enriched by recent theoretical developments and empirical findings in evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology and neuroscience, and social psychology and psychopathology. Yet despite the fact that some theorists have developed specifically “social heuristic” (Gigerenzer, 2008) and “social intuitionist” (Haidt, 2007) theories of moral judgment and behavior, and despite regular appeals to the findings of experimental social psychology, contemporary moral psychology has largely neglected the social dimensions of moral judgment and behavior. I provide a brief sketch (...) of these dimensions, and consider the implications for contemporary theory and research in moral psychology. (shrink)

This paper explores the issue of democracy and the role of the democratic classroom in the development of society in general, and the way in which educators understand and deal with diversity in particular. The first part of the paper explores different meanings of democracy and how they can be manifested in the classroom. We argue that the idea of a ‘democratic classroom’ is far too broad a category; democracy is defined in action and can have realist or pragmatic characteristics, (...) elitist or pluralist roots. The realist form of social education was championed by political scientist Charles Merriam, while a social educative process more dependent on pragmatic problem solving was pursued by educational philosopher John Dewey and those who followed in his theoretical wake. The history of democracy in the United States, and the battles of how to import different meanings of democracy into the classroom over the course of the 20th century is explored, suggesting that the educational establishment has a tendency to adopt more realist/elitist forms of civic education. We present five ‘democratic’ classrooms with different characteristics to illustrate the different characteristics social education can exhibit. In the second part of the paper we discuss the relationship between different types of democratic classrooms and issues of race/ethnicity/culture. (shrink)

We highlight the important lessons our contributors present in our collective project of fostering dialogues both between applied ethics and computer science and between cultures. These include: critical reflexivity; procedural (partly Habermasian) approaches to establishing such central norms as “emancipation”; the importance of local actors in using ICTs both for global management and in development projects – especially as these contribute the trust essential for the social context of use of new technologies; and pluralistic approaches that preserve local cultural differences (...) alongside shared norms. May Thorseth then contextualizes our work vis-a-vis broader philosophical discussions of deliberation and democracy. (shrink)

Diggins brings Reinhold Niebuhr into the post-structuralist dialogue, and demonstates that his writings are the more constructive about the human predicament. "[I]n Niebuhr power and morality meet in one, with a suspicious glance at the disavowal of power and the pretensions of morality.".

ArgumentWhen the New Deal administration attained power in the United States, it was confronted with two different problems that could be linked to one another. On the one hand, there was a huge problem of unemployment, affecting everybody including the white-collar workers. And, on the other hand, the administration suffered from a very serious lack of data to illuminate its politics. One idea that came out of this situation was to use the abundant unemployed white-collar workers as enumerators of statistical (...) studies. This paper describes this experiment, shows how it paradoxically affected the professionalization of statistics, and explains why it did not affect expert democracy despite its Deweysian participationist aspect. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Social‐scientific data, such as those found in Philip E. Converse's 1964 essay, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” have led some to question whether basic assumptions about democratic legitimacy are unfounded. However, by another set of criteria, we have the “democracy” that was intended by the Framers—namely, a liberal representative system that avoids strong civic engagement by the citizenry. At its deepest level, the American system has been designed to ensure elite influence over the main ambitions of (...) American policy: the expansion of public and private power. When social scientists accumulate findings of civic disengagement and ignorance, it is wrongly supposed to be an indictment of the citizenry; rather, those findings should be understood as the expected result of a certain set of commitments throughout American political history, of which civic apathy and ignorance are the desired outcomes. (shrink)

… power is never uni dimensional; it is exercised not only as a mode of domination, but also as an act of resistance or even as an expression of a creative mode of cultural and social production outside the immediate force of domination.The point is important in that the behavior expressed by subordinate groups cannot be reduced to a study of domination or resistance.Clearly, in the behavior of subordinate groups there are moments of cultural and creative expression that are informed (...) by a different logic, whether it be existential, religious, or otherwise.Our faith is ultimately in individuals and their potentialities.In saying this, I do not mean what is sometimes called individualism as opposed to association.I mean rather an individuality that operates in and through voluntary associations.If our outward scene is one of externally imposed organization, behind and beneath there is working the force of liberated individualities, experimenting in their own ways to find and realize their own ends.The testimony of history is that in the end such a force, however scattered and inchoate, ultimately prevails over all set institutionalized forms, however firmly established the latter may be. (shrink)

This study identifies citizen journalists' role conceptions regarding their news contributing activities and their perceptions of professional journalists' roles. Specifically, the ethical criterion of media credibility was assessed to identify predictors on their perceptions of roles. Analyses reveal citizen journalists perceive their roles to be generally similar to professional journalists and even rated certain roles more prominently for themselves. Further, their perceptions of media credibility were found to function as a core belief in how they assessed their roles and also (...) those of professional journalists, which has implications for a system of open ethics. (shrink)

This study begins with the question of whether the press is conveying messages that help readers in their moral development. Using a Kohlbergian model, this study explores the question by analyzing the moral language in columns and letters to the editor from three Oregon newspapers. The study's content analysis reveals that most arguments presented in the opinion section of the three papers are done so at either Kohlberg's preconventional or conventional levels.

: Theoretically, feminists ought to be the best deliberative democrats. However, political commitments (which this author shares) to inclusiveness on issues of reproductive health and gay and lesbian rights, for example, create a boundary within feminism between those committed to the "feminist consensus" on these issues and women activists who share some feminist commitments, but not all. This article offers theoretically and empirically informed suggestions for how feminists can foster inclusive deliberation within feminist spaces.

Theoretically, feminists ought to be the best deliberative democrats. However, political commitments to inclusiveness on issues of reproductive health and gay and lesbian rights, for example, create a boundary within feminism between those committed to the “feminist consensus” on these issues and women activists who share some feminist commitments, but not all. This article offers theoretically and empirically informed suggestions for how feminists can foster inclusive deliberation within feminist spaces.