Todd (2016) proposes an analysis of future-directed sentences, in particular sentences of the form 'will(φ)', that is based on the classic Russellian analysis of definite descriptions. Todd's analysis is supposed to vindicate the claim that the future is metaphysically open while retaining a simple Ockhamist semantics of future contingents and the principles of classical logic, i.e. bivalence and the law of excluded middle. Consequently, an open futurist can straightforwardly retain classical logic without appeal to supervaluations, determinacy operators, or any further (...) controversial semantical or metaphysical complication. In this paper, we will show that this quasi-Russellian analysis of 'will' both lacks linguistic motivation and faces a variety of significant problems. In particular, we show that the standard arguments for Russell's treatment of definite descriptions fail to apply to statements of the form 'will(φ)'. (shrink)

Intuitively, the more powerful a theory is, the greater the variety and quantity of ideas can be expressed through its formal language. Therefore, when comparing two theories concerning the same subject, it seems only reasonable to compare the expressive powers of their formal languages. On condition that the quantum mechanical description is universal and so can be applied to macroscopic systems, quantum theory is required to be more powerful than classical mechanics. This implies that the formal language of Hilbert space (...) theory must be more expressive than that of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. However, as shown in the paper, such a requirement cannot be met. As a result, classical and quantum formalisms cannot be in a hierarchical relation, that is, include one another. This fact puts in doubt the quantum-classical correspondence and undermines the reductionist approach to the physical world. (shrink)